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Full Name of Author — Nom complet de l'auteur
EDWARD BUTLER HARRISON

Date of Birth — Date de naissance
10/03/45

Country of Birth — Lieu de naissance
CANADA.

Permanent Address — Résidence fixe
5018 WALSH
TERRACE, BC

Title of Thesis — Titre de la thèse
SOCIAL WORLDS: BRITISH COLUMBIA SOCIAL STUDIES UNIT "DEVELOPING TROPICAL WORLD" AS REFLECTED THROUGH THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE HERBERT MEAD AND ALFRED SCHUTZ.

University — Université
UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA.

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade
1984

Name of Supervisor — Nom du directeur de thèse

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EDWARD BUTLER HARRISON

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA
FALL, 1984

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

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NAME OF AUTHOR: Edward Butler Harrison

TITLE OF THESIS: Social Worlds: British Columbia Social Studies Curriculum Unit "Developing Tropical World" as Reflected Through the Writings of George Herbert Mead and Alfred Schutz

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED: Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE WAS GRANTED: 1984

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(Signed) Edward B. Harrison

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

5018 Walsh Avenue,
Terrace, British Columbia

DATED September 23 1984

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Social Worlds: British Columbia Social Studies Curriculum Unit "Developing Tropical World" as Reflected Through the Writings of George Herbert Mead and Alfred Schutz" submitted by Edward Butler Harrison in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

T. Aoki
Supervisor

D. Massey

M. M. Van de Pitte

K. G. Jacknicke

William H. Schubert
External Examiner

Date Oct 1, 1984

Dedication

To my mother who would have enjoyed
all of this work.

ABSTRACT

The intent of this study was threefold:

a) to understand critically the perspective of knowledge embedded within the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World";

b) to provide an evaluation of the way in which the selected resource material reflected the program developers' view of the reality of the "geographic foreigner" or developing tropical world; and

c) to extend the understanding of the intersubjective meanings which program developers use to describe the world for others.

Focusing upon an analysis of the taken-for-granted concept "developing", it is demonstrated in the analysis that a technical-scientific explanation predominates in the curriculum. It was argued that relying on one perspective limits the unit's possibilities for reflecting the history, culture and daily life of the people of the region.

Counter to technical-scientific thinking are the life world philosophies of Alfred Schutz and George Herbert Mead. Schutz, through his phenomenological and social analysis, focussed upon such taken-for-granted concepts as biography, consciousness, time, motives, and typicality. His work, it was argued, provides the curriculum worker with a basis for selecting materials which portray the life-world settings of the people of the developing tropical world.

Mead, as a pragmatist, was interested in the unfolding of the social horizon to embrace Others. His concepts of sociality, history, biography and the social act illuminate the possibilities for selecting

appropriate materials which reflect both the student's present situation and that of the people of the developing tropical world.

Each argues that the technical-scientific basis of knowledge presents a passive view of the world. Both Mead and Schutz reflect the importance of understanding the dialectical relationship between what is familiar and unfamiliar. They would perhaps suggest, it is argued, reconstructing the unit "Developing Tropical World" so that it takes account of social action or an active participating view of the world. Without considering such a basis of knowledge it is concluded that the developing tropical world is rendered distant and remote from the student's way of being in the world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Appreciation is extended to a number of individuals:

To Dr. T. Aoki who guided my graduate program, served as an advisor in the writing of the thesis and gave me his reactions to the various aspects of the work as they unfolded.

To Dr. Walter Werner who introduced me to Schutz, and engaged in much needed dialogue as the work neared completion.

To Dr. Bryan Connors for his supportive dialogue both over coffee and the telephone.

To my wife Carol, who supported me through it all. She gave up much.

To Dr. Bill Shubert who so kindly gave of his valuable time to act as external examiner.

To the many other graduate students and friends who provided the landscape for my thought. Without their continuing dialogue many ideas would never have gelled. I would especially like to thank Eric Burt, Basil Favaro, Doug Inglis, Peter Rothe and David Smith.

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CHAPTER I

Beginnings: Making the Familiar Problematic

Opening Comments

Ideas have their origin in silence; we listen for the resonant voice within us for answers to our questions but when we do not hear it we begin to wonder. I often wondered as a young teacher, "What does the social studies program mean to my students?" In asking myself this question I found I was consistently looking back to the program guide for the course of studies. The thought, "What did the program developers intend for us to do with this curriculum?" was foremost in my mind. Why do they ask us to do the program in this way? While these were seemingly simple questions, I felt, it was my own silence, my own inability to answer these questions that led me further into the study of school curriculum.

There are many ways in which the term "curriculum" is defined but these may be largely distilled to reflect:

1. goals or intents of the program;
2. means or activities and displays;
3. conditions or the climate in the classroom

through which a teacher may establish a relationship with the students. Each of these aspects of the program interrelates one or the other in various ways, but it is how the intent, activities and displays are viewed by the program developer that is critical, for he may open and close the possible avenues of exploration in the classroom (Aoki and Werner, 1979). In other words it may be crucial to understand not only what the program developer has explicitly stated but also what he has not said; each becomes important for our further understanding of the program.

Context for the Study

Every day teachers work in their classrooms and speak to their students; often the substantive content to which they address themselves is reflected in official curriculum guides.[1] The guides may prescribe or suggest a variety of approaches to the possibilities of classroom instruction: one, for instance, may have the intent of broadly directing classroom themes, while another may narrowly define the topics and still others may suggest that the program be constructed through a dialogue between the teacher and the student. These approaches to instruction illustrate that there are different views as to how the classroom interaction between teacher and student might take place; they reflect, in other words, three different conceptions of curriculum.

The term "conception" may be used interchangeably with perspective, orientation, vantage point or paradigm. It refers to the set of assumptions by which an actor makes sense of his world. We do not reflect our world through the way in which we view it, nor is it based upon intuitively given ideas but rather it is constructed by us in the course of our interaction with others (c.f. Schutz, 1973: 287-356). In terms of curriculum a particular perspective may embody what is known within it, the rules through which it is known and the issues which surround how it is known. We are referring to the particular way in which a program developer portrays his view of the world within the curriculum. It is his vision of the social world of man, his view as it is contained within the official guide for a particular course of instruction that will be the focus of our interest.

Two assumptions have been made with regards to the conception of curriculum in the foregoing. The first assumption is that there are conceptions of curriculum which premise that knowledge is socially constructed; that is, the meanings which we give to the language we use every day arise from our social interactions with other people (Schutz, 1973: 287-356; Gadamer, 1976; Berger and Luckman, 1967). The meaning which we impart to the language reflects our own way of being in the world; our own particular background from which we speak. Language, within this context, is not seen as being neutral but rather as reflecting the point of view of individuals or groups engaged in its use (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Neutrality itself may be viewed in terms of the particular group which seeks this particular vantage point; it is based upon the socially constructed assumption within the group or community who uphold the value (Schutz, 1973: 49; Leszek, 1968: 1-10; Blum, 1974: 245-269; McHugh, 1968). I may suggest that a curriculum developer inevitably will reflect his particular view of man in the world in the program which he constructs.

The image of man portrayed in a program may be disclosed through the language which has been used to convey the program to others. The following will serve as an example.

Young may be interpreted as saying that a program which imparts theory to students is in effect creating a passive view of life. In effect the possibilities for understanding their own particular life circumstances are denied. Young suggests this when he states:

> If knowledge is highly stratified there will be a clear distinction between what is taken to count as knowledge, and what is not, on the basis of which process of selection and exclusion for curricula will take place. It would follow that this type of curricular organization presupposes and serves to legitimate a hierarchy between teacher and taught, for if not, some access to control by the pupils would be implied, and thus the processes of exclusion and selection would become open for modification and change. (Young, 1971: 38)

Students are seen as being manipulated to remain within their own particular social class (Young, 1971: 19-46). In this sense Young seems to be saying that for an active view of man to be contained within a program, the language should portray the unity of theory and practice. This is to say that the separation of knowledge into forms, i.e., theoretical and practical, prevents an understanding by the student of the potential actions which may result in a transformation of his social situation (Bowles and Gintes, 1976: 32-43; 264; 288). This example shows that the image of man as either active or passive may be revealed through the language used in the program itself. That the language may be interpreted through a recognition of the possibility of a variety of vantage points becomes important for further revealing its socially constructed base (Apple, 1975, 1977; Kliebard, 1975: 70-83: Schutz, 1973: 119-122; Young, 1971: 14[illegible] Aoki, 1971).

The second assumption is that there are a number of perspectives or conceptions of knowledge, and hence of man, from which programs may be approached (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 49).[2] Each program developer comes to his task with a different biography, different educational background, social class, etc. Within the individual's approach to program development certain basic questions may be raised: What are we to accomplish? How do we intend to accomplish it? And with what resource material will we achieve it? (Aoki and Werner, 1979: 6) It is within these questions and the conscious or unconscious choices pertaining to them that a program developer will introduce his particular view of the world within a curriculum. If a developer, for instance, decides that his program should be viewed as neutral, then it is possible to understand this in terms of other views which might be taken, e.g., man as a social actor in his world. There is a tension created between what is and what ought to be (Apple, 1976; 1977). Habermas provides us with an example of how the various conceptions of knowledge may be used to create tension between different world views (Habermas, 1971: 301-377). His particular paradigms may be outlined as follows:

Scientific-Technical	- the scientific method used as a mode of inquiry - interest in prediction - approach is objective and hence detached - observation is a basic technique - object under study is isolated from its total context

Situational/Contextual	- understanding the meaning of lived experience - rules for understanding are determined within the context - multiple approaches are used to consider the same theme
Critically Reflective	- making conscious the unconscious underlying assumptions or interests which are interpreted in terms of ideology and political context - commitment and active involvement in the social environment

Each view has a particular vision of man contained within it. In the first instance man is viewed as a passive being, while in the latter two man is viewed as an active being. The tension between these views creates what Bernstein has called "news". This conflict has the potential to allow uncovering of new possibilities for probing further into our ways of knowing. Without such possibilities we would stagnate in terms of understanding (Bernstein, 1975). It is the uncovering of the new that is important for it has the potential to deflect our interest towards looking beyond what we take for granted in our everyday life or beyond those goals for human action which may be officially defined by various institutions (Berger, 1966: 41-42).

Officially defined goals are often a part of government curriculums along with the knowledge, methods, etc., which reflect them. It is possible to investigate these in terms of various paradigmatic views of knowledge (Garfinkle, 1980). Werner (1977), for example, used Habermas's framework of knowledge to display some of the assumptions which were embedded within the Alberta Social

Studies program. He may be interpreted as saying that the assumptions which underlie the program are not necessarily those which we all share. Uncovering the particular beliefs which lie behind it may be viewed as being sufficient since it provides the individual with the opportunity to understand the power relations which lie behind them (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

Each of these ways of approaching curriculum would focus in terms of understanding program guides, upon the language that is used to describe the curriculum for the teacher. Underlying each of these descriptions of paradigms with reference to curriculum is the attempt to clarify the following:

1. the intersubjective meanings which program developers used to describe the world for others; and
2. how these meanings may reflect the actual or lived experience of the student in the world.

A few curriculum writers have addressed themselves to these issues: Apple (1975; 1977) critical reflection; Aoki (1979; 1980) meaning and action; Young (1971) control and knowledge; Huebner (1966; 1967; 1979) work-school relationships; Werner (1977) understanding program perspective. While the interest of each varies, their concern is, in part, with the curriculum and the meaning it may convey in the classroom. Each, in his own way, points to the open horizon for understanding; each seeks to create further tension and, in turn, raises new questions.

Within this horizon we may delimit the routinized and predetermined nature of a curriculum guide. It represents the explications of the goals, means, and conditions for carrying out possible instruction within the classroom as they are viewed by the curriculum developer. Once these are published in a guide, they, in a sense, represent a static view of the developer's world. But at the same time they represent a fixed text through which we may begin to interpret the meanings which he intends to be carried out in the classroom. In this sense we may begin to address the issue of what is meant within the curriculum and propose what that may be. This dual concern speaks to the further understanding of our conceptions of curriculum in that, potentially, it will open new horizons for further investigation.

As a part of this study, a unit from the British Columbia Social Studies 8 Curriculum - the "Developing Tropical World" - has been selected to illustrate a way of understanding programs. I will breifly outline the history of this curriculum before progressing to the unit itself.

History of the British Columbia Social Studies Program - Secondary

The present (1984) British Columbia Social Studies Curriculum was developed between 1966 and 1968. A committee entitled the Secondary Social Studies Revision Committee was given the task by the Provincial Government of developing a curriculum guide which would be a part of the legislated program of study to be introduced into the British Columbia school system in 1968. This committee may be interpreted as having engaged in the activity of curriculum development; what remains of their deliberations is in a sense an artifact, the British Columbia Curriculum Guide - Social Studies - 1968. The fact that the program was constructed by a committee suggests each member brought to the discussion his view of social studies and a conception of man underlying this. Since only a single curriculum guide resulted from their deliberations, the guide itself would represent a shared or agreed upon view of man; it may be seen as a text or document through which we may interpret this view (Hoy, 1978: 1-9). That the perspective of man embedded in the program is made problematic arises from the committee's failure to include a statement with the guide which rendered the view explicit.

Grade 8 Social Studies Program
- The Developing Tropical World

The selection of the unit "developing Tropical World" provides a specific, concrete example through which the possible conceptions of knowledge underlying it may be considered. The geography of the "Developing Tropical World" was defined by the Social Studies Revision Committee as referring to the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Within this unit, the Committee expects students to understand something of the geography of the area (location, size, soil, etc.) and something of the social life of the people living in these areas (British Columbia Curriculum Guide Social Studies, 1968: 2).* The Committee, as I would interpret it, expects students to understand aspects of what it is like to be a human being living in "the developing tropical world". But the questions which we may address with regards to this understanding reflect the basis of this study.

---

* Hereafter referred to as B.C.S.S.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to understand fully and fundamentally the perspective underlying the British Columbia Social Studies 8 curriculum unit, "The Developing Tropical World". The study will address the possibility of understanding this unit in terms of the social theoretic perspective of curriculum development which underlies it.

Statement of Problem

1. How is the developing tropical world identified within the Grade 8 Social Studies Curriculum Guide?

A premise of this study is that an analysis of the program is needed in order to understand the perspective of knowledge related to the developing tropical world embedded within it. Implicit in this is the identification and evaluation of the way in which the program developer constructs a reality of the geographic foreigner or people living in the developing tropical world.

2. How is the developing tropical world identified within the prescribed resource material given in the B.C. textbook circular for secondary schools?

The perspective of knowledge related to the developing tropical world will be identified within the prescribed unit of the British Columbia Social Studies course. Implicit in this identification is an evaluation of the way in which the selected resource material used in the course reflects the program developer's view of the reality of the "geographic foreigner" or developing tropical world.

3. How can the program's perspective of the developing tropical world be further identified?

A premise of this study is that by "shining through" the phenomenological description of Alfred Schutz and the pragmatic analysis of George Herbert Mead and demonstrating how they may meet within their respective philosophies, we may further understand the intersubjective meanings which program developers use to describe the world for others.

Embedded within this larger problem is a sub-problem: How may the bridging of the two theoretical positions of the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz and the pragmatism of George Herbert Mead be carried out?

Approach to the Study

The British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit, "Developing Tropical World", the prescribed resource material for the unit, and the works of Alfred Schutz and George Herbert Mead form the basis for my understanding of the program; these materials are the texts which I will interpret. When I speak of interpretation I am describing the interaction of the interpreter with the text. This suggests that I am not acting as a neutral observer; rather, I enter into the text and in a sense perform the text, which is to say that I make it come alive for myself (Palmer, 1969: 251). But it is not enough merely to read the text to perform it; there must be some initial understanding of both the subject and the situation before an interpreter - text may enter into the horizon of its meaning (Taylor, 1971: 3-4). What is described here is the hermeneutic which is involved in the interpretation of the text. While it may seem contradictory to speak of understanding prior to understanding in a hermeneutical way, the intent is clear; before an interpreter may begin to interpret the text he must be able to create a question which allows him to enter fully into the interpretation. Something within the texts must be unclear (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979: 6-7). If we reflect upon the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit, "The Developing Tropical World", what is concealed is the perspective of knowledge which underlies it.

Something which is unclear is open to interpretation; it is not possible, however, to know it as if it were some concrete object. Rather, it is only open to further interpretation. This implies that the meaning of a text or texts standing in possible relation to one another may be illuminated only by differing perspectives; in this way interpretation may be viewed as a circle - a hermeneutic circle (Hoy, 1978: vii). A further point must be made; if something in a text is not clear, then in its illumination we are beginning to bring it from its unhiddenness so that it may be more fully known; there is, in other words, a dialectic present within the hermeneutic (Gadamer, 1975: 431). The following will serve as an example: if I am somewhat familiar with the term "curriculum" and pick up the British Columbia Social Studies

Curriculum guide I should have an idea of the intent of the book, but by no means could I claim to understand the meaning of the term in this context until I investigate further. "Curriculum" has some meaning for me but this meaning is largely placed against a landscape of the unknown; the dialectical sense of the hermeneutic is brought to the surface: it is the relationship between that which is known and that which is not. The dialectic becomes an important part of the hermeneutic interpretation since it further opens the horizon of possibilities; it is pre-categorical.

Entering into the interpretation suggests that the interpreter begins to understand differently; there is a transformation taking place. What initially we may expect to find may not appear; we understand not so much what we may know partially already but rather where it is that we have not understood as we should. The continual interpretation shows us where we have understood wrongly and invites us to return again to that which we already know in a different way (Palmer, 1969: 233).

Text interpretation involves the interpreter's own preconceptions and making use of these "so that the meaning of the text can be made to speak for us" (Gadamer, 1975: 356). Making use of one's own preconceptions does not suggest that a priori categories are determined before the text is approached in a rigorous way, but rather that the interpreter's way of understanding or approaching the text are made explicit. The range of assumptions that are introduced into the interpretation, in other words, must be clear at the outset. Such an explication permits the reader of the text to locate the groundstructure or basis upon which the interpretation was begun. The dialectical quality is retained since understanding in relation to the text must necessarily be perspectival and incomplete (Palmer, 1969: 165). Further it ensures that the interpreter maintains an open horizon towards the text as each new development unfolds: Gadamer states it this way: "it is the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to the language that speaks to us in tradition" (Gadamer, 1975: 239).

Tradition, as I interpret Gadamer, is critical to our present understanding through interpretation. It is not a static entity which is brought into the present; rather, tradition is a dynamic part of the present; indeed, it reflects a fusion of the past and present. The past, in other words, is always being interpreted in terms of the present: we place ourselves in the tradition and become one with it (Gadamer, 1975: 258). But while the text at one and the same time represents past and present, it is temporally distant from the present. Temporal distance, in terms of the present may be interpreted as hiding the essential meaning of the text, leaving it to be construed.

The interpreter is viewed as entering into a dialogue with the text, a dialogue in which the author is present only to the extent that his interpretation or communicative effort is but one of the data sources. This interpretation suggests that a dialogue with a particular text becomes, in a dialectical sense, a dialogue with other interpretations of the text, i.e., the tradition which surrounds the text itself. The dialogue seeks to understand the historical dimension of the text itself and the influence of past interpretation which are both embedded in the text or have been made in terms of the text (Gadamer, 1975: 360). Thus the present interpretation of a particular text includes an awareness of its own historicity. The reader of a text is not simply reading what is there but rather as Gadamer states:

> All reading involves application, so that a person reading a text is himself part of the meaning he apprehends. He belongs to the text that he is reading. (Gadamer, 1975: 105)

In this sense the material that I write now must be interpreted even to be understood.

Hoy suggests that this by itself is not enough, that it is possible for the interpretation to become relativistic (Hoy, 1978: 166). Anything I say, for example, about the British Columbia Social Studies 8 topic, "Developing Tropical World", may be incorporated as part of the text. An interpretation of a text must, therefore, be open to criticism if it is to be considered valid and legitimate. Criticism may be related to understanding through interpretation. Understanding in this sense is closely related to self-understanding about a situation. From self-understanding it follows within this position that there must be self-criticism (Ricouer, 1979: 91).

Self-criticism alone, however, is not enough. The interpretation must have a public reaction; this reaction contributes to the validity and legitimacy of the interpretation. It is within the self-criticism that we should recognize that it is not self-criticism in a dogmatic sense, but rather in a hermeneutic sense (Hoy, 1966: 167). It does not stand as my interpretation of the unit "The Developing Tropical World" alone but instead as an interpretation situated within a community of discourse; the purpose of the discourse is not to uncover weak points in text but rather to let the meaning of the words emerge (Barrett, 1979: 190). In a very real sense the emergence of the meaning is in terms of an open horizon (Gadamer, 1975: 432; Schutz, 1973: 60). This text must be read and interpreted within the context of discourse and curriculum in order that the full sense of the dialogue be retained.

The approach to the study seeks to reflect the hermeneutic tradition as it is reflected by Gadamer. The texts which will be reflected upon are the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit, "Developing Tropical World", the works of Alfred Schutz and George Herbert Mead. These materials provide the focus around which the central questions have been raised.

Summary

Although a few educational authors discuss various conceptions of curriculum, fewer address the question of the intersubjective meanings which they impart to their various programs. It is difficult to find writers who attempt to probe their own taken-for-granted assumptions with which they approach their particular tasks. The meanings which they give to a program characterize their way of viewing the world, and the way in which they view others acting within the program, and therefore their world. This study, in the chapters that follow, will explore possible alternates for further revealing the intersubjective meanings that underlie educational curricula.

Footnotes

1. All provinces have official curricular guides, that is, guides which are prescribed by the legislatures of that province.

2. A number of writers have proposed a variety of perspectival views of society: e.g., Schutz (1973); Weber (1947); Cooley (1929); Mead (1934); Berger and Luckmann (1967). A number of curriculum writers have been interested in perspectives:

    a) Freire (1973) - domestication - liberation

    b) Aoki (n.d.) - designative, appraisive, prescriptive

    c) Eisner and Vallance (1974) - curriculum as technology, cognitive process, self-actualization and consummatory experience.

CHAPTER II

Perspective of Knowledge Embedded in the British Columbia Social Studies Unit Developing Tropical World

PART I: Context: Habits of Thought

> To touch something is to situate oneself in relation to it ... We never look at just one thing; we are always looking at the relation between things and ourselves. Our vision is continually active, continually moving, continually holding things in a circle around itself, constituting what is present to us as we are. (Berger, 5, 1977: 9)

The social world is a world of social interaction. Within this social world individual members focus on a social situation in different ways and thereby read or describe what is the same situation differently (Filmer, Phillipson, Silverman and Walsh, 1972: 19). Hence, the social world is a world of multiple realities. Such a suggestion would mean that different epistemologies, beliefs, psychologies, politics, etc., result from these different visions of realities of social life (Habermas, 1971). The differing presuppositions underlying these different perspectives result in alternative approaches to the same natural world and social phenomenon.

The understanding which results from each of the paradigms differs extensively. Indeed, as Chuang-tze reminds us, it may be as different as "seeing life through experience" and seeing life as though one were "machine-minded" (Fromm and deMartino, 1960: 7). Varying paradigms allow the interpreter to begin to disclose the assumptions he takes as given beliefs which have guided the development of a particular curriculum. Bensman and Lilienfeld describe it this way:

> It is our major contention that major habits of mind, approaches to the world ... are extensions of habits of thought that emerge and are developed in the practice of an occupation, profession or craft. (Bensman and Lilienfeld, 1973: 1)

Clearly curriculum people are engaged in an occupation which entails application of their "habits of thought" to their work.

Relation to Social Studies Program

In this study our focus will be upon the unit, "Developing Tropical World". The British Columbia Grade 8 Social Studies program was revised in the late 1960's. In constructing this unit the Revision Committee made certain assumptions and decisions about the knowledge it should contain and how it should be organized. They decided, for example, that it should be mainly a geography unit. But in the course of their work the specific assumptions underlying the paradigm or paradigms of knowledge best suited to the unit were not explicitly stated. In this instance, they had "hidden" their habits of thought. Dawe suggests that there is nothing covert about the intentions of such developers but rather than addressing the fundamental issues of their curriculum task, they tend to start from a loosely defined consensus of "what is good education", progressing to the task of ordering goals, knowledge and resource materials for the unit. But as Gorbutt states, it is not enough simply to accept this, for contained within their assumption is a variety of possibilities for constructing curricula. He states:

> The apparent self-evident justification for dividing education into particular forms of knowledge is laid bare as an ideological statement. The process through which particular curricula are institutionalized and justified becomes open to sociological examination. Thus, for example, the social assumptions underlying compensatory education, meaningful curricula for non-academic school leavers and mathematics all can become the object of enquiry. We are forced into an often uncomfortable re-examination of the content and underlying assumptions of the curriculum at all levels. (Gorbutt, 1972: 7-8)

Since the Curriculum Revision Committee did not specifically state its position on "what is good for education" or choice of paradigm, it is a premise of this study that an analysis of the program is needed in order to disclose the perspective of knowledge related to the unit, "Developing Tropical World", as set out in the Curriculum Guide. Also, since the program prescribes resource materials, it follows that in order to develop fully an understanding of the Revision Committee's perspective of knowledge, an analysis of the resource material is also required.

Analysis: A Focus Upon Hidden Assumptions

Werner identified two general presuppositional categories which are parts of the perspective of knowledge implicit in any program:

a) of-course assumptions, and

b) presuppositional relevancy systems (which provide a fundamental orientation to perceiving and structuring the social world). (Werner, 1977: 52-53)

For each of these presuppositional categories Werner has identified he provides two reference points through which the assumptions underlying various aspects of the Unit may be identified. Each of these categories is described below:

a) Of-Course Assumptions

Phenomenologically, an of-course assumption refers to the reality which is always the object of belief (Wagner, 1970: 73). Experiences and meaning are thus intimately tied to the individual's belief in the world which he immediately perceives. There is an uncertainty in the reality and, until further investigation, it becomes a "maybe". Einstein spoke of it in this way:

> If an experiment agrees with a theory it meant
> for the latter "maybe" ... (Einstein, 1979: 19)

"I believe", in other words, that it may work but that it is so must be reserved for a later time. There is only the assumption that I may act for the present with the conviction that I may be correct (Kuhn, 1970). But such "thinking as usual" does not remain a stable feature of any life for long (Luckmann, 1978: 25). It is these presuppositions, however, that form the very essence of the Curriculum Revision Committee's belief in "what is good for education"; these in turn form the basis upon which our understanding of the Social Studies Unit "Developing Tropical World" may be reflected.

b) Presuppositional Relevancy Systems

Individuals do not make free-floating random choices in terms of their everyday activities; that is, their actions are based upon some interpretation of the perceived events to this moment. The same may be said of the social scientist. He is continually narrowing his field. He begins, in other words, with some way of proceeding whether his interest be in experimental science, phenomenology, etc. Natanson reflects this when he says:

> ...from the standpoint of the Social Scientist, the construction of models (ideal types in the language of Social Science) is the procedural means through which both actors and action are comprehended. (Natanson, 1970: 74)

Individual frames of reference become on the level of physical or social sciences, paradigms or the over-arching fields of enquiry within a particular approach to understanding natural or social phenomena. Kuhn, for example, identified a number of paradigms within the field of science, among them Copernican astronomy and Newtonian dynamics (Kuhn, 1970). Each paradigm provides a scheme of reference for interpreting events; that is, it references to an appropriate epistemology or procedure through which data are interpreted and indexed as prior knowledge. Paradigms reveal, in terms of the knowledge, its probability for being true, what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and the degree to which it may be accepted by the community of scholars.

An understanding of the particular paradigms through which the Curriculum Revision Committee approached the "developing tropical world" reveals, to a large degree, their particular presupposition relevancy structures. It becomes an uncovering of the unconscious beliefs about the structure of knowledge which is reflected in their work.

Knowledge, in this context, illuminates not only the "maybe" and its particular scheme of reference, but also an image of man or a framework through which the view of man is interpreted. (Walsh, 1972: 16ff). For instance, man may be viewed as a concrete object to be manipulated or as a flesh and blood person with the will to decide for himself.

Our concern here is twofold:

a) the image of man in the developing tropical world. As I interpret this the image of man stands as an icon reflecting ourselves back to ourselves in the same sense that W.I. Thomas developed his concept of the "looking glass self".

b) the image of man in relation to the educational presuppositions of the program. Each image reflects the assumptions made by the Revision Committee about how people should act in the social world.

PART II: Discipline and Pedagogical Perspectives: Developing Tropical World

The framework suggested by Werner (1977) for initially understanding some of the habits of thought of the Revision Committee involves us in making sense of the written guide and resource materials for the "Developing Tropical World". Their choice in emphasizing geography as a major discipline of study requires that a twofold approach to the unit be made:

a) a discussion of the world of the professional geographer as he works within his discipline;

b) a discussion of the world of the professional geographer as it is interpreted through the unit, "Developing Tropical World".

Discipline: The World of the Geographer

If I approach the physical world as a geographer I bring with me a certain subset of beliefs that will influence my way of viewing the world (Hartshorne, 1949). I will, in other words, make certain a priori assumptions about how I should see geographically. Broek, for instance, describes some of these assumptions:

> Geographers, in general, consider their field to be first and foremost a social science, but many value highly its bonds with the physical and biological sciences. (Broek, 1965: 3)

His interest will be directed towards a place, economic concerns, landscape influences, climate, cultures, etc. It is such selections that permit the geographer to distinguish his discipline from sociology, philosophy, etc. Two concepts, which receive emphasis within the discipline are "space" (interactions over distance) and "place" (the location in which human activities take place). Geographers, also, share a perception that there must be a human presence before they are able to make sense of the world; geography is very much a social occupation.

The foregoing discussion assumes two aspects of the geographer's world:

i) that it focuses around concepts which may be more or less mutually agreed upon, at various times, by members within the group, and

ii) that individual members of the group may interpret these shared concepts differently (Polanyi, 1974: 252-253). It is also important to make clear that both the concepts and the meaning which the geographer gives to them can not be understood apart from the time in which they were constructed: both must be considered in terms of the past in which they were formulated and the present in which they are being interpreted (Gadamer, 1975: 258). For example, place has been understood largely in concrete terms; e.g., "This place is Edmonton", but within our present time a new connotation has arisen, place as placeness; e.g., "What is it like to feel at home in a place like Edmonton?" (Chorley and Haggett, 1969). In my time I cannot consider the one sense of place without considering the other; if I did I would encounter the danger of taking an historical view of my work. But the "presentness" of our interpretations of a concept is never static; there is always the belief that concept is knowable in our present. The knowability, however, is held in the sense of "until further notice"; some new interpretation of the concept may be forthcoming at any moment which may drastically alter our presently held meanings.

Knowledge within geography becomes "unknowable" in the full sense of the term; there is recognition that it is impossible to conquer the full, lived sense of any object as each may be interpreted as having open horizons within the discipline; in other words, each holds the possibility of leading on to a new concept and ideas. (Husserl, 1973: 32ff) Thus a geographer's "world" embodies:

i) the broad, agreed upon concepts which constitute geography,
ii) the knowledge of the discipline,
iii) the meanings and interpretations previously associated

with it, and

iv) shifting paradigms through which it may be interpreted.

All of this suggests that knowledge is personal.

Geographers commit something of themselves to their writings within the discipline. Polanyi makes this point when he says:

> ...into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known... (Polanyi, 1974: viii)

Within each act of knowing which the geographer performs there enters the passionate contribution of the person's own particular way of knowing what is to be known. There are three aspects within the act of knowing which may be identified as being significant:

A) intentionality - the basis of consciousness. We are always conscious of something. A geographer, for instance, may be interested in spacial relationships. Intentionality is the act through which the geographer or anyone else experiences an object whether ideal or real.

b) theorizing - the geographer's way of thinking about the essence of the object in the world; and

C) understanding - the mode of presentation of the object within geography which reflects the way in which it is understood in its relations with the world. Each of these aspects of the geographer's act within his work reflects his own interests, his own passions. Each decision he makes is critical to the final public presentation of his work. The dialogue between geographers about the essential nature of their work ensures that such issues are discussed; they are important to the ongoing praxis of their everyday working lives. Beyond this, however, they are important background for our own understanding of the varying assumptions with which a geographer may approach his craft (Bensman and Libienfeld, 1973).

"World", as it is related to the geographer, reflects the basic understandings with which he approaches his work. His acts are acts of knowing within the academic framework which he prescribes for his and his colleagues' field of interest. But the question must now be addressed: How are his daily academic activities within the discipline portrayed in the Social Studies Unit, "Developing Tropical World"?

World of the Geographer: A Pedagogical Interpretation Through The "Developing Tropical World Unit"

The term "world" may be conceptualized in terms of the world of the geographer since this is the major approach sanctioned by the Revision Committee (BCSS, 1968: 4-5). Within the view of the Revision Committee, two different conceptions of geography are presented:

> A) it "describes the earth's surface with particular reference to the differentiation and relationship of areas" (BCSS, 1968: 4). (I interpret this to mean that each arbitrary region may be seen as unique in some ways, while also having shared characteristics. Regions, for example, may be economically related.)
>
> B) it "is the dynamic study of man in the perspective of the world which is related to his understanding of the place in which he lives and his interrelationships with other places" (BCSS, 1968: 4).

Each of these views of geography is embedded in a context which may be described as follows:

> Geography is concerned with the characteristics of places and regions particularly as to:
> a) their location in relation to other places;

> b) variable phenomena, both natural and cultural (physical and human), which distinguishes one place from another; and
> c) interaction between places. (BCSS, 1968: 4)

Contextually, space is considered in a physical sense, that is as distance between two places; e.g., "location in relation to" and "interaction between". Within the Revision Committee's interpretation of geography, the emphasis placed upon a physical view of space suggests that the human experience of space is less important. But, at the same time, mention is made of "variable phenomena" in which culture plays a role. In order to understand what the Committee means by this, a consideration of how they interpreted the actual work of the geographer is necessary.

The Revision Committee chose to emphasize what it believed was the mode of inquiry used by the geographer:

> The empirical method underlies most geographical research, but a statistical and mathematical approach is being greatly expanded because of the increasing availability of high speed electronic computers. (BCSS, 1968: 4)

Clearly identifying the dominant mode of inquiry as "empirical" leads to the question, how does the committee interpret the term?

The Committee, I would suggest, saw the method mainly in terms of technique and analysis. They suggested that analysis permits a complete understanding of a region. This provides, in turn, possible grounds for generalizing about other regions. (BCSS, 1968: 5) While regions may be designated as arbitrary units, once they are delimited they are, in a sense, "frozen", and become a unit for study. Their futures, both physical and cultural, may be analyzed bit by bit to locate or identify relevant interrelationships. The action of "freezing" the region permits the geographer to dissect it, count, measure, and predict future events within the region. (BCSS, 1968: 5) This interpretation suggests that the geographer is largely viewed as a person who "theorizes about", rather than "lives in" the world. The approach, as described, portrays the geographer's main intent as one of restructuring the region according to a set of principles or criteria which he established a priori. The Revision Committee, in this way, views the geographer as a detached observer, as someone who is not involved in the world of his own making. Culture would become a "thing" within a region, an object for study.

Habermas argues that such a view has the hidden interest or purpose of gaining control over the subject that is being studied, in this case a geographical region (Habermas, 1971: 308). People acting within the region are assumed to be acting according to a set of predefined recipes which they have internalized. Such a set of recipes is often spoken of as the laws of nature. Natural laws are formulated around the principle of rationality within the universe, and when applied to humans the assumption is made that man always acts in a rational manner, or that he acts in predictable ways in sympathy with the law-like patterns of the universe. Such law-like patterns belong to a technical-view of science. (Habermas, 1973: 254) The program supports the claim that the geographers search out the patterns by which man acts with economy and efficiency within his life-world; i.e., the world that surrounds him every day. Curiously, seen in this way, it is nature, and not man, who is recognized as speaking.

Geographical research becomes a part of a community, in which the geographer is not permitted to claim that he has influenced the findings through his personal commitments to the topic under discussion. Such a situation results from the belief which is embedded within the technical-scientific procedures themselves; that is, that the procedure or recipe to be followed is neutral and free from personal influence. Technical-scientific validity, however, also requires the existence of an external community of geographers who share the same beliefs about the assumptions underlying the recipe and who accept or reject the study on the basis of adherence to the rules (Schroyer, 1971). It follows that there is a sense of certainty involved in the instrumental claim.

Certainty provides the positive ground for the empirical method. Embedded within it there is the sense of precision since it speaks to the finitude of man rather than to his infinitude (McHugh, Raffel, Foss and Blum, 1974). Dickens once wrote in Choakumchild's School Room that it was the facts that were important! "Now, what I want is, FACTS. Facts alone are wanted in life, for knowing the facts allows us to know why people act in the way they do." Actions become measurable under this label; they are controlled and mastered rather than providing the pivot around which human understanding is sought.

Following Habermas (1973) it is possible to suggest that the view of man as a rational actor, as a follower of a priori rules or regulations which await, reveals a separation between theory (the theorizing about the world) and practice. Within the unit, "Developing Tropical World", the geographer is revealed as establishing theories about the way in which the world works. The activities of man are talked about in terms of the theories themselves but they do not necessarily speak to the everyday lives which the people lead. Students are expected to follow the technique of the geographer in the sense that they are to learn something of the rules he uses in order to arrive at an empirical view of man. This concern with the technical separates the student from the possibility of taking action himself, in terms of the developing tropical world. He, in reproducing the geographical recipes, will find it difficult to see his own possibilities for social action. Schutz echoes this concern when he suggests that when one approach (e.g., the technical-empirical) to understanding comes to dominate, then the possibilities for new horizons become limited. Indeed he views such a predominance of one method in a political context when he states that such an over-reliance is a form of "imperialism" (Schutz, 1973: 49). I would interpret this to indicate that Schutz would concur with Habermas' suggestion that the scientific-technical paradigm is oppressive in its political interests; i.e., that it seeks to control or limit our understanding by its insistence that the position is the most acceptable or legitimate. It must be made clear here, however, that this statement is open to debate in terms of its philosophical parameters. But equally clear is that the scientific-technical position, defined within the program, does degrade the experiential qualities of being human. Tuan, a geographer, makes this point about the reduction of human experience within the technical-sciences when he says:

> A large body of experiential data is consigned to oblivion because we cannot fit the data to concepts that are taken over uncritically from the physical sciences. (Tuan, 1977: 201)

Tuan's point is particularly apt in terms of the "Developing Tropical World" unit. The Revision Committee has appropriated the empirical method without being fully cognizant of its implications. Thus they explicate the method of the geographer as follows:

> Much geographic research is based upon direct observation; viz. the use of topographic maps, aerial photographs and sampling and interviewing procedures in the field ... These techniques, used from the viewpoint of place, location movement and aerial distribution, are directed to the analysis of geographic problems. (BCSS, 1968: 5)

Again, we may return to the phrase "what is good for education". In this case it is assumed that a technical-science paradigm is best. But at the same time we cannot ignore the possibility that the choice of methodology is limited to one view of "the world". I feel this is Schutz's point interpreted in terms of an educational setting. The liberating tendencies, which we ascribe (rightly or wrongly) to an educational program, are oppressed. Such oppression takes as its aim the creation of a conformist, obedient population (Schroyer, 1971; Apple, 1976; Huebner, 1980; Freire, 1973).

Contextually, the Social Studies Revision Committee formed a static view of the methods of the geographer, missing what Laudan has suggested is the comparative context. He states:

> All evaluation of research traditions and theories must be made within a comparative context. (Laudan, 1977: 120)

Thus an aspect of the oppression within the program is that it fails to capture the "aliveness" of the discipline itself, presenting it rather as an adherence to method. In this sense students could come to be viewed as slaves to method.

If the discipline of geography is understood within the context of the Revision Committee's interpretation of the empirical method, then it is only reasonable to view the following excerpt in that light:

> The student should comprehend the structure of ideas that is the essence of history, geography and the social sciences; he should gradually accumulate the kinds of information that produce these ideas and heighten his perceptions of them. (BCSS, 1968: 3)

I interpret this to mean that students are expected to reconstruct the methodological activities which the geographer is presented as doing. He is expected to retrace, in essence, how the geographer was able to arrive at his conclusions. Consequently, searching through the "accumulated knowledge" pertaining to the developing tropical world requires that students re-discover what is already known. Students, for example, may be required to determine the climate of Bombay according to the Koppen systems of climate classification. Kuhn has labelled such activities within science as "puzzle-solving". Freire has labelled the over-concern for learning factual information as "banking education". In essence both terms indicate that the student loses control over his own life within such an educational context and indeed he could become a slave. Metaphors such as "puzzle-solving", "banking" and "slave" are not all-encompassing but merely point towards that which must be disclosed further. Underlying such metaphors is the reduction of inquiry, as I have previously stated, to recipe-following. While we may debate this conception of the empirical method within the fields of science, its simplified presentation in the British Columbia Social Studies program leaves little beyond recipe-following. The controlling interest is to ignore, by default, the comparative context which Laudan identified as a part of the "aliveness" of any theory or discipline. In order to expand upon this aspect of the program two features of it will be considered:

a) the objectives; and

b) the view of the student, as an actor, within society.

Limiting the Comparative Context: Pedagogical Implications

a) Objectives

There are four objectives identified by the Revision Committee as pertaining to the program. It will suffice here to consider one or two examples.

> Knowledge
>
> To cause students to acquire a body of knowledge (comprised mainly of Basic Concepts or Principles and Generalizations) about the functioning of Human Societies both past and present, both at home and throughout the world.
>
> Methods of Acquiring Knowledge
>
> To cause students to develop some facility in using the methods of inquiry through which knowledge in the social domain is discovered and acquired. (BCSS, 1968: 4)

The objectives for the program set out a causal relationship between knowledge and methods. A causal relationship indicates that what is known at this moment conditions what will be known in the next. This reflects, in essence, an a priori situation in that what is to be known is already known before we actually encounter it (Durkheim, 1964: 16). Reducing knowledge to what is presently known enabled the Committee to control the parameters within which students may know (and how they may know) within the unit; what is to be known is specified within the unit, and how they may know is specified within the approach to the unit. Such control may occur in two ways:

i) limiting the comparative knowledge base; and

ii) controlling the resource materials which provide the primary focus for the program.

The objectives of the unit are used to prescribe the "boundaries" of knowledge; that is, the potential limits within which the students and teachers will be able to function.

"Boundaries" as prescribed by the objectives also ensure that the Revision Committee is able to predict the ways in which the students are to act once they have proceeded through the unit. (Kliebard, 1975: 38) Such predictability establishes the limits for what the Committee might accept as the truth. By this I mean that knowledge which would fall outside of the causal limits would be suspect. For example, a Marxist perspective of development may be held as suspect knowledge within the program and its grounds for claiming truth may be dismissed. A capitalist perspective, on the other hand, may clearly be held as containing the truth. Indeed its truth claims may simply be taken for granted. The possibility for exploring dialectical relationships between the individual and society are eliminated since the Committee's interest is in legitimizing a single perspective of inquiry only; i.e., technical-scientific. Eliminating the possibility of establishing such a dialectical relationship speaks to a particular pedagogical view of the student within the unit.

b) View of the student as an actor within society

Limiting inquiry to a single paradigm provides some control over how the student will come to imagine himself as an actor within society. The Curriculum Revision Committee saw the students as passive beings within the unit. Such a position follows from their understanding of empirical inquiry, that is, where knowledge is independent of the inquirer. Such knowledge will be said to exist in the same way regardless of whether or not the student is present. Her role will be to absorb it passively. In a sense the knowing comes to the student rather than the student approaching the task in her own way. The student is told what is relevant and what is not; what doesn't fit is discarded as being superfluous. Students are seen as conforming to the methods and knowledge presented; to challenge the way of knowing could invoke various forms of punitive action from the teacher closely following the guide; e.g., failing a test or grade (van den Berg, 1975: 101-103). Musgrove suggests that the purpose of a passive way of knowing is to shape, control, and manipulate the human organism to perform efficiently within the system (Musgrove, 1968). Limiting knowing to one view gives tacit recognition to the assumption that man is controlled by destiny rather than being an actor who has control over his own destiny. Students are rendered impotent in terms of their own destinies.

Student Evaluation: Pedagogical Context

Through their control of the mode of inquiry the Revision Committee viewed the students as passive consumers of knowledge who would not have the potential to act independently from the group. The students are seen as being treated uniformly within the program's context. It is, in other words, important within the unit to know what everyone knows. We all should know, for example, how Asian farms are organized. Such knowledge ensures that a standardized testing procedure may be used with respect to the unit. This is indicated, in part, by the broader statement on evaluation contained within the program, which states in part:

> Specifically, as far as the Social Studies teacher is concerned, evaluation must proceed in terms of the objectives which are clearly stated at the beginning of this program ... Throughout the program, then the teacher must keep all the objectives clearly in mind ... (BCSS, 1968: 79)

Teachers must, as I interpret the statement, instruct to the objectives of the unit "Developing Tropical World" as these would reflect the empirical method of inquiry. While there is some attempt at critical thought with respect to the objectives - "Teachers should try to get outside the objectives to determine whether or not the objectives themselves are invalid" - I would suggest that this, given the single-mindedness of the program, is not a position which is meant for action. If the Revision

Committee supported the statement, I believe that they would have suggested some alternative examples following the statement. The content of the unit is directed towards making the students testable. Potentially what is learned within the unit is not how to take action and resist the testing, but rather how to accept testing passively as something that should be done to them.

"Developing Tropical World": A Summary

The British Columbia Social Studies Unit, "Developing Tropical World" is dependent upon a reduced interpretation of how the geographer proceeds within his discipline. An oversimplification such as this results in a distortion of how he proceeds with his professional work. The explication of the empirical model of inquiry in a reduced version, as well, limits the scope of potential understanding within the program. Such an appropriation does not account for the praxis of debate that may be taking place within the field of geography over conflicting methods of research, or indeed of debates within broader philosophic circles, such as that between the "Vienna Circle" and the Frankfurt School (Tuan, 1971; 1977; Connerton, 1976: 32). These issues form part of the life world of the geographer, but they are hidden from the student and teachers within the broader structure of the program.

The Revision Committee, in selecting one mode of inquiry, is also limiting the choices that may be made by students in terms of selecting possible life world actions. Particularly, the empirical inquiry, as it is presented, emphasizes the passive nature of understanding; it emphasizes what is learned, rather than how it is to be learned. Students are given a theoretical point of view which moves them away from understanding the social forces within their everyday lives (Werner, Connors, Aoki, Dahlie, 1976). Students should become observers and not participants in their world. It could be said that the conflicting tensions which students experience in their everyday lives were not sufficiently important to be a major part of the program.

PART III: Developing Tropical World: Substantive Content

The title of the unit, "Developing Tropical World", presents a context through which the image of man held by the Revision Committee may be further explored. Of importance is the term "developing". It is an a priori category selected by the Curriculum Revision Committee to characterize the tropical area of the world. It is suggestive of a possible future for the region and may, in terms of previous western characterizations of it, be contrasted with such terms as "underdeveloped" and "backward" which are symbolic of a static view of the area. "Developing" as a term of reference suggests that there is an implicit standard against which the tropical world may be measured; such a standard would be found in those nations which label themselves "modern" or "developed". These terms would apply to the sense of fullness embodied within the concept of development (Berger and Kneller, 1974: 4).

Labelling an area as "developing" has the potential of constructing a frame of reference through which the people's achievements may be measured or evaluated. It also carries with it a very powerful vision of how social transformations will be achieved.

The Revision Committee's concept of developing may be further explored in terms of the content outline; such outlines suggest the content which the teacher of the course should select. Specifically the substantive intent for the unit is stated as follows:

> The programme is designed so that students can examine in some detail those areas of the world that lie in or near the tropics and that have economics essentially rural agricultural, or subsistence in character. (BCSS, 1968: 23)

Agriculture has been selected as the main substantive topic. Around this theme the social organization of the people of the developing tropical world is considered in relation to the following agricultural types:

a) Hunting and gathering
b) Shifting Cultivation
c) Pastoral nomadism
d) Rudimentary sedentary agriculture
e) Subsistence crop and livestock farming
f) Intensive subsistence (rice dominant)
g) Intensive subsistence (rice not dominant)
h) Commercial agriculture.
(BCSS, 1968: 23)

View of Culture

Listing farming activities in such a way sets up a system of categories for evaluating the culture of the people; this is made clear in the following statement of the Revision Committee:

> (The focus upon agriculture) does not preclude the possibility of considering some urban, industrial or other cultural phenomena within the regions selected. (BCSS, 1968: 23)
> (Brackets added)

I have interpreted this to mean that the Committee believed "marginal cultural" phenomena do not contribute in a significant way to the total understanding of a culture. The way of understanding the culture has been made in terms of what Pike has labelled an etic view; that is, made as an outsider or surveyor of the culture would make the judgments (Pike, 1967). An outsider's perspective is contrasted by Pike with an insider's perspective or emic view. Here the frame of reference used for understanding the actions of the people is constructed as though the individual were an actual member of the group.

But what is important here is not so much the outsider view used by the Revision Committee, but rather their interpretation of it. Basically, it distorts the work of the geographers and anthropologists upon which it is based.

Cressey, for example, uses a similar inventory approach to culture but at the same time makes clear the basis of understanding, from his perspective, when he states: "The function of geography is to understand the total landscape, cultural and physical, and to evaluate the diverse personality of an area from place to place" (Cressey, 1955: vii). Inventory approaches to culture represent the position of the early twentieth century anthropologist, Boas. His work with the native people of North America, as I interpret it, was concerned with recording all of those cultural features which could be collected and measured. But his position was not being totally reductive; he did, as well, have an interest in the subjective aspects of culture. (Rohner, 1969)

Boas' epistemology, therefore, attempted to account for both the subjective and objective aspects of the culture. His view is different from, for example, a Newtonian one. For he was attempting to understand something of the reality of the people rather than depending upon a system of pre-existing categories through which the people's activities will be defined. This is what I believe Cressey was warning against; that if too narrow a view of culture is taken, much of the richness of the culture is lost. The inventory method used in the unit relegates some of the possible ways of knowing the culture to greater or lesser importance without considering the actual contexts in which it is seen by the people and without providing for the teacher the grounds upon which they made their decision. The framework of agricultural types indicated earlier, for example, has been isolated within a movement of thought, and presented for use within the unit. In a very real sense it avoids the debates, once again, which give life to a discipline.

The statement of agricultural types may be interpreted further in two different ways:

i) as examples of types which bear no relationship to one another; or

ii) as types which do bear a relationship to one another.

In the first instance there is no sense given to agricultural evolution within society. They are simply given to be understood within the particular unit, and their relevancy is clearly presupposed. In the second instance culture is viewed in an evolutionary way, that is, as having an open horizon which reflects the people's ongoing interpretation of the necessary conditions (climate, soil, etc.) of their ecological environment. This is somewhat related to W.W. Rostow's proposals made in the 1950's, namely that the movement of societies from one position to another occurs in a general spiral, each position being linked one to the other through various transition phases (Rostow, 1961). Such a position reflects a hierarchical vision of culture.

Hunting and gathering economies, for example, are not seen to be as sophisticated as a system of commercial agriculture. The various agricultural societies may be interpreted as moving through these various stages, to become eventually a fully developed nation; such an assumption was explicit within Rostow's work. What is being excluded here, is a view of culture which considers the functional rationality of everyday life of which Pike spoke. (Pike, 1967)

If I reflect further upon the agricultural listing, I note that commercial agriculture falls at the very end of the list. The presentation of a capitalist form of agriculture as being the end of a developmental process, if accepted in the first place, is, perhaps, evidence of a bias on the part of the Curriculum Revision Committee. I would raise the question: does this imply that a socialist system of farm organization is not likely to lead a nation to becoming developed; and if not, why not? These are questions upon which the Revision Committee is silent, but such questions may logically be carried through into a consideration of the relevant resource material related to the program.

Summary

The view of the tropical world as "developing" is indicative that a "less than" perspective towards these areas had been adopted by the Revision Committee. As such the region has been implicitly judged relative to the developed areas of the world. Underlining this position is the cultural viewpoint which the Curriculum Revision Committee adopted:

> ... societies value system, goals, organization, and level of technology determining which elements of the land are prized and utilized. (BCSS, 1968: 6)

This statement suggests that there is to be an implicit a priori standard against which each culture will be evaluated, despite any differences which exist, namely the standard of technology. There is not sufficient material within the curricular statement related to the developing tropical world to fully evaluate the implicit meaning of the Curriculum Revision Committee. It is with this in mind that I will now turn to the resource materials associated with the program.

Developing Tropical World: An Interpretation of Prescribed Resource Material

The British Columbia Ministry of Education centrally prescribes the text resource material issued in conjunction with a program. Materials for the unit under consideration fall within two categories in the materials list:

1. prescriptive materials that must be used by all teachers. The text by Carswell, Morrow and Honeybone, Man in the Tropics, is the book that is required for the unit, "Developing Tropical World";

2. supplementary materials that are available but not necessarily used. Textbook materials, other than those appearing in the list, may not be used unless permission is granted by a local school board.

Man in the Tropics has been the core textbook in the course since it was introduced in 1968; the other textbooks have remained unaltered with the exception of a text by McCaffery which was revised in 1973. I interpret these textbook materials, which were selected by the Revision Committee, as being, in their eyes, fairly representative of the stated objectives of the unit. The materials, in other words, reflect the Committee's vision of how the classroom teacher would approach the knowledge, skills, etc., of the unit on a day-to-day basis. The materials are widely available to the teacher, in that they come from a prescribed list, and represent a form of control in terms of the school knowledge which is available to both teachers and students. This is not to say that a teacher may not introduce some of his own materials into the classroom, but clearly he must do so within the tacitly sanctioned parameters of the course. Nor is it to say that such control is likely to occur, for as Kirst and Walker point out, teachers may, in fact, hold a completely different conception of the material presented to them (Kirst and Walker, 1971). Rather, we are speaking here of the underlying assumption made by the Curriculum Revision Committee that these materials would influence classroom practices as envisaged by the Committee. Clearly resource materials are reflections of the curriculum itself and not a reflection of actual classroom practice.

Three approaches to the texts will be used:

i) the perspective which the core text presents of the actual activities of the professional geographer; i.e., the geographer's world. This was selected since it is the one most likely to be used as the central reference by teachers;

ii) the educational interpretation of the geographer's activities. The way in which the various authors have interpreted the geographer's activities for actual use in the classroom with students; and

iii) the way in which the textbook material (also designated as resource material) interprets the concept of "developing" in relation to the unit, "Developing Tropical World".

Through these materials a perspective of man and his world is presented to students in the course. Here we are speaking of the collective experience of people and their everyday lives in terms of their beliefs, values, ideals, knowledge, shared rules, etc.

i) The Text's Interpretation of the Geographer's Working World

The perspective of the geographer's working world as it is presented in the textbooks is largely taken-for-granted. In part Carswell* does, however, indicate partially their view in the following statement:

> This book has been prepared on the basis of the practical method of teaching. The best way to study geography is to go out with a notebook and a map to record by sketches, diagrams, maps and record what has been seen. After the information has been recorded an attempt must be made to explain the facts. (Carswell, 1968: xiv)

The statement initially speaks of the geographer's active interpretation in the field; he is one who, like the anthropologist, must live in the field. But his activities are viewed in terms of his ability to explain what he has seen by means of a likely theory; this would, as previously described, suggest that such a geographer would have a technical-science interest.

This statement forms the only substantive comment about the actual work of the geographer; it is presumed by the authors of the text, therefore, that the teachers will fully understand the educational interpretation as being reflective of the geographer's actual work.

ii) Educational Interpretation of the Geographer's Work World

An educational view of the geographer's world may be considered

*Carswell, Morrow and Honeybone. Man in the Tropics. Ontario: Bellhaven House, 1968. Hereafter referred to as Carswell.

initially in terms of the following statement made in Carswell:

> Man in the Tropics has been prepared from this point of view. It contains sketches, maps, diagrams, pictures, statistics, descriptions, and other forms of geographical data which the students must study in order to answer the questions included in the text. (Carswell, 1968: xiv)

As I interpret the statement, students are seen as reproducing the activities of the geographer in order to understand how he makes sense of the world. This reflects the disciplinary approach to the social sciences which was encouraged by Bruner in the late 1960's. (Bruner, 1968) The strategy suggested that students would actually learn something of the geographer's trade, but there is a significant difference presented here: while the geographer goes out into the field, the students are expected to remain within the classroom and go over all of his findings and puzzle out the solutions. This is typical of all the resource material in the unit. A sampling of the exercises will serve to illustrate:

> A) Look at Figure 24. a) What colour are the sheep?
> b) What is likely to be found in the sacks?
> c) Describe the houses of Oatif. (Carswell, 1968: 24)
>
> B) Compare Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Santos using the following criteria:
> 1. location relative to the sea, each other
> 2. harbour facilities
> 3. land transportation available, etc.
> (Uttley and Aitchison, 1969: 109)
>
> C) This graph shows the average temperature and precipitation conditions for Singapore. Locate this city and attempt to explain why these conditions exist. (McCaffray, 1963: 219)

These questions (and, I would claim, virtually all of those within the text) may be placed into a category which treats the human condition as a factual entity. Society is given a reality of its own apart from the individual. Durkheim makes this point when he says:

> (There are first) ways of acting, thinking and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him ... They consist of representations and of actions ... Since their source is not in the individual, their substratum can be no other than society, either the political society as a whole or some of the partial groups it includes ... (Secondly, there are): Other facts without such crystallized form which have the same objectivity and the same ascendancy over the individual. These are called "social currents". Thus the great movements of enthusiasm, indignation and pity in a crowd do not originate in any one of the particular individual consciousness. (Durkheim, 1964: 3-4)

Clearly underlying their approach to the text is the positive spirit described by Durkheim. As the exercises throughout the unit begin to relate together students are led towards making generalizations, with universal applications about the way in which man may develop himself. In addition to this the exercises indicate that the cultural or social facts are measurable in the same way that natural phenomena would be. For example, question (b) cited previously is measurable in the same way that climate and precipitation are measurable. Also the questions, as I have indicated in a previous portion of this chapter, point towards the neutrality of the geographical findings; the educational interpretation of the geographer's work is that he is indeed a neutral observer.

Beyond Durkheim's statement the managerial value of factual knowledge may be recognized in the educational setting. The questions merely reflect the material with which the students have been presented in the previous part of the text. To answer the questions a student merely has to look back. (Kuhn, 1970; Freire, 1973) The importance of following the recipe for answering the question is significant in several ways:

First, the normative use of language; that is the meaning structures of the language standardize the ways by which we judge actions and suggest motives. Mills suggests in short that by providing such vocabularies the social canalization of thought occurs (Mills, 1963). Such canalization neutralizes the potential conflicts between points of view, thus de-emphasizing the variances within the social world. We are taught to accept what we see or hear as the truth. In the case under consideration students see the world reflected through a scientific-technical view.

Secondly, Mills suggests that such a normative view of language carries with it the "social and political rationale" as well. Language itself, in other words, may not be treated neutrally (Mills, 1963). Berger and Luckmann make this point as well:

> The symbolic universe assigns ranks to various phenomena in a hierarchy of being, defining the range of the social within the hierarchy ... for example ... as recently as the Spanish conquests in America it was possible for the Spaniards to conceive of the Indians as belonging to a different species ...
> (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 102)

There is thus a two-edged sword being forged: a) the people of the developing world become totally objectified or reified, and b) the students are viewed by the authors of the texts as having become objects to be manipulated. What is suggested here is that there is a political interest embedded within the factual language used in the resource material. The problem raised here is a particularly difficult one, for I am suggesting that there is a relationship between the knowledge presented in the resource material and a political stance or ideology which was deemed acceptable by the collectivity of the authors of the resource material.

The political interest or intent which I would suggest underlies the curriculum is essentially a conservative one; that is, it serves to preserve the prevailing political system which, in the west, is capitalist. I am not suggesting a simple master-slave relationship, as for instance may result from the social relations in the classroom. Rather, I view it as an extension of what may be described as the protective role of the master towards the slave (Connerton, 1976: 18). The master, in other words, protects the students from the negative - the criticisms that are possible of the economic system in which they live. There is here a relationship between the knowledge which is legitimated within the curriculum (in essence a cultural view) and the social relations established between teachers and students in the classroom.

> In short, the history of twentieth-century education is the history not of progressivism but of the imposition upon the schools of "business values" and social relationships reflecting the pyramid of authority and privilege in the burgeoning capitalist system. The evolution of U.S. education during this period was not guided by the sanguine statements of John Dewey and Jane Addams, who saw a reformed educational system eliminating the more brutal and alienating aspects of industrial labour. Rather, the time-motion orientation of

> Frederick Taylor and "Scientific Management", with its attendant fragmentation of tasks, and imposition of bureaucratic forms and top-down control hold sway. (Bowles and Gintis, 1976: 44)

Emphasizing facts within the curriculum, as I interpret it, is part of the division between the master and the slave, but it also reflects the larger "legitimacy of knowledge" which we find within a curriculum. Thus the view reflected of the people of the developing tropical world is, in part, the view of ourselves which has been deemed acceptable; it is a legislated view.

It would not, however, be correct to involve a conspiracy charge: there is no illegitimate coercion; there is no plot. Rather I would suggest that we have lost the art of critique and with it, the possibility of understanding the dialectical and historical roots of our own thought. Educators have forgotten, over the years, how to re-search possibilities. There needs to be an uncovering of what is there so that we might understand our life situations in a deeper sense:

> By means of an unalienating and liberating cultural action, which links theory with praxis, the oppressed person perceives - and modifies - his relationship with the world and with other people. (Gutierrez, 1980: 90)

The people who construct and select curriculum, as I have indicated previously, are unaware of their own tacit programs through which they seek to influence people, of their own "of course" and "presuppositional relevancy structures". Within the resource material I find no evidence to suggest that these significant educational issues were addressed.

In summary, the educational interpretation of the geographer's work as reflected in the resource material is an instrumental technical-scientific one in which the students are expected to solve the puzzles which are set out before them. But the resource material is consistent in this philosophical sense with the curriculum itself: the Revision Committee has consistently emphasized the passive, puzzle solving view of the students within the course.

iii) Textbook Perspective of "Developing" in Relation to the Tropical World

Themes to be considered in relation to the perspective of "developing" reflected in the resource material are:

a) view of the farming activities;

b) view of people's economic interactions.

These themes will serve to illuminate as well the educational interpretation of the culture of the people of the developing tropical world.

a) View of Farming Activities

i) Small Farms.

Early on in the text Man in the Tropics the following statement is made with reference to the farms of South-West Asia:

> Farming methods are antiquated. Ploughs pulled by donkeys or oxen, the hoe, the spade are seen everywhere. Winnowing is the typical threshing method. (Carswell, 1968: 23)

Statements such as this are typical of the references to small farms, made in the texts. In many cases the farming methods are contrasted with those of the "limited amounts of technology which are available in the area". They are essentially portrayed as being largely inefficient in their production techniques when measured against westernized farms. Inefficiency is often linked to the primogenitary practices of the people of India, "Ceylon" and Pakistan (and Bangladesh). Carswell expresses this point of view when he states:

> The custom whereby each son in succeeding generations received an equal share of each type of land owned by the family has led to this serious problem. The scattered location of the plots discourages efficient cultivation and makes irrigation difficult. (Carswell, 1968: 77)

Judging farming solely in terms of its efficiency reflects once again the curriculum's focus upon a technical-science perspective of knowledge. Seen from this vantage point the farmers should be concerned with maximizing their return in terms of the mechanized farming implements, fertilizers, etc. Farming becomes an activity which may only be comprehended in terms of its measured input-output as it directly relates to productivity; i.e., how many man-hours, how many bushels, etc. Any activity which is not directly related to productivity becomes "a waste of time". Classifying walking between fields, under the system of primogeniture, as a "waste of time" in a sense damns the Indian farmer for creating his own poverty. Essentially such a position raises the question: How may he be so stupid as not to see his own inefficiency?

A discussion of the farmer's inefficiency closely ties together the concepts of time and money. Money is essentially a compensation for unlived time (Berger, Berger, and Kneller, 1974: 102). The division of time into productive and non-productive segments suggests that the more time the farmer spends at his labours, the more money he will have at his disposal. The more money he has, the larger his farm may become and the more equipment he may be able to afford; i.e., more importantly, the more efficient he would become. Quantitatively the input-output model becomes very efficient but it is the qualitative (lived sense) of the farmer's life that becomes hidden.

Indian farmers, for example, moving between the various plots of land exchange news and gossip as they encounter one another. It is such subtleties of the small farm that Carswell and the other resource authors do not address. If we reflect upon the statement below regarding Mr. Dunutileke's farm, we are guided towards the typical features of farming life. Every farm is the same; we have no sense of looking through Sartre's keyhole (Sartre, 1956: 358). There is little of the life of real people in their everyday situations. The Dunutileke farm is not a concrete farm; it is a mythical farm and Mr. Dunutileke is not a "real, knowable person":

> Mr. Dunutileke is also typical of many others in Ceylon in that he has a large family. The population of Ceylon as a whole is increasing fast as a result of high birth rate and improved medical care. For instance, in 1957 there were 9,165,000 people in Ceylon; in 1960 this number had grown to 9,896,000 ... (Carswell, 1968: 71)

We are not encouraged to exchange places with Mr. Dunutileke as we might with Tom Sawyer riding down the Mississippi on his raft; nor are we the kind of observer who watches him from the bank move on his raft down the river. (As Carswell's geographer with a notebook might.) (Percy, 1956) Mr. Dunutileke's life is inaccessible to us. He is one of many statistics; his experiences are alienated from us since they are not true accounts of his experiences, but rather re-interpreted versions of his experiences filtered through scientific-technical language. Such language isolates us from our own existential involvement in his life; we know nothing of him as a person. He is lost to the reader in a maze of factual references. This is not to say that a factual basis is not required in the curriculum but rather that when the emphasis is placed upon such information it becomes important in itself. Sutdents, for example, are expected to know the sources of Mr. Dunutileke's cash income:

> Paddy is not, however, the most important source of cash for Mr. Dunutileke. His cash income is higher from the sales of vegetables. The vegetables he grows are tomatoes, onions, beets, capsicum, green chillies and chewing lutel vines. Capsicum and green chillies are sometimes known as peppers ... (Carswell, 1968: 72)

His and his family's efforts on the farm are reduced to lists, which destroy the very labour which expresses their care in farming. Viewed in this way it has an expressed meaning for them beyond the cash value; it represents a part of their day-to-day struggle for life. The farm itself becomes a symbol of Mr. Dunutileke's works and those of his ancestors and living family. It is a place where he lives and will die. As an objectification he ceases to be a person; he is an abstraction viewed through blurred eyes (Webb, 1962: 264-272). He becomes a construct whose life view is distorted to fit into the theoretical model provided by the resource material.

The reality of Mr. Dunutileke's work has been reconstructed in relation to a rationalistic approach to the understanding of human action. We are, for example, told that Mr. Dunutileke's motive for production is a profit one: Mr. Dunutileke's motives are imputed to him by the authors of the text. Rather than allowing him to speak for himself, his frame of reference is provided for the student. Schutz argues in opposition that we must understand the motives and interests of the individual if we are to begin to locate him within our perspectives (Schutz, 1971: 22).

Presenting Mr. Dunutileke's world as a neat and tidy rationalistic one, Carswell is requiring that the student closely follow the cognitive model through which they approach the small farmer. Through such a model the students must shift their perspective to accommodate that of the authors. The students, in essence, are moved from their own commonsense view to a rationalistic one. Thus the existential understanding of Mr. Dunutileke is denied any importance within this frame of reference. It has no validity within the scientific-technical position since it would represent what W. I. Thomas suggests is a vantage point or the individual's own subjective point of view. Solely emphasizing the factual aspects of Mr. Dunutileke's life, his "home" becomes a foreign expression in which the reader is left pondering its unfamiliarity.

The resource material typically presents small farmers in the "developing" world as being people who prevent the modernization of the tropical regions. Descriptions of farm life generally do not concern the lived situations of their lives. Such a culturally relative view tends to present the farmers of the tropical world as simple and uncomplicated as compared with Western ones:

> The life of the workers is the simple one of the farmers everywhere, in great contrast to life in the large cities. (Carswell, 1968: 337)

Such universal statements classify the small farmer's life and I would suggest, relegate him to a position of unimportance. Geographical, sociological and anthropological studies indicate that simple farmers have an understanding of their natural surroundings which often moves beyond that of the zoologist, biologist, etc. Omitting reference to these understandings within the resource material essentially leaves the farmer a passive actor within his world. Such a view, however, is consistent with that presented within the Social Studies unit being considered.

ii) Large Farms

The resource material often focuses upon the role of the large farms within the "Developing Tropical World". Typically these farms reflect a plantation type economy which is described within the unit as commercial agriculture. Descriptions of the plantations begin a rationale such as the following:

> Banana plantations are usually carved out of jungle lands and gradually transformed into the large cultivated areas ... A plantation is laid out in sections for the convenient allotments of work ... Workers clean out new growths of underbrush every three or four months and spray regularly to prevent disease. (Carswell, 1968: 278)

Most descriptions of the farms emphasize the organization of the farm itself. What is not emphasized is the "worker" aspect of the farms; that is to say, most plantations employ workers to work on them. Wages are often paid in terms of cash, housing and arable land.

Carswell moves beyond the usual descriptions in that he addresses the political question of the ownership of the banana plantations:

> As Canadians we sometimes complain about the American influence in our country's economy. Many firms in the Vancouver area are owned and operated by parent companies in the United States. In Central America the influence of the United States is most outstanding in the realm of agriculture. The following is a description of the activities on the large banana plantation in Central America, typical of the type of development operated by American interests. (Carswell, 1968: 278)

Several questions may be raised with respect to the description which followed the above quotation:

A) Why were the labour conditions on the farm ignored?

B) Why were the questions related to American investment in plantation economies not explored further?

C) Why were some of the alternative positions to this type of ownership not explored further?

Beyond these questions directly related to Carswell, I may ask why the other resource material did not discuss the question of ownership at all. That plantation ownership was of concern at the time the books were being written is reflected in some of the contemporaneous literature from South America (Linquist, 1972).

By not raising such social-political questions the authors of the resource material effectively neutralize the social commitments which may be involved in an individual's day-to-day life-world. Describing the activities carried out on the farms in factual terms permits the authors to gloss over the serious social issues of poverty, enslavement, economic control, etc., which underlie the social forces of South America, Africa and Asia.

The approach taken towards the banana plantations is repeated time and again with reference to coffee, tea and rubber plantations of the developing tropical world. Workers are generally described in neutral terms as though their actions on the farm were totally directed towards its welfare:

> The coffee harvest begins in May and continues into August, during the warm, sunny, dry weather of the winter. Men spread a canvas under each tree to catch the coffee beans. They climb ladders to reach the upper branches. Children pick from the lower branches. (Uttley and Aitchison, 1969: 101)

The company becomes a benevolent provider of the people:

> Practically all the houses are one storey and few have porches. They are built of clay bricks. The bricks are covered with a stucco, which is whitewashed. Often a bright colour is used. Rose is a favourite tint. The rooms are rather small with high ceilings.
>
> The average home has no rugs. The floor is of wood, except in the poorest homes, when it is of clay ... (Uttley and Aitchison, 1969: 103)

The social question, such as how the labourer is treated in terms of his wages, his involvement in running the farm and whether or not labour unions are permitted, is never raised.

Plantations, further, are often described, not in terms of a labour intensive activity, as the small farm is, but rather in relation to the degree of mechanization which is used on the farms. The authors of the resource material make reference to refrigerated ships for bananas or to mechanized pickers for coffee (Carswell, 1968: 280-281; Uttley and Aitchison, 1969: 103; 137). Plantation agriculture appears to symbolize the degree to which the area is modernized. It acts something like a barometer of progress; the more plantations the more progressive the region. But this view of modernization does not carry with it the possible institutions through which modernization and social consciousness manifest themselves in western nations. Labour unions and democratic institutions would serve as illustrations. "Modernizations", state Berger, Berger and Kneller, "must be regarded as a process by which specific clusters of institutions and contexts of consciousness are transmitted" (Berger, Berger and Kneller, 1974: 119). The limited view of modernization reflected through plantation economy limits in this sense the student's horizon and would not allow him access to the possible vantage points of the plantation workers.

Presenting modernization in this way represents a conservative approach to the whole problem of economics and its impact upon an individual's life-world. The resource material indicates plantation economy benefits not only one class but the society as a whole, when the evidence would in fact suggest that such a system has consistently worked to place one class over another; to ensure that the rich dominate the poor.

Both farming types - small and large - tend to portray the native farmers as resisters to change; as people who must be led like children to some form of modernity. In both instances people are essentially portrayed as "backward" and indeed in need of "developing".

b) View of People's Economic Interactions

Physical resources are those which are of use to man in an economic sense. As such these resources are seen as being "farmed" or extracted and shipped to Western nations as raw products in the same way as bananas or coffee are sent. Several examples cited from the resource material may serve to illustrate:

> Jamaica's bauxite is taken from open pit mines by dragline excavation ... The Jamaica Railway Corporation transports the alumina produced at the alumina plants, Kirkvine and Evuarton, to Port Esquivel for shipment to Alcan's smelter in British Columbia and to other smelters. (Carswell, 1968: 249-251)

> Bolivia is the only large tin producer in the Western Hemisphere. Without tin, Bolivia would have little to sell in the markets of the world. This one metal makes up two-thirds of the value of Bolivia's total exports. (Uttley and Aitchison, 1969: 82)

> The oil is sent to the Mediterranean coast by pipeline from Hassi Messooud and other Algerian oil oases. Find these pipelines in the map on page 55. Oil tankers carry the oil across the Mediterranean to southern Europe. (Eiselen and Uttley, 1969: 57)

Embedded in these statements are what might be termed an early colonial view of the developing tropical world, that is, the view that was prevalent in Europe towards the developing world in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Myrdal, 1963). This position is perhaps reflected best in the statement by Carswell, with regard to European settlement in East Africa:

> The building of the railways, however, has led to greater European settlement and improvement in agriculture, but this in itself was a very slow, costly and difficult job. (Carswell, 1968: 77)

In essence the statement reflects the "civilizing function" which European culture was viewed as having in the developing tropical world. That is, the opportunities that the Western culture provided would eventually bring equal opportunities for the native inhabitants. Further, a frame of reference is provided for the reader through which they may see that technology or modernization is morally and ethically defensible since it will, in the end, result in an improved way of life for the people of Africa. Of this position Myrdal says the following:

> It was, however, mainly the conservatives who came to determine the development of economic theory. As I mentioned at the end of the last chapter, the fate of their theories profited from the accident that they happened to be conservative; for this implied that they were interested in a natural state of harmony which, to them, was fairly like the world they saw. Their technological analysis of social reality became therefore more easily acceptable because it mirrored the status quo. This is what I referred to as the "realism of conservatism". (Myrdal, 1963: 137)

Myrdal underlines clearly, not only the European political attitude towards Africa at the time, but also the view towards Africa reflected in the resource material; that is, the maintenance of a socially conservative view. Within the material the students are shown that the African is only slowly becoming capable of controlling some of his own economic life:

> Figure 173 shows one of the Kenya farmers talking to his (native) tractor driver. The sheep on the left are grazing on the wheat stubble and in the background are some of the work-covered hills typical of the higher parts of the plateau. In recent years most of their farms have been taken over by Africans. (Carswell, 1968: 181)

The image of potential equality which I have suggested is implicit in the material and is usually presented to the students as the best way of developing the tropical world. The authors preferred this view of development over other possible choices, such as revolution, despite the rise of nationalism in the area in the latter part of the twentieth century (Fanon, 1963).

Through this view of imperialism presented in the material on resource development comes an image of the people of the tropical world as being inferior to those of the Western World. As such it becomes a legitimate interest of the western governments and companies to exploit people in the name of progress. Further, the view is presented that the people must accept it for there is no other alternative available apart from acceptance.

Perspective of Culture Within the Resource Material

Farming and resource development each reflect a perspective of culture which is contained within the resource material. A cultural perspective identifies the frame of reference through which the authors of the material described their view of man in the developing tropical world. Such a view is transmitted through the stock of knowledge which they have identified in order to convey their substantive context. In all cases the authors take-for-granted their particular point of view.

Generally the resource material recognizes two ways of understanding the culture of the people of the developing tropical world:

1) the culture of the white "newcomers"; and

2) the culture of the traditional inhabitants.

The following statement perhaps reflects the perspective of the culture developed within the material:

> Efforts to settle racial friction continue. The southern part of Africa is a region with many problems to solve. One is building greater co-operation between European and Bantu. The Bantu greatly outnumber the Europeans. Through the years the Bantu have provided an abundance of unskilled labour. Europeans have contributed money, knowledge and technical skills.
>
> Gradually more Bantu are learning how to handle the tools of modern industry, how to carry on business and professional work. Many, however, still have a great deal to learn before they will be able to take their places in the world of Today. (Eiselen and Uttley, 1969: 151)

The phrase "many however, still have a great deal to learn" is reflective of the following statement by Malinowski:

> ...so do the natives, pagan or heathen, barbarian or savage, who enjoy the benefits of our great Western culture. The uncultured is to receive the benefits of "our culture"; it is he who must change and become converted into one of us. (Malinowski, 1945: viii-ix)

Both of the above statements reflect what I would describe metaphorically as the missionary view held by the white South African towards the Bantu. By the missionary view I mean that the authors of the resource material felt that they must proselytize the reader regarding the need to transport the native spiritually to what was perceived to be a higher level of culture; namely that of western technological societies. Malinowski reflects this spiritual transformation through his use of the term "converted". In a sense I take him to mean that the natives must make a Kirkegaardian type of leap in order to accept the technological faith. Such a conversion also implies that the Bantu would be required to leave their own culture behind since it is "less" than that of western man's science. My suggestion here is that the authors of the resource material are consistent in following Malinowski. Students working on this unit would be exposed to a consistent position of western cultural superiority.

The authors of the resource material have consistently constructed the frame of reference within which the Bantu are evaluated. The Bantu are pictured as living co-operatively with the South African Whites. The term "greater co-operation" (cited in the quotation p. 65) would reflect this point of view. Evidence of this may be discerned through the description of the creation of the "Homelands".

> How can the Bantu keep the best of their own tribal culture and at the same time make good use of the benefits of European civilization? What kinds of government can be created that will assure each group the rights and opportunities to which it is entitled? These are some of the questions the people of the region are struggling to answer. (Eiselen and Uttley, 1969: 151)

Homelands are presented as a place where the Bantu may preserve their own culture. As I interpret the statement the Homelands are presented as an icon of the white South African's determination to develop a co-operative spirit with the Bantu. It is something the authors indicate is possible if everyone works together. But underlying the position is the assumption that African people still have a lot to learn; they are like little children who will grow into the possibility of accepting a scientifically described world.

This attitude partially reflects the writings of Morgan and Tylor and their perspective of culture. Essentially they propose a developmental view which suggests that man will, at differing stages of development, pass through various stages: savagery, barbarism and civilization (Morgan, 1963; Tylor, 1958). Such a position legitimizes the practice of classifying various societies in terms of western civilizations; everything is made relative to it. Western technologies, therefore, offer to the Bantu the promise of deliverance from hunger, disease and poverty. The implications of the promise are never fully explained. The possibility that such deliverance for the Bantu may not occur is mentioned in a closing paragraph on South Africa:

> The system of Separate Development is complicated. It will take years to carry out. Many people wonder whether it will succeed. The Europeans who govern South Africa are certain that Separate Development is a good plan for the Bantu, but many Bantu resent the whole idea. (Eiselen and Uttley, 1969: 52)

This is only the second time within the South African section that the authors suggest there may be two frames of reference for interpreting the lived sense of the people in South Africa, that the two cultures may in fact never live in harmony. Labelling people as "primitive" and "backward" glosses over the possibility of understanding the social realities that exist within the various nations of the developing tropical world (Carswell, 1968: 188).

The authors of the resource material take it for granted that everyday life for the Bantu is not problematic in the sense that there is significant tension between two cultures who are struggling to shape their own destinies. Rather implying that the Bantu are "unco-operative" permits us to view such social issues in the context of a mild family squabble where the parents may plead that, "We have given you every opportunity to become as you will - why are you not grateful to us?" Further it recognized the hierarchy of leadership as between a father and his children. The father leads, the children follow. As such the passively-depicted Bantu are perhaps not unlike the passive student.

Black and White cultural relations are depicted essentially in this way; the progress of a particular black culture may be measured in terms of its acceptance of the white culture. Such a perspective is typical of an imperialist vision of the developing tropical world.

Concept of "developing" Reflected in the Resource Material

i) Background

I have alluded to the imperialist view of "development" in previous sections of this chapter. At this time I will explore this concept in relation to the resource material. Development, as depicted within the resource material, is clearly related to the introduction of technology within the region. If I search for the view of culture which is embedded in the resource material, I would locate it within a pre-Boasian framework where the prototype of development was largely that of Western European Culture. Boas himself questioned the attitude of racial and cultural superiority which was represented in such positions (Boas, 1948). The unilinear view of culture provides an ideological framework through which the imperialist position is supported. Within such a framework the understanding of the cultures of the tropical world as being "less than" would become important in order to utilize efficiently the labour of the cultures which would be exploited by the industry (Caulfield, 1974: 182). Beyond this such knowledge also becomes useful for the various degrees of political pressure which would be applied through the governments organized in the colonies.

Boas challenged the view of racial superiority and questioned the right of anthropologists to make judgments about another culture in terms of their own (Boas, 1948). I point this out, not to become enmeshed in the anthropological issues surrounding the work of Boas, but rather to indicate some of the alternatives to the linear developmental models of culture implicit in the work of Morgan and Tylor and the evolutionary theories of W. W. Rostow (Morgan, 1963; Tylor, 1958; Rostow, 1961).

ii) Illuminating the Concept of Developing

The linear developmental models are implicit in the resource material. Carswell assumes such a stance when he states of agricultural development:

> It is generally agreed by scientists that the first civilization begun by man was in the region at the end of the Mediterranean Sea ... In this area, now called "the fertile crescent" because it is a crescent-shaped oasis watered by two great rivers, man first cultivated grain and settled down to live in one place. The practice of scientific farming began in these earliest civilizations as man learned to produce better strains of grain. With the introduction of irrigation, crop production increased and so did the population ... As the Ice Age came to an end, civilized man spread out from Mesopotamia in all directions. (Carswell, 1968: 1) (underlining added)

As I interpret this statement, man as he evolved progressed developmentally at different rates; some groups stopped at one point; others at another. The view, however, of how these transformations of the various cultures occur is not specifically addressed within the text. That is, it is an assumption on the part of the authors that cultures will slide one into the other and that they are continuing to move towards some point of ultimate perfection. Change in culture is, therefore, seen as being natural. Such a vision of change does not recognize the social forces which may be incorporated into the possibilities for altering the situation (Stravrianos, 1976: 168-169). The assumption that is consistently made with reference to the concept is that development will ultimately have a positive effect upon culture. Carswell, for example, assumes that the function of the educational facilities is to diffuse the scientific technology:

> Figure 178 shows a scene, unknown not long ago, but becoming increasingly frequent in many parts of Africa. More and more schools are being built, and more and more students are going to advanced courses in technical colleges and university colleges, such as Makerere in Uganda and Salisbury, Rhodesia and also in Britain. (Carswell, 1968: 183)

Such an assumption, however, also assumes the dependence of the nation upon the technology that is being imported. Berger has pointed out that it is not only the technology but also the institutions that are imported. Western technology, he argues, could not be supported without such imports as well (Berger, 1976: 121). The impact of such instruction is one of cultural alteration in the sense that a technical-scientific view of man is often imported.

The institutional framework which is imported may have the additional function of permitting the basis for a new elite to develop within a nation, that is, a group of indigenous people who largely embrace the technical culture of the West. As such this group could become active in attempting to ensure that modernity progresses in a way that is acceptable to the Western, exporting nations. This group would in a sense perform the same function as the early anthropologists, in helping the imperial powers to understand the indigenous cultures. This new western educated group conveys the "message" to the people and attempts to ensure the entrenchment of the technical-scientific values. It is this group who are given the necessary skills to transcend their own culture. The neutrality of technical science leaves behind the baggage of culture, language and tradition.

The scientific community concerned with the technical science thus ensures the dependence of the people upon the developed nations. As such, education becomes the co-opting means of cultural subversion; students using the resource material are presented, I would claim, with such a picture. For instead of raising questions regarding the role of education in the developing tropical world, students are left with the following:

> 22. Study Figure 178 and then make two lists, one of things that are similar to your own classroom and the other of things that are different.
> 23. Judging from the drawing on the board, what do you think the lesson is about? (Carswell, 1968: 185)

Basically they are asked to name and classify the educational procedures; a technical role.

The concept of development that is reflected within the resource material is mainly one of a unilinear progression based upon the hope that all people may ultimately embrace the doctrine of equality. To become developed, if you are black, is to try to view yourself as if you were white and living in a technological society. It is assumed within the resource material that all people will indeed want to embrace the western standard of betterment, for their own good. Such views are placed before the student as if they were the only possibilities. It is an imperial-colonial view of developing. Within this context the moral, ethical, value and belief structures of the people are virtually unconsidered.

Summary

Analysis of the British Columbia Grade 8 Social Studies program has demonstrated that the Social Studies Revision Committee consistently turned to a technical science orientation within both the Curriculum Guide and the resource material which complements it. Their initial assumption regarding "what is good for education" has been consistently revealed in the discussion. Further, the of-course assumptions and presuppositional concerns of the Committee have been reflected as follows:

a) that such an approach is taken-for-granted;

b) that geographers are factually oriented;

c) that geographers seek ultimate or universal truths;

d) that geographers consistently avoid debate over epistemologies;

e) that geographers are not concerned with political issues;

f) that problems associated with introducing culture to the developing tropical world are central issues;

g) that discussion of what technology is, is not considered;

h) that changes in income and economic status are not considered important; that a cheap labour pool must continue to be available;

i) that man is an object - specifically, man in the developing tropical world must be conquered;

j) that it is acceptable to judge people according to a technological hierarchy;

k) that it is acceptable to manipulate people;

l) that a reconstructed logic is used;

m) that ethical and moral questions are never fully addressed;

n) that control over central resources is extensive;

o) that the profit motive and capitalist forms of production are emphasized; and

p) that passive acceptors of knowledge are prized.

Man's experiences in the world become objects of study; a reification, in other words, of their actual existence in the world. Students, in turn, like the manipulated puppets of the developing tropical world, become objects through which knowledge will be recycled, without reference to their everyday lives. The structures of reality are, in other words, viewed as the same for everyone. Students and the people of the developing tropical world become malleable together.

But such findings raise further questions:

1) What could this unit look like?

2) What might be the deeper possibilities with the resource materials?

3) What is the possible relationship between the students and the curriculum?

These questions are reflected, in part, through the work of the Austrian phenomenologist Alfred Schutz. Schutz based his phenomenology on a critique of the positive sciences. Thus his position is opposed to the technical-science approach used by the British Columbia Social Studies Revision Committee as a basis to develop the Grade 8 Unit "Developing Tropical World". The reader is asked to reflect dialectically upon both the work of Alfred Schutz and the Unit under consideration to unfold new possibilities for understanding. The dialectic is extended in Chapter 4 through a consideration of George H. Mead and the Unit. In Chapter 5 the dialectic between the concepts of Schutz-Mead and the Unit "Developing Tropical World" is explored.

CHAPTER III

Schutz: The Limits of Intersubjectivity

Phenomenology of Everyday Life

Schutz, in his lifetime, was interested in disclosing our experience of the world in relation to the others whom we encounter in our daily lives. I am born into the world which, over time, I understand as being intersubjectively constituted:

> Once the experience of the Thou is assumed, we have already entered the realm of intersubjectivity. The world is now experienced by the individual as shared by his fellow creatures, in short, as a social world. (Schutz, 1967: 139)

In this statement Schutz begins to clarify the separation between his phenomenology and that of Edmund Husserl. Husserl was essentially concerned with: a) the reduction, b) the eidos and c) the transcendental. Briefly these may be understood as follows:

a) the reduction: Husserl was concerned to go beyond the introspective psychologies of the day. The method of reduction or bracketing was introduced into his philosophy as a form of safeguard to ensure, so far as is humanly possible, that the experience itself is revealed. Bracketing focuses the phenomenologist's attention upon the core or, to use James' term, the kernel of the experience.

In this sense every experience is to be viewed as though it had never occurred before. We suspend, in other words, that which we already know, in order to understand the experience purely as meant (Husserl, 1960: 20). The fringes or horizons of such experiences are to be bracketed out of the deliberations.

b) the eidos: Husserl was also concerned with a second kind of reduction, that of eidetic reduction. If we, for example, consider our understanding of a single chair, before us, we are beginning to understand something of Husserl's meaning. Beyond this, if we ponder other chairs which we have encountered in our life we may ask: what is it that these chairs have in common aside from their individual characteristics? If we consider this aspect, the chairness of chairs, then we begin to contemplate the EIDOS - the image - or the essential meaning of the object chair. The object of the eidetic reduction, in Husserl's terminology, may either be a material object or an idea.

c) the transcendental: The transcendental philosophy of Husserl was rejected by Schutz as losing sight of the central focus of phenomenology, namely the understanding of everyday life. Schutz described his rejection of Husserl's thrust as follows:

> "...unobtrusively, and almost unaware, it seems to me, the idea of constitution has changed from a clarification of the sense of being, into the foundation of the structure of being; it has changed from explication into creation. The disclosure of conscious life becomes a substitute for something of which phenomenology in principle is incapable, viz., for establishing an ontology on the basis of the processes of subjective life." (Schutz, 1975: 83-84)

I interpret Schutz as being concerned with the way in which everyday world phenomena present themselves; what it is like for us, for example, to encounter people of a different culture from our own. In rejecting Husserl's search at the transcendental level, Schutz began to search for literature that for him illuminated the structures of the life world. Thus we find him exploring such writers as Bergson, James, Mead, Dewey and Santayana for his inspiration. Taking it for granted that the Other exists suggests that Schutz's phenomenology is concerned with the intersubjective. It is based upon the observation, that for me, when I see the Other, there is no reason to doubt what I see. Observation, my experience, becomes the fundamental datum. We, in essence, suspend our judgment; we do not accept what we see or reject it, but we merely note the experience of seeing the other as our datum. It is in this way that Schutz avoided the doubt expressed by James: "My inability of me to meet the expectation of others if others may be" (James, 1890). Schutz may be seen as saying that the world of intersubjectivity as experienced by me has two dimensions:

1. the world that I became aware of as being constituted with others regardless of whether they are predecessors or contemporaries; and

2. that the world is taken-for-granted by me. My habits, language and others all constitute my taken-for-granted way of being in the world, or we may say that it is the world that is not analyzed any further by me given the present situation.

The first dimension may be described as the world in which I think of the Other as being a real person and not an object to which I refer. The Other is living with me, for example, in the face-to-face situation. In this situation, there are aspects of the past, present, and future which are present to me through my internal time consciousness. The second dimension of the intersubjective is the world I accept as being there. It has been constructed through my contact with others but I have now forgotten or pushed back the circumstances under which I first experienced it. I cannot recall my first encounters with learning the English language, for example, yet I take it for granted as a cultural phenomenon; I use the language in all aspects of my everyday life.

The taken-for-granted is that towards which, epistemologically, phenomenology directs itself. Being aware, that is, being able to express why I acted in a particular manner, provides iconic statements through which the taken-for-granted experience of the individual can be made explicit. It begins with the natural attitude and seeks, within the horizon of experience, to understand that which is familiar in the experience; i.e., to illuminate the "thing-itself". Here it is posited that the individual sees himself as being at the centre of his life world, but at the same time recognizing that a particular event carries with it the experiencing of the Other. The task of phenomenology, as I have interpreted Schutz is to disclose the hidden features of the lived experience of individuals. My expectation of Schutz's work in this field is that he should disclose, through an analysis of the individual and intersubjective situations, the extent to which an experience may be understood within the context of the social-historical life world which he takes for granted. The analysis which follows will, therefore, focus upon the limits of Schutz's approach to the individual and intersubjective experiences.

Biography

The biography of a particular actor permits him to define himself within a particular situation; it has been constructed in terms of his past experiences embedded in other situations, and aids him in understanding how a particular action or ongoing event relates to his overall plan; Schutz terms this "map consulting" (Schutz, 1967: 116). An individual centers himself in relation to the external world; the world is named as his world and all time and space perspectives are viewed as revolving around him (Schutz, 1973: 307). At the same time the metaphor of "map consulting" suggests that the biography is not static but rather each new action or preconceived project, upon completion, may contribute to the development of map or life-plan. The use of the term map, however, also suggests that the basic framework within which the actor is acting or living his projects through, is delimited. Thus Schutz says:

> the ontological structure of the universe is imposed upon me and constitutes the frame of all my possible spontaneous activities. (Schutz, 1971: 76)

Here he may be interpreted as saying that an individual only appears to act freely in a given situation; that any action that is carried out is carried out within the imposed framework of the lifeworld (Schutz, 1971: 289).

Within this imposed ontological structure Schutz identified areas which may be used to distinguish the grounds for basing our projected actions into the life world:

A) the world within actual reach;

B) the world within potential reach - restorable reach;

C) the world within potential reach - attainable reach;

D) the world beyond reach
(Schutz, 1967: 36-40; 1975: 118).

The world within actual reach and the world within potential - restorable reach may be interpreted together since both are descriptive of the present or the Here and Now and the immediate past. If I turn away, for example, from a book, it is no longer accessible to me. But I may return to it at any moment, and it is probable that I will find it as I have left it. The world is experienced by me, in other words, as a constance, where objects in the world are always thought of as being there. I am always able to say, "I can return to them again" (Schutz, 1967: 8ff; 1971: 23; 1973: 20-21 for contexts). The world of actual reach and potential restorable reach overlap one another in the biography.

The world within attainable reach refers to the world that never was within my reach; that is, it depends upon my desire to bring it within my reach. I interpret Schutz to include both the world that is known to me and sectors of the world which are unknown to me (Schutz, 1967: 39). Both aspects may be discussed in terms of: i) subjective degrees of probability, and ii) grades of ability. The following will serve as an illustration: Do I want to go to Hawaii; is it, in other words, part of my biographical situation and life-plan actually to go? This question reflects the degrees of probability in relation to the potential situation. Do I have enough money to go; is it, in other words, empirically feasible given my scarce resources? (Schutz, 1967: 39) This question reflects the possibility of the individual actually going to Hawaii. Ontologically, then, action within the world occurs within an imposed framework; however, it is the limits of this imposed framework upon which my interest will focus.

Consider, for a moment, the above question: do I have enough money? If we treat this as an iconic statement, what are the potential limits of understanding which are possible? Suppose that I answer, "No". To answer "No" means that in terms of my present circumstances it is impossible for me to go. The answer to the question is in reach. But underlying this there is always the possibility that if circumstances change I may go. "No" in this sense may be taken to mean "possibly no". The grounds for the "no" in terms of the individual's answer are thus constructed in terms of the situation. If we extend our analysis we realize that "no" contextually also refers to surplus money to spend on extra activities. Here, in other words, we begin to expand the context of the situation by encompassing the world of earning money; the job which I work at does not provide the surplus funds necessary for the trip. Other questions may be assigned which will further begin to address the human environment, ideology, and moral position of the individual (Schutz, 1973: 284). We are beginning to address further the world that is within restorable reach as well as the world of attainable reach; I may never have considered what lay behind my being denied the trip.

We are now beginning to speak of the intersubjective and historical dimensions of a biography. For example, the world that is within your actual reach or restorable reach is taken-for-granted by me as being within my potential reach. This is not to say that my actual experience of the situation will be the same as yours since your biographical situation will relate to your specific situation (Schutz, 1975: 118). The limits of such a situation were discussed by Mead as well in terms of taking the role of the other. The world that is within actual reach is a world of direct social experience. It is the world of others, with whom we share a common temporal dimension, and in the face-to-face situation, a common spatial dimension. Those who are my contemporaries would not share this dimension but rather I would experience them as the post office clerk who handled my mail, the truck driver who delivered the vegetables to the store, etc. I never actually see these people but I take it for granted that they are there; otherwise I would not be able to obtain my mail or my vegetables.

Historically, the biography is the totality of my experience in the world. It has been polythetically constructed as I have lived my life with others. I cannot grasp the totality of my life in a moment, but rather divide my experiences into areas or themes which are important or relevant to me. My world of work, for instance, recreation, family, etc., are in a sense presented to me as different provinces of meaning, to use Schutz's term. The claim could not be made, however, that these experiences do not overlap one another for they would, but rather they may be interpreted as areas in which a theme of experience is possible. Thus, if I am asked what it is like to work in a teaching situation I am able to relate my description to that particular area of interest. The theme, however, may be theoretically grasped as I consider the question; I speak, in other words, to my interpretation of the situation at the moment, as it has been influenced by my whole experience of work. As I think further back upon the experience, however, other biographically relevant aspects may be recalled; my memory of certain incidents will be remembered as I shift my focus from detail to detail. Among the details we will find: a) experiences which are socially embedded; e.g., my school experience, parents, friends, teacher training, view of the school; and b) those experiences which are private to the individual, in terms of his unique interpretation.

The "world of working" is developed within the theme of the individual living through his life with others (Schutz, 1973: 227-228). He assumes that the world of others, the objects he sees, the actions he takes all have meaning and centrality, that there is no doubt that all of these experiences have taken place. An individual bestows meaning upon his world, the world in which he lives every day.

The world of working is also an intersubjective world in which we are aware of the logical compatibilities of our experiences; our experiences must provide us with the sense that this is what is and not raise in our minds the question of doubt. (Schutz, 1973: 230) Within the world of dreams, for example, we will accept that we may fly until we confront the issue in our wide awake world. It might also be stated that the dreamer has no ability to act upon nor change the world of others; the limit is that the action may only be thought. Castaneda echoed this when he had to be admitted ritualistically into the world of the sorcerer, Don Juan (Castaneda, 1972). He had to suspend the beliefs of one world in order to be admitted into another. Schutz states, "the more the mind turns away from life, the larger the slabs of the everyday world of working are put in doubt" (Schutz, 1973: 233). It is through our contact with Others that our doubts about events within our daily lives and subsequently our biography are checked.

History

As I reflect upon my experiences as a teacher, my focus is in terms of my remembering what it was for me to become a teacher. Remembering is centered around recalling the events as they are interpreted in terms of the present. The act of remembering involves a noetic-noemata relationship; what is thought and the thinking become intricately bound within a horizon. Experience is then polythetically built-up from events which are seen as relevant within this horizon. Since teaching is, as we have previously suggested, in part institution, there will be sections of my experience that will be historically conditioned; that is, they are part of my biographical experience but they are hidden from view. I may not be aware, for example, that the origin of the term curriculum is derived from the term race track, yet I teach within the curriculum each day. The historicity of the experience must be fully explicated. But as it pertains to my direct experience, the experience of which I have full knowledge, I am able to say, "yes, that is so". We must, however, raise the question of how it is possible to maintain the full separation of the various provinces in terms of recollecting an experience. Schutz and Luckmann maintain that this is possible: "In no case is that which is compatible within the finite province of meaning P also compatible within the finite province of meaning Q" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 24). I interpret Schutz as maintaining that my "knowledge about", that of which I have direct experience, provides me with a clarity, "determinateness, and consistency" which I might not otherwise have; I am in this sense a "competent expert" (Schutz, 1975: 121). But even though I am a competent expert does that mean I have not added on to the experience from other provinces of meaning? In order to consider this further within the biography and particularly within those aspects of the biography that deal with the historical and intersubjective it is necessary to consider further the concepts of noema and noesis within the horizon.

Noema-Noesis

The world of the geographic stranger is a theme which is immediately before me; around it are various sub-themes which, in varying degrees, are related to the theme: the ideas I have for instruction, the materials at hand, those I think of, my encounters with geographic strangers, my students, etc., are all potential relevant topics. Such concerns would reflect what James has termed the thematic kernel and halo, or what Schutz, following Husserl, has termed theme and horizon (James, 1890: 275; Schutz, 1973: 208).

The theme and horizon constitute the frame of reference for any particular topic, but within this frame of reference it is possible to bring together all experience in a unity, as long as, I interrupt Schutz to suggest, the question of doubt is not raised.

Following this example it is possible to say that upon reflection I may distinguish two elements within the theme:

First the geographic stranger, which is not a real object, an object of the physical world, but rather is a part of my structured inner world; and

Second, my consciousness of geographic strangers which permits me to reflect upon the concept.

The noema, in other words, the intentional component of each act, carries with it a meaning which is composed of my previous, sedimented experiences and my present (immediate past) experiences, as well as my future expectations; this theme of geographic strangers is one that I have thought about before and it carries with it a variety of memories. Noema is made pregnant with memories, expectations, etc., and at the same time it represents the possibility of enriching experience by indicating how it may be possible to go beyond to create new experiences. What it is important to keep in mind, however, is that the noema does not refer to the real object.

The "real object", i.e., the geographical stranger, is the one which is perceived from one aspect, then another, from one side and then the other. It reveals itself through the numerous perceptions which the subject makes of the concept. This process by which the concept is experienced is termed noesis; it involves the modes of consciousness (perception, recollection, retention) by which the subject comes to a realization that the object is there, that it is important (Husserl, 1960: 36). The concept is synthesized with other perceptions and with parallel synthesis of noemata into an object which is really before me. That such a constitution occurs is revealed through the understanding of what the concept is and what it means.

In terms of the noesis an act is lived through, it is the sole focus of attention; a subject walks down the stairs. As he walks he is not able to grasp his experience of the stairs. The significance of the act may only be apprehended through his reflection upon the act itself; it is only at this moment that the subject is able to ponder the full meaning of the act. Reflection upon the process of experiencing the act and its noematic contents is for the contents to appear in an objectified form in the consciousness. In turn the objectified datum could become a new source of noesis-noemata experience; the description that emerges is that of a dynamic, ongoing relationship of correspondence between the two. Schutz developed his grounds for understanding the experiencing and experienced in terms of James stream of consciousness. The stream of consciousness for James may be interpreted as relating together the continual flux through which we experience the life world. In order to understand the meaning of this life world we must interrupt the flow but in doing so the thought "ceases forthwith to be itself" (James, 1890: 244). It becomes the perceptive experience which is looked back upon; further it reveals the full meaning of the act in terms of its past, present, and future (noemata).

An understanding of the noesis-noemata correlate lies at the base of any phenomenological analysis, which in turn is part of the ground structure within which the concept of horizon is embedded. It is through such an understanding that the sense of the object itself emerges. Noema, for example, is considered in relation to will, judgment, experience, that is, in terms of the object itself, but it is only "in terms of"; the object itself remains hidden. I reflect upon the book and through this reflection the noematic content of the theme is revealed but the "sense" of the book itself remains hidden (Sokolowski, 1970: 151).

The central question here, as I interpret Schutz, is: How do we know the sense that something is real? For him it is reflected in a phenomenological analysis of the reasonable encounter and the reality which constitutes it. I may encounter anything, for example, the geographic stranger who is before me (Schutz, 1970: 37-38). But at the same time I may begin to alter the form of that encounter so that the stranger becomes a concrete object; i.e., he is objectified in the way of losing those qualities which we may attribute to a living being. As long as I do not pose the question, "Is that reasonable?" then I do not endanger my acceptance of the images. But if the question "Is that reasonable?" is posed then I am reflecting upon the unity of noemata as it is given to me (Husserl, 1931: 365-366). An answer in the negative would require a further explanation of the data until such time as an affirmative answer was arrived at. Speaking to the objective sense of the object is important since it reveals the difference between the real, for example, and the imaginary; we must be able to understand irrationality-rationality; unreality and reality. Thus it may be suggested that within the noesis-noemata correlate P and Q could be compatible as long as the question "Is that reasonable?" is not raised. But this is subject to (A) raising the question in the first place, and (B) answering in the affirmative that "No, it is not", and (C) that the dream, for example, was non-sense in terms of what I knew. Suppose, however, that the dream was compatible with what I know in the wide-awake attitude and that it aids me in understanding the situation in which I find myself. At this point the distinction within the finite provinces begins to blur; P and Q do become compatible.

The biography is the individual's historical centre in the social world; it is what enables him to make sense of his experiences, both subjective and intersubjective. It carries the view of reality within the individual's perception which is not only taken-for-granted within the wide-awake stance but also the dream world. Such a reality view cannot be understood as the difference between P and Q but rather in part, as the relationship between P and Q. Such a relationship retains the noemata-noesis correlate and seeks to understand the influence upon experience. To speak of the biography is also to speak in terms of the flow of time; and past, present and future which are part of the praxis of everyday life.

Stream of Consciousness/Reale Duree

Flow of time in relation to the individual may be described within Schutz's writings in two ways:

1. as it relates to the passage of experiences within consciousness; and
2. as it relates to the individual's experience of time.

If we reflect upon this in relation to the topic at hand we realize that in order to begin to understand the lived experience of another, we must also be sensitive to the way in which his undertakings are understood within the biography and how the experience of time is understood. A simple example which is popular in the area in which I live is people's reference to "Indian Time"; what they seem to mean is that the Indian people have a different conception of time from that of the white people. But the question in terms of Schutz's phenomenology is first, "How is it possible to have different conceptions of time?" and second, "How is this important to our understanding of intersubjectivity?"

Experiences contained within the biography imply that an individual must, at some point, have been intentionally directed towards an Object; to speak of a biography is to make the assumption that an individual was "conscious of" his perceptions and that these are stored within the memory and are capable of being recollected (Schutz, 1971: 2). Schutz's concern with understanding the way in which an individual recollects from his memory is central to his discussion of understanding social life. In his work

Schutz makes use of an important distinction between the writings of William James and Henri Bergson. The essence of this distinction is captured in the following line which he wrote: "Music is a meaningful context which is bound to a conceptual scheme" (Schutz, 1971: 159). In order to interpret this sentence further we will turn for a moment to James and his notion of stream of consciousness.

James sought, in his psychology, to single out the thought of the individual as belonging to himself: "No thought even comes into direct sight of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own ..." Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and context are able to fuse thoughts together which are subdued by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. "The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature" (James, 1890: 226). Building upon Hodgson's chain of consciousness as a continuing sequence of different feelings or experiences, James likens the consciousness of the individual to a stream or river (James, 1890: 230). Both Hodgson's chain and James's stream may be described as visual metaphors.

The stream of consciousness may be divided into two aspects: first the substantive and second the transitive (James, 1890: 243; Schutz, 1975: 8-9). The transitive refers to the flow of consciousness; we, in a sense, suspend our thinking about our surrounding and immerse ourselves in fully living the experience; I fully live through the reading of a hunting experience of a tribal group in New Guinea, without stopping to think about what I am reading. The substantive part of consciousness, on the other hand, relates to the reflective attitude. If we consider a teacher, for example, writing a lesson plan about the New Guinea tribe at some point he will interrupt his action of writing the lesson and ask "Will it work?" We have interrupted the flow of consciousness; we are thinking about our experiences beneath that of those of the internal world which we live through.

Metaphorically, a river of consciousness postulates that there must be unity within it; the various incidents of a lifetime must in some way or other make sense within an individual's biography. It was upon this point that I interpret Schutz as finding a unity between James' use of the term "fringe" and Husserl's concern for the "polythetic" character of the individual's experience (James, 1890; Husserl, 1960: 21). One step of an action builds upon another until they may be grasped monothetically in a single moment. As a foundational concept the metaphor of a stream or lifestream is indubitable (Husserl, 1960: 121). Schutz may be seen as using the stream of consciousness to lay a foundation for his notion of the past in terms of the individual's biography. Our experience in the outer world provides us the data upon which we build our life world; as we look upon our own biography we are able to say this is how we see the world. Looking back in a monothetic glance allows me to see the pastness of the event in, if we like, much the same way a philosopher thinks about his particular topic. But at the same time this does not vanquish the world that is before me; rather it makes the experiences which have occurred much more vivid to my consciousness. In this way reflection upon an act may be thought of as creating an open horizon, one in which the possibilities become expansive rather than limiting (Schutz, 1973: 123).

Within these works, the relationship between the imageless stream and reflection is important since access to consciousness is not possible as long as the action is ongoing. The gestalt of the experience is reflectively captured in terms of the world; to ask the iconic question "What is it like" is to ask a reflective question; we try to move through to the essence of the experience. In this sense to postulate a stream or lifestream metaphor is to accept the clear division between the transitive and substantive. However, if, for example, I am walking along a street I have been on before, I may also recall the other times I have been on the street. I am living my "now", the present situation, with the past. The rain blasting in my face today, and the day it was -100°C. These two situations taken together heighten my awareness of the "now", but they occur simultaneously within the experience of being on the street, one could not be without the other. Biographically, one is not an evaluation of yesterday and today but rather I live the two experiences together; they become something new.

Time and Stream of Thought

We must recall that we are still considering Schutz's statement, "Music is a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme". As we reflect upon the stream metaphor further, we must consider its linearity. A stream, for example, is for the most part always moving forward ... even if in an imageless manner. A melody, however, has certain qualities which are not restricted to linear thought. That is, one note must make sense in relation to the others so that we are able to move with the entire flow. In order to explore Schutz's reference to melody further, we must briefly consider Bergson's dialectic of (1) mechanical or mathematical time, and (2) duration or internal time. Mechanical time may be described as clock time, the time of the external world (Bergson, 1910). Internal time, on the other hand, is thought to be our lived time, the time we think it takes, for example, for an event to occur. Bergson's thesis was that time and space, rather than being separate, as they are in external time, are one and the same (Bergson, 1910: 87). This may be illustrated through the following simple example: if I hear a cuckoo clock and count the number of strokes, then I am concerned with mechanical time. I am able to place each stroke in space as 1, 2, 3, etc. If I were, however, to be caught up with the music of the clock rather than with the single stroke, my consciousness would hear the individual durations not as moments separated from each other but rather as the same moment, as a melody; time is thus projected into space and they become one (Bergson, 1910: 125; van den Berg, 1970: 101-130; Schutz, 1971: 181). We may now interpret Bergson as saying that individuals in their everyday lives live within the possibility of multiple time perspectives. We may also suggest that he views the culture in which industrial countries function, a technologically oriented culture, as glossing over internal time with its successively deeper layers, preferring rather to place a much higher value on the formality of external time. To speak of "Indian Time" within Bergson's conception acknowledges the importance of living in one's own time. I am suggesting that he is pointing to the texture of time; a melody is a quality, it is not something which we may grasp. This conception of time is somewhat opposed to that of James.

James consistently uses the stream metaphor. In accepting the stream metaphor it may be suggested that he is postulating a linear flow of experience and time. A stream does not turn back on itself but rather constantly flows forward even in moments of turbulence. "Expecting and being ready for a new impression to succeed; when it fails to come, we get an empty time instead of it; and such experiences ceaselessly renewed, make us most formidably aware of the mere time itself ..." (James, 1890: 626-7). Such a conception of time places James' conception, in a sense, outside the stream (James, 1890: 239). While it may reflect the movement of consciousness, it does not reflect the interrelationship between the aspects of consciousness; the relationship between one note and another which produces the gestalt of the melody to which Bergson refers.

If we reflect further upon the melody metaphor as it may be interpreted through Schutz's work, we may note that the constitution of the melody was built up step by step in order to build the whole. It was, in other words, polythetically constructed, but in order to understand it as a whole, it must be monothetically grasped. While the conception initially appears to be close to James, we see that clearly it is not. The whole of the melody is anticipated by us the moment we begin to hear two notes, each distinguished by its existence in the specious present (Husserl, protentions and retentions) ... In other words, there must be a temporal relationship between actual experience, past experience, and anticipated experience (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 55). The experiences are contextually bound to what I have experienced before and what I am experiencing now; a lesson about geographic strangers cannot be viewed as a lesson out of time, as a lesson which is not linked to students' past, present and future. It is as a melody bound to all the possible contexts in which a particular student interprets the resource material. I interpret Schutz as saying that the individual experiences are important in terms of their unities within the consciousness. They are not isolated within the consciousness but rather carry with them an internal sense for making them whole, and in a temporal sense relating them to the whole within the stream of time (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 52-53).

How each particular experience is arranged is, as in grasping the melody, dependent upon the stress or tension of consciousness experienced by the individual. We experience different aspects of a total event in different ways. A teacher, for example, presents an aspect of Asian life to students and in doing so she presents the particular cultural understandings as she views the unity of what she is presenting. A student, however, hears the rhythm of the presentation differently and reconstructs the presentation within his consciousness the way he, given the present situation and his biography, has come to see it. Such an interpretation will reflect the different emphasis which a student may place on the external, polythetic aspects, of the presentation which makes up the unity as it is viewed at that moment, in a monothetic glance. The unities which have been constructed by the teacher are not necessarily those of the student; the unities ebb and flow through temporal time. Some are lost and others, which are experienced as being of more relevance than others, are retained. The "quanta" of inner duration, suggest Schutz and Luckmann, are dependent upon retention, impression and anticipation (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 56). How long an individual will reflect upon a particular unity within the stream will depend upon the motive for carrying out the particular reflection and, in turn, the motivation will determine the length of time spent in terms of the reflection. Here we would notice the difference between Dewey's "stop and look", or in other words, the close scrutiny of a particular unity and the glance (Schutz, 1967: 55). We must as well recognize the intersubjective implications for temporality present in both the melody and the teaching situation.

A melody is, in terms of the music, an experience which has been created by a composer. Often the composer's music is interpreted by a player who in turn plays for a listener. The players (for our purpose it would not matter if they were present or not since the same situation would prevail) enter into a quasi-simultaneous relationship with the composer; they enter into, in other words, the "flux of the music" (Schutz, 1971: 174). Through this they are with each other, they are brought together in a Now, the present, and will get older together as they play the music. That is, they share a quasi-simultaneity of their streams of consciousness (Schutz, 1971: 23) for the duration of their time together. The teacher and students in the classroom live with the possibility of sharing a quasi-simultaneity of their streams of consciousness and thus enter into a We relationship which would be focused around a pedagogic situation, in our case the geographic strangers. In the school setting, however, the teachers and students, who would not necessarily have first hand experience, rely on the materials available to interpret the particular culture. I interpret Schutz, in this instance, as saying that the possibility of entering into a quasi-simultaneous relationship with a member of another culture will depend upon 1) a first hand account of a member of the culture; 2) the teacher as prime interpreter being able to understand something of the realities of living in the culture, (here the iconic question "What is it like?" would provide the basis) and 3) the student's own sense of inner flow in interpreting the question of "What it is like".

We may extend further Schutz's interpretation at this point in the sense that we must understand something of that which it is to be human. The temporal flow of inner time is not limited to a single culture but rather would be the experience of any wide awake human being; we all experience time as a part of our being-in-the-world. A problem, however, does begin to emerge in terms of the way Schutz has been interpreted to this point. While we are able to say that a quasi-simultaneity of streams of consciousness and hence the temporal stream does emerge, provision must be made for the historical periods which are excluded from the relationship, in the sense that we are asked to suspend what we know in order to enter into a relationship of the moment. What is being communicated through the composer and the player is not simply the melody but also the historical realities of the situation in which the music was created. Early American Blues, for example, is not simply a melody but it carries with it a political reality of the everyday life world of the singer. The act of interpreting the music, requires more than the simultaneity of streams of consciousness; it requires an understanding of the historical context of the music in order for it to make sense.

Schutz, however, does open this possibility when he states:

> My interrelationships with my fellow-man, their interpretations of my situation and mine of theirs, codetermine the meaning the situation has for me. This complicated texture of meanings is constitutive for our experience of the social world. It could rightly be said that Mozart's dramatic art is rather a representation of the basic structure of the social world than an imitation of nature. (Schutz, 1971: 196)

I interpret Schutz as saying that entering into a social relationship requires that I be fully cognizant of the historical time in which I live. A full understanding of the temporal relationship within the social community in which the relationship is established is required. Recognizing the basic structure of the social world is also taking account of the historical moments which influence it. A teacher in a classroom with his students is in a relationship of authentic communication, addressing not only the historical moment in which he and his students are living, but also the historical context of the material or resource they are using. This point will need to be developed further at a later time. Suffice it to say that in order for the students to make sense of the geographic foreigners together, they must, as I have interpreted Schutz, be concerned with both the inner and outer times that are reflected through the various classroom materials and their own sense of understanding, in terms of the temporal times in which they themselves live, and their own biography.

Our interpretation of Schutz to this point has begun to explore the dialectic between the individual and the social world through two central concepts which he explores:

a) biography and its horizonal aspects; and

b) time and the stream of consciousness.

Both concepts, as I have illustrated, are crucial to our understanding of the ways in which students within the Social Studies 8 program in British Columbia may understand the geographic foreigner and hence the unit "Developing Tropical World". I have suggested that motives in constructing the unities within the stream of consciousness are important. It is to a discussion of motives which we will now turn.

Motives

My reasons for having acted in a particular way reflect an interrelationship between what I feel or think and what those around me feel and think. An educator and those who learn with him reflect the complexity of understanding: the reasons why the group, be it a student-student, teacher-student or a class as a whole come to share a particular situation for study. Why those classroom participants may become deeply committed to considering their understanding of geographic foreigners, for example, reflects, in part, their particular reasons for becoming involved in such a study. Such genuine reasons, aside from those present in an objective sense; i.e., the curriculum, would reflect what Schutz terms "motive".

If we speak of motives in general we are speaking of a specific intention which separates it from the spontaneity of intentionality; the latter occurs upon reflection as a substantive moment within the stream, while the former occurs in a spontaneous or unanticipated way within a situation (Schutz, 1970: 6ff). It is in this latter sense that I concentrate upon the dialogue I am having with a particular student to the exclusion of all else and attempt to interpret its meaning in terms of my background of experience; we may say we have a specific interest in this dialogue which is reflecting our search through our knowledge at hand (Wagner, 1975: 319). Motives provide a ground structure for comprehending the meaning context which a [illegible] intends. Schutz identified these different motives:

i) in-order-to;
iii) because; and
iii) pragmatic.

The in-order-to motive may be interpreted as being oriented toward an intended or future state of affairs: an educator might say, for example, we will use this particular display in class tomorrow since I feel it may help us move toward a better understanding of this particular situation. A because motive, on the other hand, is oriented towards the past of the individual, "I acted as an educator in this particular way because ..."

The third type of motive suggested by Schutz is the pragmatic or interpretive. We live our life to its fullest within the life world, we act both within and upon this world; in other words, are able to transform it. We act "as if" we may always carry out our actions again within the life world; we have a "practical interest" in the world. (Schutz, 1971: 72; 1973: 306) Let us first turn to the in-order-to motive to consider it further.

1) The in-order-to motive reflects our purposive conduct in terms of our life world. We will take action, in other words, in order to achieve a certain state or purpose. There is surrounding this motive a sense of anticipation that the particular goal may be achieved. A sense of the historical, however, pervades the motive since that which we expect to achieve in the future may carry with it that which has been in the past. Schutz illustrates this by suggesting that an object in the corner carries with it some expectations of the situation (Schutz, 1970: 24). If I, for

example, enter into my basement in Northern British Columbia, I do not expect to encounter a snake; I may suspend my belief in what is in the corner until further notice, but I do not have a completely open horizon of possibilities within the situation; certain of these possibilities are suspended. I will investigate further, however, in order to understand more about the object in the corner. Further we may say that an in-order-to motive displaces the time considerations of the individual, since it is oriented toward a future which will come in the way we expect to come, that is, at the "same time"; meaning I think this will happen, but since it is in the future I recognize that it may be interrupted at any time. The individual's feeling of assurity in everyday life that the future will come is based partly upon the because motive. An interrelationship between the two may be illustrated as follows: I know that science has proved theoretically that the sun never sets, that the earth moves around the sun. However, I continue to refer to the sunsetting in my everyday conversation. I know the sun sets because I have witnessed it before, in the same way that I fully expect it to rise. I know that it must set in-order-to rise.

The apprehension of the because motive by an actor is a reflective act. Natanson suggests that such an act is the difference between life and thought (Natanson, 1968). It implies that the criteria for evaluating a specific action are available only after the fact; the action must have been completed or interrupted and become an act. The because motive therefore speaks to the genesis of the act itself (Schutz, 1973: 71). An actor may be interpreted as bringing into his description his past lived experiences which, as he understands them, provide a meaning context for the completed act. Referring to the past act is regarded as a new act of attention where the concern is specifically with the meaning of the individual's action. The act which I have just reflected upon becomes itself new or reborn in that I may have focused upon one aspect of it more than upon others or, in its simplest form, the freshness of the prior action, upon reflection, may be lost.

Understanding the because motive is dependent upon the individual knowing why he acted in a particular way. Schutz describes this as self-explication and for him it becomes a critical component in terms of making sense of the act:

> And since every interpretation in the pluperfect tense is determined by the Here and Now from which it is made; the choice of which past experiences are to be regarded as the genuine because - motives of the project depends on the cone of light which Ego lets fall on its experiences preceding the project. (Schutz, 1967: 95)

He clarified his meaning in relation to a man opening an umbrella which I interpret as follows: If a man were asked why he was opening an umbrella, he would answer, "Because it is raining". The because motive is a restatement of the act monothetically; the various prior contexts in which the umbrella had been opened, or polythetic constructs, are collapsed into one statement about the present act. Here the metaphor, "cone of light" refers to the ability of the actor to understand the full meaning content of his act. In our case the statement, "because it is raining", does not provide more than an iconic statement; the disclosiveness of the polythetic structure of the monothetic glance must be explicated within a phenomenological context. The limits of the individual to recollect events is dependent upon his ability to remember.

I may find myself at any given moment within the world of everyday life and I take my experiences within this life world for granted. I understand that I must deal with this world and come to terms with it. I, therefore, recognize that the world acts upon me and I act upon it, and realize my possibilities for transforming this world. As Schutz suggests, I make contact with it and expect it to offer me resistance through which I attempt to transform it in various ways, either giving up my efforts or managing to overcome. The recognition that I am within the world and that I must enter into that world, Schutz terms my pragmatic motive (Schutz, 1973: 312). This is to say that I am, within time and space, the centre of my world. But up to this point I have not recognized the world as a world in which others exist; now, we must consider these motives within their context of a world inhabited by others.

If we return to the example of the classroom teacher for a moment, we realize very quickly that a lesson implies the coming together of the various participants each with his various motive. A lesson, however, provides for them the common focus within the context of the classroom; the participants, in other words, must enter a social relationship in which a common motive is shared if there is to be a dialogue among the participants. This is not, however, to say that the interpretation of the motive may not be different; i.e., it may be for marks or interest. The shared motive among class members would be understanding the lesson. The entering into of such a relationship for Schutz is termed reciprocity of perspectives. Such a notion, in relation to the motive, interpreted in terms of the intersubjective, is central.

Reciprocity of Perspectives

I would suggest that Schutz has built his theory of the reciprocity of perspectives upon the term "vantage point" as it was developed by Cooley (Cooley, 1902). Simply we may say that a student sees the classroom from his particular vantage point, as does the teacher, or as would the author of a text. But it was suggested previously that all the students are in a classroom together, so we talk of a reconciliation between all of these various vantage points. I step, figuratively, from my vantage point into the vantage point of another; but it will be recognized that there is relativity involved here. We cannot actually take the place of the other but rather it must be imagined that we do; this is the reciprocity of perspectives. In my everyday life I take it for granted that I can take the place of the Other. From this concept Schutz concludes the following:

> By this operation of these constructs of common sense thinking it is assumed that the sector of the world taken for granted by me is also taken for granted by you, my individual fellow-man, even more, that it is taken for granted by "us". But this "We" does not merely include you and me but "everyone of us"; i.e., everyone whose system of relevances is substantially (sufficiently) in conformity with yours and mine. (Schutz, 1973: 12)

It is within the reciprocity of perspectives that we are able to speak of reciprocal motives, that is to say every one of us is assumed to have a common interest or motive.

Within the classroom setting we may say that the social interaction is based upon the understanding of the other and an anticipation that, barring the unforeseen, I know how the other will act. It may be suggested that when, within a classroom dialogue, a student asks the location of Kampuchea and the instructor points to the correct area of the globe, there has been a degree of understanding between the two. The in-order-to motive of the student is interpreted by the instructor as a because motive, since it was assumed that the student had something in mind. Otherwise the question would not have been raised; the because motive of the instructor took as a presupposition the student's in-order-to motive. Responding to the situation, as an instructor, the teacher pointed to the map, thereby engaging in an action in order to provide the student with the requested information. It is taken for granted by the student, within the context of the situation, that the other is willing to do so, since he had, in the past been involved in like situations; that is, his knowledge at hand involving similar motives and circumstances suggested that the teacher would be willing to help him. Such an example involves a generalized rule, or idealization as Husserl terms it, that Schutz labels the reciprocity of motives (Schutz, 1973: 23).

Our discussions have, however, avoided the question of how the other "knows" the motive within the situation. It will be realized, of course, that he doesn't. The student, for example, upon further questioning may reveal a completely different motive than that which the teacher assumed. There thus lies within this relationship two aspects: first that it was just chance that the other understood our motive and second, that in order to understand the motives of each other, the student and teacher must open the dialogue further (Schutz, 1973: 24). I would interpret Schutz, within his discussions of motives, as suggesting that within the intersubjective setting, and particularly within the face to face situation, we must be sufficiently aware of the participants' motives before committing ourselves further to the dialogue. This is to say that while we take-for-granted the motives of the other in everyday life, we will, if a conversation is to continue, seek to clarify the Other's motives in terms of our own. It would be possible to say that we would do this at the point where we no longer are able to assume the motive is the same. Reflection upon the motive involved in the dialogue and the degree of commitment that would be required to continue, suggests the possibilities of an emergent hermeneutic; we seek to clarify the idealization of the Other through dialogue with the Other. Such a notion would only apply within the face-to-face situation; i.e., where the Other is immediately before me.

Motives in terms of Schutz's theory of intersubjectivity reflect further the "we" relationship in addition to time. The two must be woven together in order that we may begin to think of a world which is specifically common to us. But we must understand that only in terms of the face-to-face situation do we see the individual; student and teacher, etc., as immediately there before us; in other instances the world is grasped in terms of what we feel is typical (Schutz, 1973: 8-12). It is in this aspect of our relations with others that we may begin to consider further the role of the resource materials (i.e., those related to the Grade 8 Social Studies Unit "Developing Tropical World") as they begin to enter into a dialogue.

Typicality

Within the face-to-face relationship we grasp the Other in our vivid present; the student understands that the teacher is standing immediately before him. Schutz suggests that this Thou-orientation constitutes this direct observation (Schutz, 1967: 163ff). But it is also possible to suggest that I encounter others who are not immediately present to me. Schutz may be interpreted as saying that we make the translation from direct experience to indirect experience very easily (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 197). The student who leaves the classroom for the day is no longer immediately before me but rather becomes one whom I know; he remains a contemporary (Schutz, 1973: 15ff; Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 73-74). We may speak of a whole range of inbetweens that would indicate variations between the direct and indirect are possible. The way in which we think of the Other in this situation, our indirect experience of him, is in terms of what is "typical"; e.g., typical motives which we feel may be ascribed to the Other; this is not to say that we know how the Other will act but rather that we may guess how he may act. In addition, however, to these "guesses" in terms of motives we may also "guess" at the Other's attitude and actions in particular situations. This would suggest that I have a construct or scheme of reference which has been added to as my contacts and experiences of the Other have developed over time (Schutz, 1973: 23).

We must also consider that both the face-to-face and contemporaries are also interpreted in terms of the social role which they are assuming at the moment (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 184). Students will apprehend me not only as Ed Harrison, but also as a teacher who is expected to do those things which are typical of being a teacher, taking attendance, for example, or using a chalk board. Naming, in other words, occurs. Through the process of naming we are attaching more than a mere label but are also attaching particular notions (Goffman, 1959). We may say that naming provides an open horizon for the object. For example, if I encounter one student, I am always open to changing my particular way of thinking about the way she will act as shared experiences further common understanding. I do not have to pre-experience in my projection of the Other, the way I think the other will act. If such was the case the instance of unknown, or as Schutz would say, novel, experiences could not be accounted for (Schutz, 1973: 7, 74; Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 186-188). It may be further pointed out within the situation that I as a teacher also view myself as teacher and in my routines within my school life act within these typifications.

I would interpret Schutz as suggesting that it is language which we use to express the typifications we have in mind. Through it emerges the generalizations of the community; the characterizations of particular cultures in certain ways, for example, would illustrate the case. All the people of Ceylon may be generalized as being farmers. But while we may state this, it is not necessary to say that there are not private interpretations of these public typifications; each has its own fringe or halo (Schutz, 1975: 105). Here we are beginning to experience the relationship of education, in a lived sense, and typicality.

My typical ways of viewing the world have been handed down to me by my friends, parents, teachers, my teachers' teachers, the material I read, etc. I see my cultural world from the inside; I take it for granted that we act in certain ways at certain times. It is, for example, part of my experience that I and others do not shout on buses. Our language and syntax conveys these ways of proceeding within the culture (Schutz, 1973: 14). Schutz may, as well, be interpreted as saying that this knowledge differs from one individual to another. We have previously made reference to contemporaries, those with whom I interact at the moment. But at the same time there are also predecessors, those upon whom I cannot have influence or act, but whose actions and ends are open to both private and public interpretations (Schutz, 1975: 119). As we move between those who are our contemporaries and those who are our predecessors the central questions become, How is it that we are able to move between these two types of experiences? and How are we able to move beyond or transcend our personal interpretations and constitute the "we" relationship? It is here that, as Natanson points out, we search for the experience of such a relationship (Natanson, 1970: 33). Or how is it that, as I interpret Schutz, we are able to be with the Other in a full relationship?

Our first question, Schutz suggests, may be considered in terms of the community of space, in the face-to-face situation, even if my "consociates" (contemporaries) are strangers to me I am able to apprehend them (Schutz, 1973: 16). All of us share such a community in terms of what is both of interest and relevant to us. The basis of this is that it is within my imagination that I am able to grasp the Other; thus we conclude that the Other may only be grasped as a partial self. By this may I suggest that the various expectations which I develop with respect to my external observations of the Other are formulated along the lines of the typical roles which I give to the Other. Such a position, as we have seen, leads us back to our sharing a community of time with the Other. Schutz attempts to show that as we move from course-of-action types to personal types, we move from increasing remote to increasingly fuller relations (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 194ff). The degree of closeness suggests a fullness in the relationship. As I interpret Schutz in his essay Making Music Together, the co-performers in the face-to-face situation would epitomize a fuller relationship (Schutz, 1971: 175). The focus of his interest is based upon Max Weber's definition of a social relationship, as follows:

> the conduct of a plurality of persons which according to their subjective meaning are mutually concerned with each other and oriented by virtue of this face. (Schutz, 1971: 175)

The subjective meaning is made possible through a sharing of motives in the community of time and space. In order for the musicians to make sense of their music together, they must share, reciprocally, the various "in-order-to" motives, in so far as sharing is possible. Schutz states it this way: "the subjective meaning the group has for its members consists in their knowledge of a common situation, and with it of a common system of typifications and relevances" (Schutz, 1971: 251). That is to say that the individual must feel at home within the group (Schutz, 1971: 106ff). We are thus pointed towards a further exploration of this meaning of subjective.

Second, how are we able to transcend our personal interpretations and constitute the "we" relationship?

(i) We must recognize that the other constitutes for us a mediated view of the self (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 245) or what Cooley has termed the "looking glass". But in order for this to occur we should be fully aware of ourselves as a personal self; the child, for example, may be said to experience his encounter with others at a relatively low social level (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 245). Thus within Schutz's work, it must be understood how the polythetic social experience of the child is constituted before a fuller understanding of how a We-relationship is formed. Schutz, as I have interpreted him, does not provide us with such a notion within his theory of intersubjectivity.

(ii) It is language which conveys the relative institutional and cultural world view. A child has experiences from the moment he is born and these may be termed pre-linguistic experiences. But at the same time these experiences are bound up with the first words of the doctor, nurse, father, mother, etc. From this it may be suggested that the child is exposed to two ways of understanding: a) that no matter how rudimentary, there are experiences which he may understand as his own; and b) that the schema for constructing typifications and ways of schematizing experiences are based upon prelinguistic experiences. Schutz and Luckmann suggest that there is a prior mirroring of the intersubjective in the "we" relation. From this it is possible to say that language is constituted through the intersubjective mirroring (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 249). Once it is mastered, in other words, the self is understood through the semantic-syntactic structure of the language, it becomes possible to separate it from the concrete We-relations upon which it was built so that the individual is able to transcend his immediate experiences.

The reality which the child experiences is screened or filtered by the language. His relationships with others may be understood in terms of his own subjective interpretation and the typifications which he has built up within them. It is suggested that the particular background experiences and the intersubjective views that are held by those with whom he has contact and in turn from whom he learns the language may differ considerably; e.g., different dialects, regional beliefs, bilingual situations, etc. It may be suggested that Schutz's view of the "tuning in relationship" is dependent not only upon the situation, but also the individual comprehension of the possibility of belonging with the group given his ability to comprehend the meaning of such an event, and given his historical consciousness as it relates to his biography; he must be able to see the possibility of a genuine We-relationship.

If we consider the previous discussion in the light of a classroom experience concerning geographical others, we are aware of the remoteness of the situation from the student. The authors of the texts and resource material have filtered their way of viewing the other culture through their own particular, typical ways of understanding. In third person resource materials, of which the material in the unit "Developing Tropical World" is comprised, we begin to comprehend the problems. It is possible that the language itself does not convey the potential for establishing a We-relationship. The student should be able to identify something which is relevant to his own ways of understanding his situation in terms of the typical structures. Within this classroom the teacher and the other students become the key to establishing a genuine We-relationship in terms of an open horizon. Such a situation depends not only upon the typicality, motives, and interest, but also upon the relevance structures which are presented within the material under study; it is this to which we will now turn.

Relevance Systems

The concept of relevance refers to an actor's selection of an item of interest from his stock of knowledge at hand; that is, from his sedimentation of previous experiences within his biography. Making a selection suggests that an individual will interrupt his stream of consciousness by an act of reflection. We must note here that such an act describes the deliberative look of the actor, his intention; this is to differentiate it from the intentionality, where there is both intention as well as a spontaneous aspect: I may see something which I did not realize was there before. The concept of relevance speaks to both qualities.

Schutz may be interpreted as intending or having developed two approaches to the concept of relevance:

i) with relation to the individual; and

ii) with relation to the intersubjective interpretation.

Much of the work dealing with the question of intersubjective relevance structures of the everyday life world was not completed in his lifetime. Therefore, this limits the horizonal context of his work as it pertains to the social world.

First, we will consider the structures of relevance with regard to the individual and then consider some of the possibilities with regard to the social world.

Schutz identified three types of relevance:

A) topical,

B) interpretational, and

C) motivational.

A) Topical Relevance

Topical relevances speak to that which is viewed as being unfamiliar within an undifferentiated background of unproblematic familiarity; it must be viewed, in addition, within a field and horizon (Schutz, 1970: 26).[1]

The term "unfamiliar" carries with it degrees of strangeness which would indicate that Schutz may be interpreted to mean the extent to which a particular problem would need to be analyzed in order to bring it within the familiar. Topical relevances, along with the other types of relevance, may be imposed: I have homework to do. Or it may be voluntarily attended to: I wish to further investigate this aspect of a culture. "Imposed" may be defined in two ways: 1) the topic may be attended to involuntarily, and 2) there may be aspects in a thematic which are voluntarily attended to or involuntarily imposed; i.e., hidden from view. The first sense may be taken for granted within the example above; it is the second sense of the term I wish to consider below.

The possibility of voluntarily moving from one theme to various sub-themes as they are related to the paramount or home theme was described by Schutz as follows:

> By the establishment of the paramount theme as a home base both the direction of the intrinsic relevances leading into the horizon and the limit up to which they must be followed are to a certain extent already constituted. (Schutz, 1973: 32)

This suggests that the voluntary turning towards has already been constituted before it is actually carried out, that is, it is passively attended to but the selection of a sub-theme was viewed as an active process. It should be kept in mind that for Schutz topical themes, as well as the other themes, are related to what the individual already knows; that is, he deals with strangeness, in terms of which he may deal with related situations; he finds aspects with which he is familiar and deals with them at that level.

We may, for example, return to our Social Studies 8 class considering India. Schutz, in this situation, may be interpreted as suggesting that while the culture is unfamiliar in some ways, there are still aspects with which we are familiar. So while we may not fully understand a particular child-rearing practice, we may understand the mother's deep love for her child. We are bound, through our understanding of love, to the mother and child. Such a thematic of topical relevance opens the horizons for further exploration within the group; the theme may become enlarged and deepened (Schutz, 1970: 29). New themes related to the first may be explored, such as how the child in the early years begins to explore his world under his mother's care. Or this theme may completely disappear in favour of what is a new topic; the dialogue may focus on building techniques in the village. But if we probe further we realize that this shift is the result of our interest in some other aspect within the stream of consciousness that has allowed us to shift our attention (Schutz, 1970: 30). Thus we begin to have some understanding of how new topics may arise within the field of consciousness of the student.

B) Interpretational Relevance

An individual's attention, in relation to the other categories of relevance, has been called to something that is unfamiliar within otherwise accepted surroundings. The noematical-noetical implications of the individual attending to an object are now given as a theme for interpretation. By the term "interpret", I mean that the object perceived must be brought within my typical experiences which constitute my sedimented knowledge at hand. I understand Schutz as defining two aspects of interpretational relevances:

> The establishment of intrinsic interpretational relevance; and the actual interpretational relevance structures constructed in relation to the object as it is directly experienced. (Schutz, 1970: 43)

Each may be expanded as follows:

i) the object may be inferentially deemed sufficiently interesting to the individual to warrant it being brought further within his situationally defined context. "Yes, I would like to find out more about how this mother is raising her child." To describe this Schutz uses the term, "establishing intrinsic relevances". "Establishing" could refer to topical relevances as it may mean that topical relevances are only an aspect of interpretational relevances; this is a topic to which I will return shortly.

ii) the object is thematized within the individual's experiences. In order to understand the meaning, in other words, of the object, it must be interpreted by him and subsumed, as to its typical structures, under the various experiences which an individual has had. The interpretation is carried out in relation to the whole setting - biographical, locational, etc., as well as that in which it is interpreted to appear. Relevance at this level Schutz interprets to have:

> ...a curious double function. Not only is it interpretatively relevant that part of our stock of knowledge at hand has "something to do" with the thematic object now given to our interpretation; but, uno actu, certain particular moments of the object perceived obtain the character of major or minor interpretative relevance for the task of recognizing and interpreting the actually experienced segment of the world. (Schutz, 1970: 37)

If an individual says, therefore, that he thinks he sees a car in the shadows ahead, he is not only calling upon previous understandings of what he believes a car typically to be, but he is also selecting certain characteristics from the immediate situation which he may interpret as being more significant to his understanding than others. The same may be said for a student exploring the love between a Hindi mother and her child. Conceptually, certain aspects of the relationship may stand out more than others. Seeing the way the mother is holding the child may be more interpretatively relevant to him that the veil which may be draped over the mother's head. Following through with his interpretations, a student may eventually be able to say why he feels love was revealed between the mother and child in the particular picture. It should be noted here that it is the interpretation of that which was familiar to the student, that of a mother holding a child, which was made thematic and not the woman and child themselves.

Within this analysis the question of what is qualified as imposed or intrinsic also arises. The first guess made as to whether or not it is love that is being demonstrated (it is possible that the child was not the mother's, etc.) originates in what Husserl has termed the passive synthesis of recognition, that is, the guess does not have an active or volitional consideration on the part of the actor (Schutz, 1970: 42; 63-64). If an individual guesses it is love between mother and child he is seeing or that the cradling is similar to some other human experience he has encountered at one time or another, then he is recognizing the situation passively. If later on he uses this initial determination to understand that what he sees is really something else, then he has involved his first guesses actively in his determination, even though they were used in a new context. In this way the first guesses are volitionally turned towards as aspects of the intrinsic moment of the paramount theme; they have come imposed since they were previously determined and at the same time they are volitional in the sense that they are made an active part of the interpretation (Schutz, 1970: 35-44; 63; 68; 166; 1973: 9).

C) Motivational Relevance

If we return for a moment to the student considering the mother and child and deciding that the picture indicates, for him, something of the nature of love, it may be suggested that to do so for him was important. By suggesting it was important, the implication is made that to do so was relevant to him, but there is nothing of the topical or interpretational in this situation. What does become clear is that what he chooses; i.e., love or some other descriptive term, determines the way in which he will act; this is to say that different goals will carry with them different potential ways of acting. While there is not a life and death situation portrayed here, there is the importance of having a satisfactory interpretation available for the student's peers. There is, in other words, the understanding that a satisfactory or plausible interpretation must be available if the situation warrants it; this is so even if he is not called upon to display his interpretation. We may speak within this setting of motivational relevance; that is, the outcome of the decision taken will have relevance for the student's future actions (Schutz, 1970: 46).

Two types of relevance motives are identified, 1) active and 2) passive. Those that are active are understood by the individual to have actively stimulated his attention (i.e., because-motives) while those that are passive impose a relevance structure on the situation. My attention in relation to my purpose at hand will focus upon the passive structure of motivational relevance.

Passive relevance structures are defined by Schutz as being relevances of a second order. By this I interpret him to mean that I have been given knowledge by others (parents, teachers, friends) which may be believed by me with varying degrees of plausibility (Schutz, 1970: 84). Nevertheless, my gearing into the outer world will take account of this knowledge; I accept my friends' advice about a classroom event since I believe them to know what they are talking about. For the moment I take this belief for granted; it is neutralized within my horizon, but I may at any moment call it into play. This is not to say, however, that I may fully be able to recollect why I believe the statement to be true; the origin of my belief may have been lost or may never have existed within my biography. But within my interpretation it must be acknowledged that I may actively bring aspects of the taken-for-granted into my field of motivational relevance.

Each of the three types of relevance has been discussed as though it were separate and distinct within the individual, but Schutz never intended for them to be interpreted in this way; his intent rather was to understand how each may be interpreted, at any one given moment, as being interrelated (Schutz, 1970: 68ff).

Schutz sums up his position as follows:

> ... We have found that what we call our stock of knowledge at hand is the sedimentation of various previous activities of our mind, and these are guided by the systems of prevailing actually operative relevances of different kinds. These activities lead to the acquisition of habitual knowledge, which is dormant, neutralized, but ready at any time to be reactivated. Motivational relevances lead to the constitution of the "interest" situation, which in turn determines the system of topical relevances. The latter being material which was marginal or horizonal into the thematic field, thus determining the problems for thought and action for which is, ultimately, the world which is beyond question and taken for granted. These topical relevances also determine the level or limits for such investigation required for producing knowledge and familiarity sufficient for the problem at hand. Thus, the system of interpretational relevances becomes established, and this leads to the determination of the typicality structure of our knowledge.
> (Schutz, 1970: 66)

These systems of relevance are not temporal in their scope; they are, as we have previously stated, part of an interrelated structure, a unity, and as such cannot be separated one from the other. Among these three types of relevance structures Schutz sees motivational relevance as being important for the theory of intersubjective understanding (Schutz, 1970: 171). But we must keep in mind that an analysis of one, the motivational, will lead to a discussion of the other three.

Intersubjective Correlates: Motivational Relevance

As I have interpreted Schutz, motivational relevance is related to an action on the part of the individual; in other words, given a number of choices he will be motivated to select one of them

(Cox, 1973: 109). But it is possible that we may not have to accept one of them. Our deliberations, then, will focus on the action of selecting a particular theme of interest as a part of a classroom setting; the student in such a situation cannot be considered a solitary ego, but one who is actively engaged in the setting with other students and his teacher. The setting itself, the classroom, suggests that at least some aspect of the environment in which the student makes the choice is not spontaneous; the theme, "mother and child rearing in India", is intersubjectively determined or socially conditioned.

Schutz may be interpreted as identifying two aspects: 1) those concerning the social character of the subjective experience as it is related to the relevance structures of the current situation, and 2) the biography of the individual as it relates to the social character of the relevance structures (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 252). The former will be considered first.

1) Social Character of Subjective Experience

The student in the classroom involved in considering a description of rice farming on a farm in South Asia is influenced in two ways: a) by the students around him who are immediately present to him, who are encouraging him to continue his investigations. These Others appear to him as part of the formal aspect of what is there in the immediate situation, the book and the classroom. b) in dealing with other students who are immediately before him, there is a recognition of a fullness in the potential relationship, while in the case of the We-relationship, the Other is viewed as being very distant; i.e., the farmer who is far away. But Schutz notes that the more information of a personal nature that is available, the lesser the degree of anonymity. Thus, for example, if the student were to have available more personal correspondence, to enhance the sense of the lived experience of the other, the closer he might begin to feel. If beyond this there is an actual entering into of correspondence with the farmer, by the student, the distance would close even more. This would be easily illustrated by two "pen pals" who, even though they may never see each other, do come to "know" or understand each other through an exchange of letters.

The social situation where the student reads the description may remain at a formal level when the subjective experiences in the social world are understood in terms of the determined ways of conducting social actions in the student's own world; the farmer's actions are judged in terms of the relative-natural world view of the student. The interpretational (those aspects of the culture which are predefined in typical ways) and motivational (those aspects which are defined in the culture in typical ways) relevance structures are understood and imposed upon the actual relevances of the people involved. It is possible to suggest that the reason the farmer is ploughing his field is not to engage in the struggle to prevent his family from starving to death but rather because he wants to earn money or because he doesn't know how to run a tractor. Within the relative-natural world view of the students, these are plausible ways of understanding the farmer's in-order-to and because-motives. The anonymity increases through that which the cultural ways of knowing hides of the other's relevance structures. We must mention here, however, that the formal arrangement of the subjective experience will determine the limits and dependence upon what one knows in a particular situation (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 254). It might be expressed in a different way: if a student is open to the fullness of his experiences, the greater the possibility of him bracketing his own typical ways of understanding. This in a classroom setting would be dependent upon, publicly, the limits (political and peer) which the groups place upon the student to express himself verbally.

2) Biography of the Individual as it Relates to the Social Character of the Relevance Structures

To speak of the openness of a student to his experiences suggests that his biography brings with it, to a large extent, a socially derived stock of knowledge and as such a socialized system of interpretational and motivational relevances (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 254). It is this background which allows classroom members to say, "We share this" but which at the same time, prevents us from saying to the farmer, "We, at a superficial level, do not share anything". In this sense we are not able to extend the relationship with the farmer; the deepening of the relationship with the farmer is dependent upon a third aspect which up until now has been hidden, and that is that we share the topical relevance among the group. Through the reciprocity of vantage points we are essentially given to each other. The group, no matter what the interpretation, shares the common theme (for example, to revise the Social Studies program).

The intersubjective theme or topical relevances may bind the group together. At the same time they may divide the group by creating differences in understanding. Through a discussion of these differences a dialogue may emerge. It may be suggested that only within the thematic intersubjective relevance structure does the humanness of the relative-natural world view begin to take place. We may interpret Schutz as saying that the agreement of the thematic relevance structures is of primary importance if the students are to begin to understand their rendering of the farmer's situation as problematic within the interpretational and motivational intersubjective relevance structures.

3) Biography as it Relates to the Socialization of the Relevance Structures

Any individual upon entering into a situation enters with a socially determined set of interpretational and motivational relevance structures, which is, as we have seen, fairly extensive. Here it may be interpreted that such a system has a "social" history, in terms of the interpretive and motivational relevances. A student in a Grade 8 Social Studies classroom does not, in other words, enter the class as a new student; rather he enters as a student who, having taken some other social studies and having been in school generally, has an expectation in terms of the various relevance systems. Some of the relevance perspective will be unique to him; he alone will view the situation in that particular way.

But at the same time we must recognize a social aspect to the organization of the relevance structures, namely that they are the result of the student taking an action in consort with others. This may be viewed as being carried out in two ways: i) either the relevance structures are viewed as being polythetically constructed within the situation and then grasped monothetically (and in this case we may say that the student would be genuinely involved in the praxis of the particular lesson), or ii) the relevance structures are appropriated monothetically from another without polythetically moving through the experiences which are necessary to build them (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 260). We may suggest that Schutz here would have in mind, for example, the case where the teacher constructs the motivational and interpretational relevances in such a way that the student consumes them. This is not to say that they are imposed, but rather they become taken-for-granted. A further example which suggests itself here is that we live in a world which takes technology largely for granted. A passage of a book describing a rice farmer who uses human labour to plough his field is interpreted in terms of the social filter of technology.

Thus it may be said that the relevance structures as they are subjectively interpreted within our biographies are to a large degree intersubjectively constructed. They reflect the interests and concerns of others, but at the same time we must recognize that they are not the same as those of all other people. They are interpreted variously by ourselves and are thus unique to the individual. We therefore come to the dialectical statement: "Socialized Man is Unique" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973). As I have interpreted it, however, the term "unique" must be tempered with the understanding that it is a social uniqueness, one that may be understood as being relatively unique (Schutz, 1970: 168). These discussions may now begin to reflect upon the structural elements of our knowledge which become socially distributed or shared with others.

4) Critical Comments

We may, however, within Schutz's interpretation of the structures of relevance, question the extent to which it is possible to separate 1) genetically, in terms of the individual, and 2) socially, in terms of the intersubjectivity of the structures of relevance. It may be possible to suggest that here, at the level of the individual, we are concerned with the notion of interpretational relevance as it relates to the frame of reference in terms of which the actor orients himself. That is, to speak of motivational relevances is to suggest that we are able to say we will act in such and such a way. The "in-order-to" and "because" motives are in themselves based upon interpretations of experience which, as I have interpreted Schutz, are seen by the actor in typical ways or understood in terms of his typical way of understanding. In other words they are constructs. But we are not sure how they come about.

If relevances are considered we may question, too, the position that they would exist within the flow of consciousness (Schutz, 1970: 86). The transitive state of the stream of consciousness is therefore left as a relatively stable substantive structure; I constantly interpret the situation as a reflection of my action of the moment, as when Dewey states I "stop and think". Further, Bergson's concept of attention a la vie, moves us away from the picture metaphors of James, towards a relational conception of Bergson.

We are now led to question the grounds of the intersubjective structures of relevance. Schutz and Luckmann may be interpreted as saying that intersubjective relevances; i.e., interpretational, are social relevances that are learned either polythetically as built up structures within the individual or as monothetic structures which are appropriated from others (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 257). But clearly such relevances do not exist within a stream: they are "socialized". In other words, they reflect the social-historical consciousness of the individual, and as such they reflect the various belief systems of the individual actor's cultural experiences. They establish the actor in the world, and constantly reflect him in a commonsense way, back to these origins. If we return to our Grade 8 classroom and to the discussion of the Indian mother and child, we are aware that the interpretational relevances, those which call attention to the situation are related to our conception of space; that is, there is an understanding that there are locations where people do not have the same relative-natural cultural view of the world. For a Grade 8 student to be able to state this in terms of an Indian mother and child suggests that the taken-for-granted structure of the knowledge rests on a relational component which is brought forward to be interpreted in the present. Further, it constantly rests upon the language and upon the signs and symbols. Clearly, however, the interpretation based in the present relates the understanding back to a social origin and not to a conception of a flowing stream of consciousness.

Social Distribution of Knowledge

Our Grade 8 Social Studies class in "geography" is to a certain extent engaged in a study of the social distribution of knowledge;

that is what the Revision Committee knows, what the teacher knows, what students know and what the resource textbook authors know. Or as Schutz stated:

> The man in the natural attitude "has" therefore a stock of knowledge of physical things and fellow creatures, of social collectives and of artifacts, including cultural objects. He also "has" syntheses of inner experience.

Personal knowledge reflects whatever the individual feels to be so. But central to this is the underlying assumption that this knowledge came from somewhere; the question becomes: how does Schutz account for this?

At the outset we must say that all knowledge is in some way or another social knowledge, for the very signs and symbols we use for understanding preclude any other interpretation. The baby experiences but, since he does not comprehend the mirrored self, he does not fully understand; experience must be understood in order to be meaningful (Schutz, 1967: 81-83). Social knowledge is that knowledge which has been built up over time and which is theoretically available to everyone (Schutz, 1971: 120).

But while knowledge is, in theory, available to everyone, in a social sense it is not; i.e., not everyone may know the intricacies of micro-computers. To make clear this statement we will use Schutz's distinction between a) insider and b) outsider knowledge (Schutz, 1971: 91ff). a) Insider knowledge is that which is available to the individual within the culture; it is often taken for granted and applied in everyday situations (distinction between appropriated (monothetic) and learned (polythetic)). b) Outsider knowledge is that which is brought into the group and does not fit the particular cultural patterns of the insider group. But within our example we have a Grade 8 group who are attempting to understand the insiders' point of view; what it is like to be a living member of a particular tropical culture. Clearly, students and teachers within this situation must understand the culture to be studied as problematic; at first students may view tropical nations as the man on the street might (Schutz, 1971: 122), that is, the man who follows typical situations, in typical ways and with typical results. Thus in Schutz's sense students are not experts. Schutz defines the expert as a person whose:

> ... knowledge is restricted to a limited field but therein it is clear and distinct. His opinions are based upon warranted assertions, his judgments are not mere guesswork or loose assumptions. (Schutz, 1971: 122)

Between these two groups (the man on the street and expert), Schutz has developed the concept of the well informed citizen (Schutz, 1971: 120). His position is described by Schutz as a person who arrives:

> ... at reasonably founded opinions in fields which as he knows are at least mediately of concern to him although not bearing on his purpose at hand. (Schutz, 1971: 123)

If we take the intent of our social studies lesson to be of such a character, then we may focus upon those aspects of the class which are centred around the familiar.[2] A student in his everyday world functions as a man in the street, but within the confines of the classroom he typically expects the world to be made problematic. But in terms of Schutz's interpretation of knowledge about and knowledge of acquaintance the questions arise: how is, first, the middle point constructed; i.e., the typical "well-informed citizen", and second, how does this contribute to our understanding of the intersubjective? (Schutz, 1975: 120)

Student as Well-Informed Citizen

Schutz may be interpreted as saying that the concept of the well-informed citizen is related to interest; it may be described in terms of zones and is related closely to the problem of relevance.

1. zone one - interest at hand,
2. zone two - those interests which have a minor bearing on the problem at hand,
3. zone three - in which the material is irrelevant.

(Schutz, 1971: 127)

Within these zones I will also bring in other interests which will, in turn, influence one another.

The well-informed citizen or student, unlike the expert, is able to range fully within the material without having to concern himself with the imposed frames of reference used within the discipline. But this does raise an interesting limitation. The student in the classroom is not able to select freely, he is to a certain extent, influenced by the frame of reference of the Resource Committee, the resource material, and the choices made by his teachers. The choices may be actually or potentially imposed on him (Schutz, 1971: 32). Within these frames of reference there are the varying degrees of experience which each of the participants may or may not have.

Schutz, in my interpretation of him, does not relate all of the possibilities which may be found in the classroom setting. But he does discuss four major instances: 1) the eyewitness, 2) the insider, 3) the analyst, and 4) the commentator: four ideal types who will influence our way of viewing the world. None of these types, according to Schutz (Schutz, 1971: 133) is pure. In his discussions within the classroom the student is also subject to socially approved knowledge or knowledge legitimated; i.e., knowledge accepted within the curriculum by ourselves and other members of the ingroup. Schutz describes it in this way:

> The power of socially approved knowledge is so extended that what the whole ingroup approves--ways of thinking and acting, such as mores, folkways, habits--is simply taken for granted; it becomes an element of the relatively natural concept of the world, although the source of such knowledge remains entirely hidden in its anonymity. (Schutz, 1971: 133)

If we return to our well-informed citizen, we may question, if he is between the expert and the man on the street, how he is able to distinguish between the knowledge which experts claim (and here he would have to make a decision between conflicting expert claims which involves him in ideological concerns)? Thus when we discuss a typical, ideal, type of well-informed citizen we must move beyond the man on the street towards the expert.

Our classroom may be viewed as a group "becoming"; "becoming" in the sense that they are emergent, in terms of the teacher-students rendering problematic the situation to be studied; the dark areas, the taken-for-granted, become illuminated (Vandenberg, 1971: 138). The well-informed citizen becomes aware of the possible.

But if we are to take Schutz's development of this ideal type as being of importance to his view of the social world, we must also understand the implications of his contention that the well-informed citizen is able to distinguish between the competing claims of the experts and understand its implications in terms of our example. What he is saying, in other words, is that the student should be able to assess critically the world, in terms of his making decisions. There is, at this point, the possibility of moving beyond Schutz's type of well-informed citizen to that of an actively participating student, one who is, perhaps, more "in the world" than Schutz would have him. But before this extension is explored, we will consider further Schutz's conception of social action as it relates to the intersubjective.

Social Action and Intersubjectivity: Dialectical Considerations

The individual is actively and continuously engaged in a dialectic with the world. He encounters others, works to earn a living and recognizes that he will die. Natanson has interpreted Schutz's view of action as follows:

> Dr. Schutz defined "action" as human conduct self-consciously projected by the actor. "Act", on the other hand, designates accomplished action. (Schutz, 1973: xxxiv)

Schutz may also be interpreted as saying all action is purposive; that is, it is always conducted towards something. Action may be covert, for example, puzzle solving, or overt, where the person gears into the world of others (Schutz, 1973: 20). Thus the actor or student in the world in terms of action is in an active relation to that which he is directing his intentional gaze toward.

Schutz distinguishes between two kinds of action which an actor might engage in within the social world. First is action in terms of another which takes for granted the typical or habitual ways of acting in the situation; the co-determined way of acting is accepted as long as it is viewed as being unproblematic by the participants (Schutz, 1973: 28; 137). In such a situation an example from the classroom may serve to illustrate: the student sees himself as the centre of his world, and around this centre, as I have mentioned previously, is the world within reach, and beyond this the world that is within potential reach (Schutz, 1973: 137). World within reach designates the field within which the actor may exert his control. It is within this field that Schutz often speaks of his world of working (Schutz, 1971: 212). The world of working is described as a world of bodily movements, but beyond this is a world where objects are manipulated, and where the handling of things, and men, occurs (Schutz, 1971: 228). Schutz in the same context further elaborates his intent when he states "... if we discuss a work of art with a fellow beholder, if we indulge Others in the same ritual, we are still in the world of working connected by communicative acts of working together" (Schutz, 1973: 258). Within this world of working, the social relationship with the other is established. This would be consistent with his early writings in Phenomenology of the Social World (Schutz, 1967: 151ff, and particularly 156). By stating, through the theory of reciprocity, that I can be aware of the Other's reciprocation towards me either directly or indirectly, Schutz may be interpreted as saying that even those who are very remote from me exert a control over me (Schutz, 1967: 156). In a later essay, Making Music Together, he describes the same relationship between the composer and the musician (Schutz, 1971: 169-170). But I cannot influence the composer so there is an inequality in the relationship. The control that exists between the composer and musician would also be typified in his essay, the Homecomer, where the cultural recipes with which the Homecomer is familiar reflect the experience of what it is like to be at home in the world (Schutz, 1971: 106-107). The relation of the homecomer to his culture is described by Schutz as follows:

> To feel at home is an expression of the highest degree of familiarity and intimacy. Life at home follows an organized pattern of routine ... Most problems of daily life can be mastered by following this pattern. There is no need to define and redefine situations which have occurred so many times or to look for new solutions of old problems hitherto handled satisfactorily. (Schutz, 1971: 108)

In other words we live through much of our everyday life in an unthinking way. By following recipes Schutz reveals an interpretation of human beings as potential automatons or socially inauthentic people. They do not, in other words, have the opportunity to enter into situations with others where the interaction is co-defined. Taking these situations as typical limits the possibilities for interaction in a genuine sense; that is, we are limited in terms of situation and perspective.

Natanson may be interpreted as raising this issue when he suggests that a question has these two aspects:

a) the situation in which it is raised, that is the larger set of circumstances in which any individual locates himself. Such circumstances would include the physical, cultural and historical setting and the metaphysics and politics of the issue at hand.

b) the perspective involved, from whose point of view, the "they" or "we" (Natanson, 1970: 60). Is the question raised in the Social Studies 8 resource material from the point of view of the Indian farmer or from that of a textbook author, or is it indeed my own point of view? But there must be more than an unthinking attitude presented. The individual must be reflectively aware (or as someone would have it, critically aware) of the open horizon of encounter in each new situation.

A second type of action dealt with by Schutz is that of the problematic. Essentially this involves a situation where the typical cultural mores, laws, etc., no longer suffice in allowing the actor to define the situation (Schutz, 1971: 9). Schutz states it as follows:

> This will be the case, for example, if there occurs in the individual or social life an event which cannot be met by applying the traditional and habitual pattern of behaviour or interpretation. We call such a situation a crisis - a partial one if it makes only some elements of the world taken for granted questionable, a total one if it invalidates the whole system of reference, the scheme of interpretation itself. (Schutz, 1971: 96, 230)

Jehenson says of Schutz, "How one seeks to resolve this crisis he never explores" (Jehenson, 1979: 118). It is a point which I would suggest Schutz does address.

If, for example, we turn to his essay on The Stranger, we may interpret Schutz as saying that the Stranger will begin to transform himself into a member of the culture which he is approaching; his world of working must seek to dominate, or to bring it within his typical frame of reference. Here we encounter Schutz's vision of a dialectic between that which is familiar and that which is strange (Schutz, 1971: 16). The inquiry for bringing the new within our understanding is one of probing, and attempting to catch new meanings and to bring these new meanings into a frame of reference which is understandable to ourselves (Schutz, 1971: 105). An example of what is meant here would be the shock of a new South African acquaintance at our house saying "Goodnight" which in South Africa is a way of asking if you wish to go to bed. Gradually, however, the recipe is understood within its new content; the knowledge of the new culture is suggested to be warranted.

We are constantly, in our own worlds, moving between that which we know and that which we do not. Schutz makes this point consistently in his writing (Schutz, 1973: 23). Our experience is broadened as we attempt to make sense of the problematic situation which lies before us. To be in a crisis situation, for example, means that one has moved from a non-crisis into crisis; what is no longer present in the situation suggests that something which we once knew is now made problematic.

Understanding the problematic situation requires that we are sensitive to the non-problematic analogue. But as Schutz's careful working of his phenomenology indicates, such understanding of the typical routine, everyday actions with others is crucial. Let me suggest a possible example of this with reference to the resource material for the "Developing Tropical World". A Bantu in South Africa constantly lives with the threat of violence. This is his usual way of being in the world; i.e., he is, no matter how objectionable to us, at "home" with this situation. For the Grade 8 reader of the resource material the task of Schutz's phenomenology would be to disentangle Pierre Joure's statement: "For we are where we are not" (Bachelard, 1969: 210). How does a Grade 8 student begin to understand what it is like to live with the constant threat of violence? Such an understanding forms the basis for taking individual action but there could be no collective prescriptions for action. However, there would be nothing to preclude these becoming a basis for collective action.

Schutz may be interpreted as having two interests in terms of social action: 1) the action which is lived through in a taken-for-granted manner, and 2) the action that is lived through as rendering the world problematic.

They-Relationships: Anonymous Others of the Resource Material

Schutz interpreted social action accruing within the context of a social world; that is in terms of "thou" face-to-face relationships, we-relationships, and they-relationships. For illustrative purposes we will focus upon the anonymity of the they-relationship, while keeping in mind that we may relate our content to the other forms. They-relationships initially involve contemporaries; i.e., those with whom we no longer enter into a direct we-relationship. Here Schutz may be interpreted as saying that contemporaries are invariant experiences which we have of the other after we no longer have direct experience of them. But within the context of the they-relationship, we have no direct physical contact with the other person (Schutz, 1971: 43). Thus the East Indian farmer and a B.C.

Grade 8 student may be considered as an example of a they-relationship.

Social Collectives

The anonymous "social collective" refers to all of the broad constructs of the world of contemporaries. Here we may locate such ideal types as "the state", "the press", "the economy", etc. (Schutz, 1967: 198). Within the objective meaning context we assume, according to Schutz, that each contains a network of interrelationships from which the total is constructed; he views this as being reduced to the personal ideal type of social collective (Schutz, 1967: 199; 1971: 45).

We may return to the Grade 8 Social Studies classroom considering India. The construction of a personal ideal type is dependent upon the stock of knowledge which a student would bring to the situation. Part of its construct would also be understood by the students to be within the context of "foreign", that is, there are others in the world with whom it is possible to enter into a relationship at a human level (Landgrebe, 1940).

Schutz may be interpreted as saying that the they-relationship will remain anonymous if the individuals within the social group do not recognize the fundamental humanness of those whom they are attempting to understand. By fundamental humanness Schutz indicates that he refers to the characterological as opposed to the functional ideal type. The characterological "presupposes and refers to a real person whom I could meet face to face" (Schutz, 1967: 197). The functional type on the other hand reduces the Other to a particular function; e.g., farmer, as in all farmers, whom I could never meet face to face. We may consider the importance of the reference material and its meaning content. Those materials which preclude the possibility of a face to face meeting will be more remote than those which do not; e.g., biography. But within this context we may interpret Schutz as suggesting that the understanding of one's own humanness and that of others is an important situational aspect which is embodied within our interpretation.

The concept of the social collectivity, as a reflection of the remote they-relationship, also presents a further problem in terms of interpreting the objective matrix which it portrays. Our Indian farmer, for example, portrays the type, but within the interpretation of this type there is subsumed the value judgments of the farmer as they "live" their world. By this is meant that the decisions they make in terms of their farming are hidden within the typical actions. If there is not a subjective meaning context revealed, full understanding of the situation is not possible (Schutz, 1967: 200; 1971: 52). That is, the habits and beliefs of the farmer remain inaccessible to the student (Schutz, 1967: 200). Within the resource material references of an autobiographical nature, the sense of the person would begin to emerge in the work. There must, in other words, be the possibility of the subjective meaning context if the action is to be understood in its fullest sense. The understanding of the other, within the they-relationship, must be based upon the direct social relationship; the limits of such a relationship would exist where the actions of the Other may be imagined as being carried out by oneself. Experience as it is related to recollection and the biography limit our own possibilities. If the Indian farmer, in our example, is starving, and we ourselves have never experienced such a state, then we are prevented from fully understanding what it is like. To begin to move towards such an understanding would be reflected in the selection of materials, as I have interpreted Schutz, that are presented in the class. A student who says, "I am beginning to understand what it is to starve", within the context of the farmer, may be beginning to understand his situation. Here we may say of the student that he is becoming, in terms of his social action, aware of his own hidden or subsumed cultural, habitual, social norms. In other words, his reflection in terms of his stream of consciousness, is revealing collectivity. The student thus moves within the dialectic of starving and not starving but more than that he is moving through a hermeneutic circle, in his attempt to wrestle with the farmer's condition (Schutz, 1971: 13). In such a situation, the student is moved beyond being a naive actor, to enter fully into the social action as it relates to the intersubjective situation. Within the interpretation of Schutz, we must consider social action as being related, intersubjectively, within the taken-for-granted and problematic situations.

In concluding our discussion of Schutz's theory of the intersubjective two topics remain: A) the pragmatic and B) the role of history or past.

The Pragmatic Interest in the World

Schutz contrasts the pragmatic, the commonsense action, in terms of the taken-for-granted social world, with the position of the scientist who seeks to raise questions concerning the meaning of the structures of it (Schutz, 1973: 137). The focal point for this interest is the null or centre point at which the individual always sees himself. Our world is the world of Others, the intersubjective world, in which we always maintain an interest in others (Schutz, 1973: 208). Such a world is the world in which the ego recognizes itself as being in the world, attention a la vie, as Bergson expressed it. Schutz interprets pragmatism as follows:

> With very few exceptions, vulgar pragmatism does not consider the problems of the constitution of conscious life involved in the notion of an ego agens or homo falur from which as a givenness most writers start. For the most part, pragmatism is, therefore, just a common-sense description of the attitude of man within the world of working in daily life, but not a philosophy investigating the presuppositions of such a situation. (Schutz, 1973: 213)

Schutz may be interpreted as saying that a pragmatic interest in the world must be concerned with the life world as it is lived. If we were to further characterize the pragmatic in the everyday world, we may interpret him as saying that it is not found within the phantasm of the various other levels of our reality; the pragmatic clearly grounds in the world (Schutz, 1973: 254). If we consider once again our social studies situation, we may interpret the understanding of foreign others as being directed towards their being in the world as well. Their actions must be interpretable by us in terms of their real world actions if we are to make sense of their actions in the situations; we may contrast this with Schutz's interpretation of Husserl when he says imagining is neutral, in other words it does not commit us to the world of Others (Schutz, 1973: 235).

A commitment to the world, in Schutz's terms, involves the pragmatic motive; the motive; in other words, to overcome the various "resistances" to my acts which I encounter in the natural attitude (Schutz, 1973: 306). We might ask, what does Schutz, within the realm of possibilities, mean by resistances? Under what circumstances would a political situation constitute itself as being a "resistance"? In the context of our social studies class we may raise the question; how the farmer acts to preserve his traditional farming practices against the interest of new Western farming advances. To evoke such a situation in the context of a resistance is to raise a political question. To understand this issue further within Schutz's work, we must turn to his interpretation of Husserl's concept of the appresentational.

Appresentational refers to the object of our perception, and specifically that which we add to the horizon (Schutz, 1973: 149-154). We see a plough, for example, and we add to the plough the various features we cannot see. The front appears to us as we see it, and by analogy, but not inference, we add, couple, pair the back to it. But other cases within the appresentational may prevail (Schutz, 1973: 299). In developing this theory Schutz turned towards an understanding of signs and symbols. Within the appresentational context direct past experience (apperception) is not added to the Object, but rather we add to the Object or idea that which we cannot actually account for. The distinction here becomes important. If, for example, to the plough of the East Indian farmer, I add my direct experience of my ploughing on a farm it may be accounted for in terms of my past history, my biography. But in terms of the appresentational I may add that of which I have no experience; I may, for example, add to the plough the belief that it has been made by a craftsman, or that the blade is dull, making it difficult to use. We may also consider the context in which the appresentational apperceptions are united in the sense that a direct past experience is added to by that which we cannot directly account for. James, for example, in his varieties of religious experiences attempts to understand the lived meaning, the meaning expressed, by spiritual experiences. The concept of spiritual is added to the experience but cannot be accounted for in terms of direct past experience. In terms of the intersubjective, as it relates to communication, the concept of appresentation in a direct relationship with the Other establishes a common ground; I understand that I will be able to talk with the Other in terms of our mutual concerns. I anticipate that we will be able to live our meaning together (Schutz, 1971: 315). If this is not so, there is no warrant for the communication to continue. But we must also be aware that Schutz, within this theory of the appresentational, as it relates to signs and symbols, also pointed out that these transcend the immediate sign or symbol; in other words, there is an expression understood, beyond that which is immediately present to us (Schutz, 1971: 343). Schutz's concern in explicating this point was expressed as follows:

> The analysis of these transcendences - from those going beyond the limits of the world within his actual reach to those transgressing the paramount reality of everyday life ... (Schutz, 1973: 356)

I interpret his concern here as leading towards that which is part of everyday life yet beyond it, into a philosophical anthropology. But on this broader scale this places the exploration of the symbol beyond that of the everyday world. However, Schutz does begin to consider it at the everyday level when he states:

> However, those interpretations will be necessarily different from that of the ingroup, because the system of relevances of both groups (and the respective apperceptual, appresentational, and referential schemes taken as systems of reference for interpreting the "order" so created) cannot coincide. (Schutz, 1971: 355-356)

There is in this description a clear hermeneutic circle described; that is, in order to comprehend everyday life, we must be able to comprehend the signs which allow us to communicate one to the other, the transcendent features of such communication, which leads us back to the signs themselves, and the symbols which gather the ingroup, for example, around itself as a cultural artifact and in turn whose meaning must be considered in terms of everyday life. Recognizing such a possibility for transformation in terms of the individual through the positing of the hermeneutic is perhaps the direction in which Schutz was indicating. This may be interpreted as being consistent with Schutz's later work when he states:

> But it may appear in contrast to the now remembered appresentation; that is, it may contrast the anticipated phase (if it now becomes actual) of the anticipation. If the appresented aspect of an object (symbol) (that is, anticipated phases of my consciousness), when they come to self-presentedness, are incongruent with previous experience, we can say the taken-for-granted nature of my experiences "explodes". (Schutz, 1967: 11)

The "chain of self-evidency" is not interrupted. We may interpret Schutz as saying that the deeper levels of reflection within the hermeneutic are required in order for the individual to establish the structures of the taken-for-granted; it is not, in other words, a simple function of time, as in "learning to live with a problem", but rather true understanding of the situation as it pertains to my life.

Part of the further understanding within Schutz's interpretation lies again in his statement which has been previously quoted above, mainly that the apperceptual, appresentational and preferential schemes are taken as schemes of reference for interpreting the order so created (Schutz, 1973: 355-356). Here we may suggest that Schutz is interpreting the symbols, even within the ingroup, as forming the ground work for an active interpretation which is revealed in everyday life, social life "investigations which are important not only from the theoretical but also from a practical point of view" (Schutz, 1973: 35, 356). Thus Schutz may be interpreted as saying that the investigation of the role of signs and symbols in the everyday lifeworld is critical for a full understanding of the lifeworld. Beyond this he may be interpreted as suggesting that the method of self-understanding is the hermeneutic.

It is within this context that we may further pursue Schutz's two essays, The Stranger and The Homecomer. I have previously identified these two essays as dialectical in nature; i.e., the dialectic of the familiar and unfamiliar. Landgrebe, within this context, makes the point that even with the homeworld, even with the most intimate familiarity, there is always the sense that the alien is present; the familiar always contains that which is unfamiliar.

Our whole world is not whole, but rather segments (Landgrebe, 1940). To both the stranger and the homecomer, there is present both that which is familiar and unfamiliar; our commonsense world is one in which an ongoing interpretation within the schemes of reference is always occurring, both dialectically and hermeneutically. But beyond this we may wonder if Schutz did not also mean critically.

Self-understanding through the interpretation of the schemes of reference recalls Gadamer where the truth of interpretive understanding is essential. If this were not, understanding itself would be impossible (Gadamer, 1975). Within this context we may consider once again the social world of the well-informed citizen. Schutz here limits his discussion in terms of the motives as they are guided by the frames of reference from which the well-informed citizen must choose (Schutz, 1971: 130). But we must consider that the well-informed citizen is also an active interpreter of the world who has not a single scheme of reference (as does the scientist or a taken-for-granted scheme of the man on the street) but rather selects from among competing schemes of reference. Beyond this Schutz states of the opinion of another, "His opinion is trusted if it enables me to form a sufficiently clear precise knowledge of the underlying deviating system of relevances" (Schutz, 1971: 132). Here the thrust of the well-informed citizen as interpreter is carried through. The well-informed citizen, however, while basing his interpretations upon the relatively natural concept of the world is at the same time conducting his inquiry within the interplay between the socially derived and socially approved knowledge. I would interpret Schutz as saying that the well-informed citizen is concerned with revealing and comprehending the broad perspective of knowledge which underlies the commonsense knowledge within which he functions every day (Schutz, 1971: 134). Schutz views the well-informed citizen as someone who is able to comprehend something of the structures of the social distribution of knowledge and make these clear to himself. Private opinion must prevail over public opinion. But Schutz, developing his description of the informed citizen, has opened the horizons of both the stranger and the homecomer in that neither could belong to a closed world, for there is something of the world in both of these types. They exist within the very possibility of worlds beyond their own. So while Schutz discusses the uniqueness of individual experiences and the failure of others to understand them, this does not mean the others are not aware that he has been elsewhere (Schutz, 1971: 114). It is part of the appresentational, the referential or the interpretive scheme which is not able to interpret adequately the experience of the other within the situation. Schutz, in suggesting that private opinion must prevail over public, may be interpreted as saying that the citizen must function within a circumstance of action; action, that is, in terms of acting within the social climate. But such an actor, having understood, within Schutz's framework is committed to making his position clear. Such a commitment involves a clarity of the various perspectives which underlie the knowledge which one is focusing upon, and a political commitment to make these opinions prevail (Schutz, 1971: 134). For Schutz the problem became how to make these experiences clear within the social world.

If we return briefly to the social studies classroom we may place these findings in context. A student encountering an Indian man with a plough has an experience of both the familiar and unfamiliar within the situation. Landgrebe (1940) points out that no matter how remote, the home world is not a closed world. The plough within our context may possibly come to stand as a symbol for the potential poverty of all Indian farmers. But as such we may interpret Schutz as indicating that the apperceptual, appresentational and interpretive schemes of reference are incomplete. The symbol is interpreted from the position of the outgroup and not that of the ingroup; i.e., the farmer's world. As such we must work harder at understanding his world; our interpretations should involve ethnographic and ethnomethodological views so that we might know more fully what it is like. But if the plough is interpreted as a symbol of poverty, we must begin to explore our own understanding of its meaning in the sense that the well-informed citizen begins his inquiry. The inquiry is that of a hermeneutic reflecting our own self-understanding and should involve the dialectic of familiarity (wealth) and unfamiliarity (poverty); reflection should then be directed toward understanding our own situation first; this may involve self-criticism. Such self-criticism may become the basis of praxis as it is interpreted within Schutz. It is only within this framework that his concept of social action begins to make sense; in turn this too becomes the framework in which students would be viewed as making sense of the Indian farmer and his plough. But we must be careful not to push this example too far since, as

Landgrebe warns, we already have some possibility for understanding that there are foreign worlds, and that these worlds constitute an open understanding of the world (Landgrebe, 1940). For Schutz, we may say that it is how we make sense of the symbol, "plough", against our own cultural background; within this interpretation, however, we must understand our own situation and deepen this in terms of another culture. But we must consider that these stand as artifacts which are used by an anonymous fellow-man (Schutz, 1973: 17).

Historical Consciousness/Concept of Past

We have previously discussed the concept of biography as it relates to the past of the individual. It contains the experiences as they may be interpreted in terms of the present. It is constituted through the social and cultural forces which lead to the actual view held by the individual of his environment; it is a world which is here before my birth and will continue after my death (Schutz, 1971: 132). In addition I encounter the social-cultural objects in my everyday life:

> All cultural objects - tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, social institutions, etc. - point back to their very origin and meaning to the activities of human subjects. For this reason we are always conscious of the historicity of culture which we encounter in traditions and culture. (Schutz, 1973: 10)

We are always aware or conscious of the world's historicity, since we continually encounter its artifacts in our everyday lives. We are capable of considering it in terms of the "already-given" whether it be in terms of our own life or in terms of the others' activity, and which I encounter as sediment (Schutz, 1973: 133).

But it must be said that within this framework, the world must first make sense for me as it is interpreted from my own null point. But within this we must realize that such a possibility is founded on the possibility of reciprocity of perspectives, which as has been previously discussed, may be interpreted in terms of space, and which now also must be considered in terms of time (Schutz, 1973: 147). I am connected with contemporaries whom I have never met and with predecessors; all of which I must interpret in terms of the present and without the benefit of first-hand experience (Schutz, 1973: 221). It may be noted that historicity is experienced without the possibility of a dialogue. In a sense I am powerless to transform a situation as it actually occurred, but rather must begin to work within the event as it is interpreted from the present; in this sense I begin to transform the situation. I am attempting to understand the prospective consciousness of the subject, from within the retrospective consciousness of my present. We are viewing the closed horizon of the past and we might say it is over and done with (Schutz, 1967: 208). We may cast back over the ideal types that emerge, reminding ourselves that they are fixed and do not point towards the future (Schutz, 1971: 210).

Dealing with the interpretation of the past within the world of predecessors, and in particular those whose presence may only be determined through signs, Schutz states the following:

> Since my knowledge of the world of my predecessors comes to me through signs, what these signs signify is anonymous and detached from any stream of consciousness. However, I know that every sign has its author and that every author has his own thoughts and subjective experiences as he expresses himself through signs. It is therefore perfectly proper for me to ask myself what a given

> predecessor meant by expressing himself in such and such a way. (Schutz, 1967: 204)

Schutz here may be interpreted as saying that he must imagine himself as standing before the author of the material. Yet still we must recognize ourselves as the prime interpreters of the event. Approached in this way Schutz's interpretation of understanding the past would be close to that of Gadamer. Schutz states that "historicism is correct when it asserts that all of history conditions the point of view of the historian" (Schutz, 1967: 212). Schutz, it may be suggested, is saying that the interpreter, the historian, must truly understand his own source in a particular situation. He must be aware, through a rigorous self-reflection of his background and social traditions of how these influence his present thinking. Schutz and Gadamer could be interpreted as agreeing when he suggests that self-reflections cannot be complete. Schutz's concept of sediments which are distilled out of a present situation would reflect this argument (Schutz, 1973: 103ff). But Schutz, in addition, suggests that it will be the historian's notion of what was of relevance to the author of the signs that will be crucial in determining the direction of the interpretation; it will depend, then, upon the number of points of view through which he attempts to understand the various possible starting points in relation to the various because and in-order-to motives that are relevant to the situation.

If we place ourselves at an event just prior to its occurrence, we must be able to determine which was the central because-motive in the situation. The matter of choosing between one of the two open horizons A or B is central to knowing the genuine because-motive. In selecting we are aware that if we follow it, there is an awareness that we must follow the whole course of events if we are to understand it (Schutz, 1971: 32). I may further understand this through a shift of perspectives with my predecessors, through the signs, or documents, which I view in the context of communicative acts intended for the others of the time. Schutz may be interpreted as saying that we assume a "pseudo-contemporaneity of my own conscious life with the conscious life of the communicator" (Schutz, 1971: 59). The documents which are used for such interpretation may not reflect the historical research, but it is worthwhile remembering that these will contain both the direct and indirect experiences of the communicator; this gives the material a more or less objective context. In assuming the pseudo-contemporaneity we must also understand that the social circumstances were different from those in which the author was writing. His fundamental stock of knowledge was placed against a very different landscape from that of the present.

The context of a landscape suggests that there must also be a concern for the subjective interpretation which the author imputed to his work. As I attempt to comprehend this I must be aware that my chances of actually comprehending are much less than if the individual were standing before me in a face-to-face situation. In these circumstances I have the possibility of questioning the other as to his intended meaning; I have, in other words, a greater chance of making sense of it. But in a "pseudo-contemporaneous" relationship

I am prevented by objective time from establishing direct contact with the other. In attempting to understand the other's subjective context, I have to remove it from its ongoing context. This would suggest that it would become much more structured than would be the case if I were in a face-to-face situation (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 50). But this then presents the problem of how time itself becomes institutionalized (Lowe, 1973: 128), how it is symbolized, and how it is prospected. Lowe may be interpreted as saying that it is the interconnection between these three that constitutes the retrospective interpretational context for understanding the subject (Lowe, 1973: 129).

It is within this retrospective view that we begin to realize some of the modifications placed upon the general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives; I may experience an interchangeability with a fellow-man in the distant past but those things that he thinks about will be different from myself. But there is still a limit within this, for even if the other happens to be my father, my understanding of his experiences cannot be the same as his, since he was born in a different time. This, however, does not describe anything of how a social historical consciousness develops through a succession of predecessors (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 87). Here we must account for the acquisition of the full sense of the past as it is contained within the biography. But as I have interpreted Schutz, while he does not fulfil this expectation, he does, nevertheless, open the way for the hermeneutical interpretations of Gadamer. Schutz's own interpretation, dealing mainly with predecessors, largely ignores the problem of symbols and their interpretation, but it is possibly sufficient to begin to point the way beyond. He does not, however, fully explore the relationships among institution, symbol and prospection within his writing. This weakens the presentation in terms of understanding the relevance structures as they were developed within the situation. Since much depends upon this interpretation of the because-motive within it, such a limitation limits our understanding of pastness within his world.

If we return for a moment to our Social Studies classroom it may be suggested that to understand the Indian farmer in the field with his plough we must also be able to interpret something of the context within which the plough stands as a symbol of past generations. So in a sense we are concerned with understanding how we are linked with our successive generations and how, in turn, the Indian farmer is linked with his. Perhaps, as Schutz suggests, it is enough, within this context, to have some naive insight into the historicity of the social world; this would apply, no matter how static the society (Schutz and Luckman, 1973: 91). We should, in other words, have some historical notions within which we may reflect upon the world of the Other, the East Indian farmer or other aspects involved in the understanding of the Grade 8 Social Studies program.

Summary

Schutz has contributed much to our understanding of how the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" could have been approached. The following notions Schutz developed could have been included:

a) that the everyday life situations of people living in the developing tropical world may form a basis for classroom pedagogy;

b) that the technical-scientific approach to classroom experience is only one among many possibilities;

c) that lived experiences of time are different from mechanistic or linear time. While geographic strangers and students may experience time differently, such differences may form the basis for further understanding;

d) that students come to the classroom setting with different biographical experiences. These experiences may reveal different ways of interpreting the developing tropical world;

e) that the historical situation influencing interpretation is often "hidden" from experience. Such influences could begin to form the basis for deepening the classroom dialogue if they are permitted to emerge;

f) that the classroom encounter with the geographic stranger is a "they" relationship as opposed to a face-to-face situation. This distancing should be considered as an ongoing part of the unit "Developing Tropical World";

g) that the basis for understanding the people of the developing tropical world is to be found in the possibilities the student sees for herself in the immediate social world.

Schutz does not provide the teacher with instructional recipes for understanding her everyday classroom activities concerning the developing tropical world. Rather, he offers the possibility of further, more rigorous understanding of the day-to-day pedagogy.

Footnotes

1. For a discussion of strangeness see Natanson, 1968; Schutz, 1971; see particularly Homecomer and Stranger essays; Luckmann, 1979: 25ff; Marianis, 1954: 4-7.

2. We consistently make educational interpretations of the social disciplines. This was the point made in Chapter II.

CHAPTER IV

Social Collectivity and the Individual: A Reflection Upon the Social Studies Unit, "Developing Tropical World" Through the Writings of G. H. Mead

> Kipling says:
> "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet"; but they are meeting. The assumption has been that the response of the East to the West and of the West to the East are not comprehensible to each other. But, in fact, we find that we are awakening; that we are beginning to interchange roles. A process of organization is going on underneath our conscious experience, and the more this organization is carried out the closer we are brought together. (Mead, 1934: 271)

Opening Comments

An interpretation of Mead's work is made problematic at the outset by the scarcity of his published papers personally supervised by him. Most of the major volumes of Mead's material were published posthumously through the efforts of a variety of editors using several sources.[1] Much of the material was based upon student and stenographic notes made from the various courses which he taught. As such Moore makes the claim that:

> In this case, however, the former completely outweigh the latter. Perhaps, had Mr. Mead himself prepared them for publication, they might have been presented in a somewhat different form. It is, I think, unlikely that he would have made any significant changes. (Mead, 1936: vi)

But this does not, I believe, lessen the influence of the editors' hand in the material. Morris, for example, labelled the first volume in the Chicago University series: Mind, Self and Society: from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist.[2] I would interpret the works of Mead, however, not as reflecting a behaviourist viewpoint but rather as concerned with understanding the dialectical relationship between society and the individual. In fact, Mead offered, in my opinion, a critique of the behaviourist stance. He viewed the individual as living in the social world, not standing apart from the world as the behaviourist would see him. Interpretations of Mead must, therefore, be carefully weighed in terms of the influence of the editors.

In this study, Mead is important for offering the possibilities of understanding the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" on two counts:

A) he promises an alternate position to that of the technical-scientific approach used by the British Columbia Social Studies Revision Committee, and

B) he begins from a social rather than an individual philosophical position. He offers to the critique of the program a social scheme for interpreting the educators' stance toward the people of the developing tropical world. His work enables us to focus upon the broader social implications of the term "development".

Critique of Technical-Scientific Approach

My discussion of Mead's work will begin with a brief comment upon his own starting point. Mead, like Schutz, was critical of the dominance of technical science in understanding how the everyday lives of the people were lived. In order to provide the general background for his critique, he focused his attention upon the work of Newton:

> The breakdown of the Newtonian mechanical system was reached when, with the development of the laws of thermodynamics and of the theory of electro-magnetism, that meaning of physical things which fits our perceptual experience could no longer be applied to the so-called material universe. (Mead, 1959: 150)
>
> In the Newtonian world a boxlike space, conceivably filled with a stagnant ether, whose structure was irrelevant to time, was the absolute environment of all change; i.e., for the physical sciences, of all motion. (Mead, 1959: 40)

Mead speaks against the social absolutes which flow from Newtonian physics. He would question, for example, the presentation of a fixed view of the people of Africa. Such a view of lived experience is not only a static (abstract) one but fails to recognize at a more fundamental level the concrete world in which the experience first occurred. Thus, as a background for his philosophy, he chose to criticize the technical scientific stance.

Mead was clearly interested in the actual mundane social relationships which form the basis of society. This is an interest which he shares with Schutz. He makes this interest very clear in the following:

> I want to speak again of the organizing nature of these larger and more abstract social relationships which I have been discussing, those of religion and economics. Each of them becomes universal in its working character, not universal because of any philosophical abstraction involved in them. (Mead, 1934: 289)

The working character of Mead's attention to the daily life world suggests his potential for understanding possible types of materials which could communicate to Grade 8 Social students about the developing tropical world. It is this working character of the intersubjective which is Mead's focus. Thus emerges Mead's view of the pragmatic philosophy to which he subscribes.

Pragmatism, as I interpret Mead, carries with it the everyday sense of the "practical", a sense which does not seek a way of becoming more efficient but rather does seek to understand critically the routines which we employ in everyday life from a social point of view. So he is critical of the efficiency sense of pragmatism:

> Pragmatism is regarded as a pseudo-philosophic formulation of that most obnoxious American trait, the worship of success; as the endowment of the four-flusher with a faked philosophic passport; the contemptuous swagger of a glib and restless upstart in the company of the mighty but reverent spirits worshipping at the shrine of subsistent entities and timeless truth; a blackleg pacemaker introduced into the leisurely workshop of the spirit to speed up the process of thinking sub specie aeternetatis; a Ford efficiency engineer bent on the mass production of philosophical tin lizzies. (Mead, 1938: 97)

In his view pragmatism does not seek formulas or routines of social action for their own sake but rather seeks to understand the very routines that confine man within his daily world. Thus the past that informs the present plays an essential role within Mead's philosophy. Mead's interests would force the Revision Committee of the British Columbia Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World" to keep constantly in mind the questions: Where did the concept come from? Why is it viewed in the way it is presented? In addition, for Mead, pragmatism takes a social evolutionary view; i.e., that society is viewed as constantly changing in that what appears today will not appear again in precisely the same way. In these terms the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World", would be seen as a socially constructed routine. In other words, as a technically and philosophically controlled offering to the teachers and students of the Province. The pragmatic question suggested by Mead is that of what lies behind a curricular statement which the Revision Committee expects the teachers to apply routinely.

Social View

Schutz began his phenomenology from the standpoint of the here and now without attempting to account for how the individual became a social man. This approach is reflected in the Resource Material for the unit developed by the Revision Committee. It acknowledges that the knowledge of societies which students are to acquire is largely taken for granted; that is, it is just there and somehow they are to make sense of it.

Mead, on the other hand, placed a great deal of emphasis upon the social origin of man: how the social man develops into a self thus becomes central to his work. A self, in the social sense, is made plausible through the prior existence of society. It is society which allows for the possibility of the individual to call out the experience of the other and to make sense of his experience in a meaningful way. Thus, a child emerges into society through his contacts with others, such as parents and friends. He comes to understand that he is in a world in which there are others with whom he may establish meaningful contacts. As such the self becomes separated from the organism; the child learns of the world indirectly through others (Mead, 1934: 135-138).

Mead views the human as an animal when it is born into the social world. Without the possibility of recognizing the other, his "humanness" cannot emerge. It is the possibility of transcending the animalness through the help of communication that allows the self to emerge. (Mead, 1934: 227) Communication establishes the individual in relation to his own social group and to the generalized vantage point of the whole group to which he belongs (Mead, 1938: 138). As such communication permits him to experience himself not as subject but as object; that is, in the same sense that he experiences others in the group as a whole. Mead's concept of communication needs to be explored further before its full implications are understood but it is worth developing even tentatively several of its implications in relation to the unit "Developing Tropical World".

There are a number of occasions in Chapter 2 of the thesis when the objective sense of the geographic foreigner is given. He is, in other words, presented as though he were a concrete object. Mead, in his work, presents the objective sense but preserves subjectivity by constantly referring this to his own understanding. He recognizes that it is his interpretation. This preserves the social sense of the work. In the same way the student studying the "Developing Tropical World" unit should be able to retain his social sense within the material. Mead makes a similar point in a discussion of democracy and the French Revolution:

> If we go back to the ideal of democracy as presented in the French Revolution, we do reach just such a sort of conflict. There you have recognition of quality; you demand in yourself what you recognize in others, and that does provide the basis for a social structure. (Mead, 1934: 288)

Within Mead's interpretive scheme, a re-cognition of oneself in the many becomes a social function of the unit and resource material. A sense of social identification within the materials would be preserved in order to be relevant to the student. An example of what Mead possibly meant may be made concrete in this unit as follows: if students were to understand the concept of "slavery" in African culture, it would be worthwhile to study analogous concepts of "alienation" and "work" in Western Culture. Certainly, we must keep in mind the limitations of the students, but Mead has clearly pointed out the importance of fully preserving the material's individual appeal and social relevance both at the classroom and societal levels. Communicative acts are, therefore, social acts which indicate how social individuals are said to emerge; they permit us to take the role of the other in our daily lives, thus continually reaffirming our social existence. But the question arises, "How does Mead understand the emergence of this social activity?"

Taking the Role of Other

A) Infant Understanding

That the communicative relationship is made possible only through our ability to take the attitude of the other person, could be an interpretation of Mead. By addressing the problem of how we are able to take the role of the other, Mead focuses upon the emergence of the self, since it is there that the genesis of our social understanding occurs. This may be illustrated through the following example Mead gives: an infant cries and the parents respond to the call. Over time he comes to understand that if he calls out, his parents will provide him with various sympathetic responses. (Mead, 1934: 366) It is not, however, the parents' response that is the focal point of our concern, but rather the baby's understanding. There cannot, for example, be any subjective context for an early cry; this is to say that the baby will not know the meaning of the cry but only the objective aspect. He will not understand anything of the emotion or meaning of his particular cry. Thus the state itself becomes the focal point, "I am wet", but there is no awareness that he is a separate entity who is in this particular state. The self becomes any self; there would be no sense of self as an entity apart from other selves. Baby, in this way, becomes a parent to himself (Mead, 1934: 368).

The child in these times is dependent upon moods and emotion to communicate with his parents. These are not part of a conscious pattern. This Mead suggests is the "mimic" phase - the response to facial gestures, etc., that baby may do. But in this way they remain the actions of others, as opposed to the baby's own reactions (Mead, 1934: 369). How does the infant come to take the role of the other? How, in other words, does he come to recognize his own self?

B) Mimic Phase

If we make the assumption that the infant must communicate with his parents, we may begin to reflect the notion that the self within Mead's framework must make sense of the gesture and verbal contents which are reflected towards him. Mead states it this way:

> The importance of what we term "communication" lies in the fact that it provides a form of behaviour in which the organism or the individual may become an object to himself. (Mead, 1934: 138)

An individual, in other words, will respond to the significant symbols which are directed toward him; his conduct becomes not only a response to others but also a response to himself.

Taking this response the individual indicates to himself what the other person will do and in doing this, he takes the attitude of the other. This, according to Mead, requires an analysis and reconstruction of the possible modes of action which the other will take toward him (Mead, 1934: 224). The significant symbols, for example, which we communicate to the individual should make sense to the extent that he is able to establish possible reactions. Such a situation indicates that the infant would begin to recognize that he has some measure of control over the social or physical encironment. But such responses are not organized, they are unstable within the toddler. He is not able, in this sense, to recognize his own possibilities within the situation. The child is continually trying to make sense of these responses for himself. The full sense of their meaning does not come until much later; they merely serve as an indication of the time span over which the self is constructed. Mead states, "In the mimic period the child utilizes his own responses to these stimuli which he makes use of in building a Self" (Mead, 1934: 150). Within this view, early life is a struggle to understanding what is socially possible.

C) Play Period

i) Imagined Game

One of Mead's descriptions of imagined games involves those which are organized and unorganized. A child who is playing by himself may take the role of the other, and will address himself as if he were the other. He may say, for instance, that he is a father, mother, policeman, etc. His response is a cognition of his possible reactions in relation to the other (Mead, 1934: 151). In other words, through his understanding of the possible actions of the other person, he begins to understand that the other has options for acting within his role. If the child is playing the role of a policeman, he may be open to arresting himself. This is, in some respects, a more sophisticated approach to the social situation than that of a child involved in a game of hide 'n' seek for here he would assume roles in a much more transitory way. The role of the policeman often involves a sense of commitment that may not be present in hide 'n' seek. The child becomes committed in much the same way that the players in an organized game might (Mead, 1938: 447).

ii) Organized Game

The relationship between the organized and the unorganized game cannot be maintained in an important way. In the organized game Mead views the whole social act as being portrayed. He states: "In such a situation the pattern of the whole social act becomes a part of the experience of the child" (Mead, 1938: 448). The experience of the child becomes significant in this situation, since he is able to distinguish his experience from that of others. He is able to take on the role of not only one other but everyone in the groups (Mead, 1934: 151). In other words, as the game unfolds before him, it must become a gestalt in his own mind; he must understand not only his own role but those of every other member. This may become increasingly complicated as we recognize that specialty players and teams may also be included within the act. But central to Mead's position is that "what he does is controlled by his being everyone else on the team, at least in so far as those attitudes affect his own particular response" (Mead, 1934: 154). But it is not simply taking the attitude of the other; there should be an acknowledgement that he is engaged in the action together with the others as members of a common social group. Such an acknowledgement speaks to what may be termed the generalized other; that is, the social acting of the group towards the whole project which is being carried out (Mead, 1934: 155). Only in this way would the individual possess, as Mead suggests, a complete self. The individual should be able to adjust to the general attitudes of not only the social acts but also institutions; an individual adjusts his actions to the way in which he feels he should act given the particular relevance structures he has identified within the situation. Here the interaction between the individual and the social events become important. "He should act" suggests that the individual is free to act as he will with reference to the community despite the community pressures that will be brought to bear upon the individual. There is, within the position which Mead explores, a reflective view; that is to say that the individual will be thoughtful with reference to his own actions.

The development of the social self become pivotal to Mead's philosophy. A self clearly is characterized as emerging through a struggle to understand his own social position. Envisioned in this way, the self is not passive. Thus when the materials for the Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" portray a passive accepting world they fail to recognize the struggle of the self in the world. Further, the resource material provided does not address the question of how the social self emerges within the society. The developing tropical world is assumed to be an adult world. References are made to children as appendages to the adult world. Further, the sexual emphasis is generally not upon female roles but upon the male roles in the various areas of the tropical world.

Considering the various ways in which the child emerges into adulthood in the developing tropical world is important. If we follow the work of Mead, a focus upon the everyday life world of the geographic stranger could be central to the Social Studies 8 unit under consideration.[3] Thus, when the emergence of the child into the social world is considered, utilizing Mead's framework will allow us to extend our thoughts towards an understanding of some of the ways in which the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit may begin to develop an approach which is different from the present scientific-technical one.

A summary of two central points which have been developed with reference to the self and its emergence follows:

1) the self initially is constituted by an organization of the others' attitudes with reference to himself; he will fully participate in these;

2) at a second "stage" these individual relations assume for the individual the full organization of the social attitudes of the group; that is, he is able to take the social attitudes of the group.

In interpreting the taking of the role of the other as Mead does, he introduces the concept of rationality in a way which is implicitly different from that represented by Newtonian physics, and hence, that uncovered in the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World".

Rational Action

Essentially, a Newtonian view reflects a scientistic attitude that the world can be totally explained. Mead states it this way:

> The scientist asks himself not whether the world will be rational and law-abiding but whether this observation will be confirmed and whether experiment will pronounce in favour of this hypothesis. (Mead, 1938: 30)

Mead's approach to rationality differs in that what is to be understood is to be found in each new and different social experience. It is, to use his phrase, the world that is there, the world that is viewed through the lens of the viewer. Mead focused a part of his attention on the work of Einstein as a way of beginning to understand how the knower, the student, or a curriculum resource writer creates his own perspective.

Einstein was not concerned with the larger observable world as was Newton. Rather he was more concerned with the atomic world in which the actions of the atoms were, according to his theory, as predictable as events in the larger observable world. But of central interest for Mead was Einstein's concern with the role which the scientist himself was playing in understanding the physical world around him. To put it simply, he was concerned with the subjective aspects of the scientist in the situation which he was observing. Mead describes Einstein's contribution in the following way:

> On observation, it was found that Einstein was right. The only facts that you have in this case are the position of the light of the store in its relation to the rim of the sun. By means of photography it can be

> measured. All facts, the so-called "data" of any subject, are nothing but certain experiences that the observer has in their relation to each other. (Mead, 1936: 38)

Here the central concern for Mead became describing how relative experiences become possible for man: the world for one becomes relative one to another. Colour, for example, is relative to the individuals who see it. But the conception he presents avoids total relativism since for an individual to understand the meaning of colour, he must implicitly recognize the relationship of the individual to the social world. (Mead, 1936: 49-50) The conception of beauty, for instance, does not exist within the consciousness of the individual but rather through the relationship of the individual to the world (Mead, 1936: 414).

A relationship between people requires that they be able to take the perspective of the other as the social experience of all who would live within a broad social group. Taking the role of the other in a limited way brings back the concept of rationality in terms of the group. I cannot, for example, take the attitude of the others in an organized group without acting in an organized way towards them. The whole group must in turn be acting in an organized way and controlling my actions if the game is to be won; at the same time I may act to control the whole movement of the game. I interpret Mead as suggesting that rationality involves the possibility of moving together, that is, making sense together of and in ongoing actions (Mead, 1934: 334). Within this interpretation the term "possibility" becomes significant. It reflects the social construction of sub-group culture (their common frame of reference) and group culture. In a sense it reflects the tacit social agreement, for instance, the "quality" of democracy, which emerged during the French Revolution. Within the developing tropical world this would reflect the basis of what it is like to live in that culture. It would not, however, necessarily reflect the fringes of beliefs that would belong to individual members of that particular sub-culture or culture.

The point that is made in the work of Einstein is that an accurate determination of events becomes no longer a possibility. As one progresses into the newer quantum mechanics, he begins to realize the uncertainty with which events may occur in the subatomic world. Physicists may no longer predict with certainty the events that occur; indeed, the central concern becomes, "Did I create that particle?"[4] This would support the position that an individual's ideas are constructed through the dialectic of the society and individual.

For Mead, the individual is not destined to act in a consensual way with respect to the group; rather, he is seeking to understand whether or not he will continue his action relative to the group in an organized sense. His actions become a possibility with reference to the group. For example, if he is involved in a game, he constantly adjusts his position with reference to the others; or if he has the ball, he is in a position either to control others in the game or to opt out of the game altogether.[5] Rationality as it is reflected through Mead, becomes a being able to enter into the perspective of the group and to take their attitude or vice versa and, in turn, to make explicit sense of the actions of the moment within their context.

Rationality becomes reflected through the control of the group over the individual and the control of the individual over the group

(Mead, 1934: 334). But this does not mean, as I interpret it, that the individual must co-operate with the group; Mead is not supporting a consensual or static view of society. He, for example, states the following:

> He can approve or disapprove of himself in those terms. He stands on his own legs just in so far as he assumes his own perspective, criticizes it, and reconstructs it. Other people can put themselves in his place, as in the novel and newspaper; and then the same reconstruction can take place. (Mead, 1936: 415)

Mead is saying that the individual or group may transform himself or themselves in an understandable way only in so far as they are able to reflect critically upon his or their situation. In terms of students in the Grade 8 Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World", they must be able to understand themselves and the social situations they encounter. By this I mean that the individual must be able to comprehend the social and political influences which are impinging upon his way of acting in the world or the way in which the world is altered by his acting. If we are to heed Mead, for the Social Studies 8 unit to make sense, it must permit a student to assume his own perspective through the taking of the role of the other. If this does not occur, then what is presented within the program is inauthentic; that is, the meaning of the material is only meaningful within its own framework of knowledge and does not reflect the possibilities which exist outside of it.

Mead's view presents an active, not a passive, view of individuals in society. Rationality, for Mead, involves an active view of society where the actions become understandable to both the group and the individual. If, for example, in the organized game a player makes a conventional move, one that is "by the book", this becomes intelligible to the other players. Also an unfamiliar move, the "accidental" move, may also begin to make sense to the players very quickly as play continues. It may, at first, catch them offguard, but they will soon make sense of it as the game continues to unfold. There is always the risk within this, however, that the individual will not be understood, and will be placed outside the game by the players. This suggests that the player must begin to initiate a dialogue with the others that will turn back the situation to them in a critical sense. Such dialogue, as Mead has said, must be within the intellectual grasp of the individual, and the ideas capable of being reconstructed within his own perspective, or as Schutz might suggest, within his own frame of reference (Mead, 1936: 415). Thus a new component is added to our understanding of the Grade 8 Social Studies program: the individual should be provided with the skills to judge the material as it stands. For Mead, such an activity might mean providing students with the intellectual skills for judging the perspective of knowledge presented in the resource material for the unit "Developing Tropical World". A reflection, such as that portrayed by the example, is an important aspect of the student's social self.

Reflection

Within Mead's framework, action in order to be critical must be rational and at the same time deliberative; that is, the actor must have some intent in mind which he has thought about before commencing the action. (Thinking, Mead suggests, is the dialogue between the "I" and "Me" (Mead, 1934: 355)). Reflection is not possible unless the individual is able to take the role of the other or the generalized other (Mead, 1934: 374). In its simplest form, reflection is in a sense a defeat of the act in progress; that is, the act ceases and the individual, to use Dewey's phrase, "stops and thinks". For Mead, reflection does not appear within the individual's mind as a "God-given" entity; rather it has its basis in the social acts upon which the individual builds his experiences of the world. Mead comments:

> (It) involves two attitudes at least: one of indicating a novel feature of the object which gives use to conflicting impulses (analysis); and the other of so organizing the reaction towards the object, thus perceived, that one indicates the reaction to himself as he might to another (representation). (Mead, 1934: 357)

Here I interpret him as distinguishing between those actions which are habits, in the same sense that Schutz describes, and those actions which are unfamiliar or novel. The situation, in other words, is brought to the individual's attention in a context which focuses him in relation to the group. Responding to an object is very complex. This complexity may be reflected in the way that it is a symbol which becomes more than itself. For instance, a shovel in the Grade 8 student's personal habitual context may be merely a garden object with little significance. But suppose the same student looks at the shovel of an Indian peasant farmer. What does he see? A shovel! but in a different habitual context. However, used in a skillful way students may come to realize the significance of the different context. A shovel to a poor Indian farmer is life itself. His family would starve without it. What would become significant here is the way in which teachers and students defeat the act and make it problematic.

The defeat of the act, as I have interpreted Mead, is a social act; interruptions need not be simply animal reactions to the events but rather thoughtful ones made significant by the importance of the symbols. Possible meanings of the shovel for the peasant may interrupt the habitual meaning for the student. Such a reflective interruption makes possible the reconstruction of the consciousness of the individual from his point of view. But the depth of the reconstruction is dependent upon the extent to which we probe:

> We exert a pressure, or at least initiate the response of pressure, in lieu of the pressure of the object to test our plan of action, and this pressure of the object has in it the element of effort, which gives us the inside of our own organisms and provides the object with an inside. (Mead, 1938: 188)

Mead, as I interpret him, is saying that to provide a concept with an "inside", that is, with an adequate framework for reconstructing the original perspective, the object of thought must be fully realized within the act. This realization involves the construction of hypothetical possibilities which are a part of the reflective act:

> The result of this is that the individual addresses himself in the role of the distant objects and ascribes to himself the same hypothetical content that he ascribes to the objects in his perspective, in so far as he is a perceptual object in the perspective - and it is only as such he enters into the reflection. (Mead, 1938: 193)

Reflection, in other words, returns our thoughts to that which is logically possible within the situation; the possibilities of what might happen. Mead takes a rigorous approach to the testing of the possibilities:

> This involves not the vague and uncontrolled presence of imagery of past contacts but a sort of experimental testing of the resistance which the object will afford against the effort that the organism will expend. (Mead, 1938: 194)

Thus understanding the uses to which a shovel may be put by the Indian peasant may span economic-cultural conditions.

An example of what Mead has suggested might be reflected in the following illustrations. The sacred cows of India are often perceived to be "useless", that is, in other words, of no economic value. Grade 8 students often hold such beliefs within the Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World".[6] But, while grounded in everyday belief, it does not necessarily reflect the actual cultural uses of the animal. Harris has rigorously studied the cow in India and has suggested the following:

> Incidentally, the preferred form of purchasing milk in the cities is to have the cow brought to the house and milked on the spot ... What seems most incredible about these arrangements is that they have been interpreted as wasteful, anti-economic Hindu practices, while in fact, they reflect a degree of economizing that goes far beyond Western, "Protestant" standards of saving and husbandry. Cow love is perfectly compatible with a merciless determination to get the literal last drop of milk out of the cow. (Harris, 1978: 20)

Other material may be provided from similar or differing points of view. As the Grade 8 student works his way through the material, it should be the responsibility of both the curriculum guide and the resource material to provide a framework to allow intelligent interpretation of the material. Each probe, as Mead suggests, would become a "sort of experimental testing". But such works still remain as a distant object; that is, the findings and conclusions to which the students arrive may only be hypothetical, since they will remain beyond the manipulatory area or the world of actual experience (Mead, 1938: 121-122; 104). This, I would suggest, underscores the need to search for the links between the students' social world and the developing tropical world. In the example cited above, Harris has provided such a link when he discusses the Western view of economizing, which provides the conceptual link between the Indian's view of the cow and the world of the Grade 8 student. The concept moves from being a distant object into that of the manipulatory sphere.

In the discussion of Mead's work, so far, there begins to emerge the distinction between that which is social; i.e., shared by others in the group, and that which is individual. Clearly, Mead locates the reflective act within the biography of the individual (Mead, 1934: 29). It is, therefore, within the individual experience that the understanding of a novel event emerges. But at the same time it is recognized that the individual experience is built up through the experiences which are in some sense common to us all. That is the social conception which dominates the taking of the position of the other, to the full recognition of the self. Mead reflects such emergence when he suggests:

> an experience of the object itself is constructed with the individual's experience, consciousness on the one side with unconsciousness on the other. (Mead, 1934: 32)

Thus Mead suggests that a further aspect of reflection is the dialectic between the conscious and the unconscious; between what is known and what is not. It is the uncovering of understanding or ways of proceeding through the problematic situation which lies before the individual. Mead, as I interpret this, suggests that such an uncovering of the unconscious could have far-reaching effects in terms of the individual; indeed, the entire field or landscape of belief may be altered. He says:

> If the promised experience of action is not attained, and action is inhibited by conflicting tendencies, a reconstruction of the field may take place, in which new objects answering to a different form of action may arise. (Mead, 1938: 418)

In our usual way of proceeding, we are often unconscious of the way in which we usually proceed. It is the unconscious, the what-we-know-of-but-are-unaware-of in our frail life that requires exploration, if we are to find the reflective link with the people of the developing tropical world within the Grade 8 Social Studies program.

In summary, reflection emerges through the present over against a past; it becomes a dialectic between what is known in the now of the individual and what orients him towards what might possibly be in the future. It is through the reflective acts of the individual that his own social self is able to emerge. He experiences and constructs his own biography. These experiences provide the basis for the interpretation of the individual's social self; it is through reflection that his self emerges. But it must at the same time be remembered that reflection involves abstraction. As Mead states:

> Reflection involves the assumption of different attitudes with the consequent different perspectives that answer to these different attitudes, but in reflection these attitudes are present not in full perceptual form. (Mead, 1938: 182)

It is the way in which the abstractions reflect the possible forms of thought, in the instance of the Grade 8 Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World", that would be important. And, it would also be important to understand how the abstractions which are possible thought forms of individual students may be made concrete within the resource material itself. Such material would provide some of the lesson aids used by the teacher to develop an understanding of the developing tropical world. But by itself reflection only constitutes a basis for possible action by the student in the social world, which in the final analysis would be viewed as significant.

Before we consider the nature of action within Mead's philosophy, it is necessary to understand his approach to the dialectic between the individual and the society within which he lives.

"I" and "Me" Dialectic

Mead, as was stated at the beginning of this chapter, developed his philosophy from the locus of society. His study of the concept of reflection was an exploration of the emergence of the individual within the broader social group. Within his early work, as reflected in Mind, Society and Self, Mead introduced the concept of the "I" and "Me". Before we proceed with our study, we may reflect upon the order of our title. Perhaps in terms of the later emergence of the "me" over the "I", it would be useful to reverse the order of this subtitle.

William James used the "I" and "Me" dialectic through much of his early work. I am not, however, suggesting that Mead's interpretation parallels James (James, 1890: 255; 291-305). As Miller points out, for instance, Mead's conception of self (which may be considered as the essential embodiment of the "I" and "Me") makes no provision for a religious experience which cannot be accounted for in a social sense[7] (Miller, 1973). This would, perhaps, help to account for the materialist interest in Mead's philosophy which has emerged. I wish to begin this discussion by pointing out that the "I" and "Me" dialectic within his philosophy attempts to conceptualize the relationship between reflection in the individual and his way of acting in society.

Mead's use of the organized game again provides a useful example for our understanding. If the players cannot understand the action of an individual, then they would come to view him as not being able to participate. For Mead the problem became how this may be understood and it would be a fair interpretation of his work to add "if at all". This addendum is addressed by Mead himself in various ways. He seems to indicate that although the "I" and "Me" may be separated for purposes of discussion, they cannot in reality be separated within the self and cannot be separated experientially from the others in the group (Mead, 1934: 41; 193ff).

Mead viewed the I/Me construct in the following way:

> The I ... is something that is, so to speak, responding to the social situation which is within the experience of the individual. It is the answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude towards them. (Mead, 1934: 177)
>
> The taking of all of those organized sets of attitudes gives him his "me"; that is the self he is aware of. (Mead, 1934: 175)

It is his concern for the origin of the self within the social community that Mead explicates (Mead, 1934: 173). He sees the self as being called out to experience other selves. The child will not only be aware of the resistance of his own body but also the resistance of others he will encounter. It is also important to consider that the self does not encounter the social experience of others as perspectival, that is, an encounter with many different perspectives, but rather as a common social perspective.

The implication here is that the individual reflection, I, is a reflection upon the social consciousness which transforms it to self-consciousness (Mead, 1959: 85; Natanson, 1956: 186). For Mead, consciousness may be viewed in two ways:

> a) It is used in the sense of awareness, a consciousness of,
>
> b) It is also used as constituting a certain context (staff) which attaches to the experience of the individual. (Mead, 1938: 73)

An individual cannot become aware without engaging in the process of reflection, which in the terms which he suggests must be "consciousness of" something.

Mead, early in Mind, Society and Self, addresses the question of consciousness and reflection as being a common sense, everyday life world type of understanding. In our everyday lives, he suggests, we usually distinguish between those events which are separate from ourselves and those that are going on in the world around us (Mead, 1934: 112). It would be up to the individual's sense of relevance which he sees in each event as to whether or not he commits himself to further exploration. But, of course, sometimes the relevance of events is imposed upon the individual: wars, accidents, loss of job are all externally imposed relevances with which an individual must deal at an intellectual level. And we must remind ourselves that schooling such as that associated with the unit "Developing Tropical

World" must also be considered. A student, being within the confines of the Grade 8 class, must determine what is relevant for him, but we must also be clear that he must in some way pass the course. Thus the individual in an intellectual setting will be continually involved in judging what is relevant to him and what is not, in terms of those conscious acts which impinge upon him.

> ... By setting up a parallelism between the things around him and his experience, he picks out those characters of the thing which will enable him to control the experience. His experience is that of keeping himself seeing things which help him, and consequently he picks out the objects those characters which will express themselves in that sort of experience ... (Mead, 1934: 113)

Thus the individual becomes "conscious of" some aspect of a situation.

Such a position within Mead suggests that an individual's consciousness of the social surroundings is based upon what he socially knows. Thus the history, myths, etc., of the nation become embedded in his consciousness and he functions comfortably within these beliefs. Mead suggests this in part when he writes:

> Consciousness becomes our experience of things not as they are but as they impress us from a distance which can never be overcome except in imagination. (Mead, 1938: 14)

The individual carries these beliefs with him and functions comfortably within them under normal circumstances. Through his concept of "conscious of", however, Mead, as I interpret him, suggests that such beliefs (knowledge) are nothing more than that. These ways of knowing obscure the individual's deeper understanding of his own way of being human with other members of humanity. The logic-in-use or path finding, therefore, within a culture becomes significant; i.e., to become "conscious of" the history, myths, etc., and to transcend them requires an intellectual challenge. Speaking of the "consciousness of" speaks directly to the social sense of the experience. Under most circumstances, Mead suggests, the "I" is indeed maintained over against the "Me". Before I consider this latter statement further, I wish to discuss one means through which the what is known, the "consciousness of" the individual may be broadened.[8]

Mead explores this when he speaks of the resistance objects exert upon the individual. The individual's social experience may be called out by a particular object. Mead's description here parallels the later work of the Dutch phenomenologist, van den Berg, who reminds us of Conteau, who, upon returning to the house of his childhood was unable to capture fully the essence of it. It was not until he turned to the stone wall which surrounded the house that he became able to focus his attention upon the past. At first, he was not able to recall his childhood in terms of it and it was not until he remembered that he was smaller when he ran his finger over the wall at the height he was then, that the memories came flooding forth. The memories were contained in the wall.[9] Van den Berg, like Mead, does not mean this literally but rather that a relational component between the wall and the self was required to bring forth the meaning. The resistance which the wall called out could only be overcome in terms of the meaning. Mead described his position in this way:

> The way in which we are going to respond is found there, and in the possible connections there must be connections of past experiences with present responses in order that they may be thought. (Mead, 1934: 115)

Thus the link in expanding the horizonal aspect of experience is a subtle one.

Mead, in exploring the "I", reminds us again and again that the link between our present reality and our own selves is significant. If a student in the Grade 8 Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World" cannot begin to make the link, and intellectually expand his own "consciousness of", then the import of the course will, according to Mead, remain at the level of belief. But within this context Mead indicates the significance of these beliefs, and their importance for understanding the developing tropical world. Mead's position is clearly revealed in the following passage:

> The sense of national prestige is an expression of that self respect which we tend to preserve in the maintenance of superiority over other people. (Mead, 1934: 284-285)

He suggests here that the distinction between the "I" and "Me" dissolves when national prestige becomes important. The Japanese have an expression, "ICHI BAN" or number one. To them, to be economically number one becomes important. But of interest here is that in Chapter 2 the concept of development as it was identified in the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" reflects an attitude of Western superiority.

What the dissolution of the "I" into the "Me" covers over is the feeling that we belong to a greater humanity, or as Mead suggests, a universe of man. It is the universe of man which the "consciousness of" the world might be claimed to cover over; that is, the unconscious awareness that we belong to the universe of man. Mead here is suggesting that this attitude must be transcended. But, of course, underlying is this question: Will it be possible to move beyond this limitation?

Mead cites an example which is relevant to the unit under discussion. His reference is to trade unions in England in the early nineteenth century.

> The labour movement reached all the way down into English society. It was a movement which got its expression in industrial strife, and that industrial strife got its expression in Parliament. As a result, the development of English democracy throughout the nineteenth century had been what is so evident today, a national movement ... (it carried with it) a philosophy which was capable of a single statement; it was one that could find its place among the trade unions themselves, one that could get its expression in the movement toward free trade, in the demand for cheap bread, and the demand for internationalism by way of free trade. It was a movement that was connected with the political and philosophical thought of the community itself, reaching beyond England to other communities. (Mead, 1936: 424)

The exploration of its own economic beliefs, we might add, became manifest in a policy of imperialism, which in the developing tropical world often carried with it the belief in racial superiority.

At this point the "I" and "Me" have been shown to dissolve within the self in terms of national consciousness. While it is developed only as a single case within Mead's work, it is nevertheless significant in terms of our understanding of how his work may be used to interpret the British Columbia Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World". In raising this point as well, we encounter a termination of the dialectic between the individual and society at the mundane level. But as Mead indicates, it is only when the universal humanity of man is recognized that the dialectic is returned. Thus, too, we may argue, does the individual's own experience become significant once again since such recognition is capable of dissolving the narrow, national interests.

Natanson correctly points out the methodological distinction between the "I" and "Me" used by Mead (Natanson, 1956: 17-18). But I feel, in that it led to what I would see as his significant understanding of national feeling, that Mead radically altered his initial premises regarding the "I" and "Me". Since in the national expression, which is a situational setting, the "I" is capable of losing its identity, it was to become a mere possibility; that is, individual experience was capable of being subverted. Thus the "I" or individual experience was viewed by Mead as being very unstable without the rigors of intellectual reflection which would constantly renew the "I" through its ability to take the role of the other. At this point in the discussion, I would like to turn to Mead's concept of communication and its relationship to the transcendence of nationalistic feeling.

Communication

Mead has defined communication in various ways throughout his works. At one point, for instance, he describes communication in terms of reason:

> Reason is the reference to the relation of things by means of symbols ... A system of these symbols is what is called a language ... It always involves, even when language makes thought possible, a co-operative social process. (Mead, 1938: 518)

At another point he describes it in terms of meaning:

> When we direct a person to go to a distant place and there do certain things, the meaning of the words which we use is dominantly logical; i.e., while the complex activity is present in the individual with its organization is what occupies attention, and the fitness of the stimuli for their function is left to

> the whole organization of the act within the individual. (Mead, 1938: 547)

> Communication as I shall use it always implies the conveyance of meaning; and this involves the arousal in one of the attitude of the other, and his response to these responses. (Mead, 1932: 83)

Communicative acts in Mead's sense are ongoing and form the basis of the relationship between the individual and the social group (Mead, 1934: 228). As such it would follow that it is the language (and indeed both signs and symbols) which permits the humanness of the individual to emerge.

For Mead communication involves a dynamic part of human social interaction; that is to say that while the physiological bases, vocal chords, larynx, etc., are essential for carrying on conversation, it is the ability of humans to take the role of the other that in the end is the basis of communication. The communicative relationship is thus established intersubjectively from the outset rather than in terms of the subjective beginning. Speech, as I interpret Mead, permits an intervention in terms of the actual completion (consummation) of the act; that is, it permits an individual to stop short a particular ending to his act and symbolically carry it through. As such I might suggest communicative language permits the fundamental tension between human beings in social relationships to emerge. Here the breaking up of the act may become more significant. In this regard Mead writes:

> The arousing of the attitude which would lead to the same sort of action as that which is called out in the other individual makes possible the process of analysis, the breaking up of the act itself. (Mead, 1934: 242)

Thus it is the stimulation of the communicative act which has the potential to begin the reflective act. If, for example, a student studying within the unit "Developing Tropical World" is listening to a discussion on the blacks of South Africa, there is the potential power within the conversation to halt the ongoing action and have him reflect upon what has been said.

At the same time the conversation is carrying with it the rules for understanding the particular situation. The British Columbia Social Studies 8 Curriculum Guide, for example, contains the ground rules for how the teacher should view the curriculum. Materials used in the classroom reflect the basic rules for describing the developing tropical world to the student:

> India's population increase in sixteen years was 144 million more than seven times the population of Canada. India is tackling this problem in two ways. The first is by encouraging the ordinary Indian to limit the size of his family. The second is by educating farmers to produce more efficiently so that the yield of the land will increase, and by developing industries, such as the manufacture of fertilizers and the steel industry, so that many other things may be made, like trucks, tractors and farm implements. Thus India's problem is both an economic and an educational one. (Carswell, 1968: 84)

Evident in this passage are basic rules of technically approaching and solving India's development problems. That the people of India have easy solutions to their problems is compounded by the fact that "they are breeding rapidly in comparison to us"; that is, there is the feeling that Canadians are somehow superior. The rules of the situation are carried by the communicative acts; they are socially derived.

McCarthy makes this same point in his interpretation of Mead when he suggests:

> The underlying system of roles is no longer attributed to individual subjects; they account rather for generation of intersubjective relations in which subjects are formed. (McCarthy, 1979: 162)

The individual becomes competent only in carrying on social communications to the extent to which he is able to demystify the situation as he sees it before him. Mead suggests that this is a social reaction; it is a situation in which he must be able to influence not only the others who are around him but also himself (Mead, 1934: 243).

Influencing others around him suggests that he be able to clarify the communicative intents which he enters into; he must, in other words, be able to do more than passively acquiesce to the situation in which he finds himself. An individual would, then, involve himself in a situation, in our Grade 8 Social Studies setting, only to the extent that the language is able to motivate or stimulate his own interest.

The non-passive role of the individual in the social setting is important within Mead's work, for not only does it help in characterizing the type of communication which will pass between individuals, but also in addition he concerns himself with the means by which social control operates within the social setting in the form of self-criticism. Mead states this as follows:

> And thus it is that social control, as operating in terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so intimately and extensively over individual behaviour or conduct, serving to integrate the individual and his actions with reference to the organized social processes of experience and behaviour in which he is implicated. (Mead, 1934: 255)

Self-consciousness, an active phase of reflection, involves self-criticism, an understanding of the social situation in terms of the individual's own experience. Thus not only are the rules of the social situation given to the individual as the standards of group action, but also at the same time the individual is open to the possibility of being self-critical of the myths, beliefs,[10] and other life world expectations which are placed upon him. As I interpret Mead, self-criticism within the individual and his understanding of the social-historical setting are important.

> ... individual behaviour or conduct operating by virtue of the social origin and basis of such criticism. (Mead, 1934: 255)

The individual, through the social setting, is placed in a situation where he must begin to understand the ground structure of his particular action. Hence a student involved in a Grade 8 Social Studies class studying the developing tropical world has available to her the possibility of taking on the responsibility of her own self-criticism. That is, if she is to understand the basis of her own actions with reference to the developing tropical world she must have the possibility of realizing to the fullest extent her own role as self-critic.

It is at this point that emergence plays a central role in Mead's work, for without it the possibility of self-criticism would have to be abandoned since it is based upon the possibility of the social historical consciousness. Every new event contains the possibilities of both past and present, or as Mead dubs it, "the old system" and the "new" (Mead, 1932: 49). Under such a circumstance both must be understood at the same time; as such the past and present would come into an immediate relationship. It is implied that the system is in constant flux and that changes within it always carry the old, or at least something of its character. Thus, a student considering the developing tropical world would become involved in the history of the old imperialist system which appeared in, say, Africa, and in the independence movements which emerged to take its place. It is the language which carries us forward, and through it, the transformations of the "old" into the "new" occurs.

Such transformations reveal themselves in our being able to take the role of the other. For example, transformation occurs when an individual in a train takes the role of one on a railway platform; in taking such a role he is in two systems at once. But Mead points out how very complicated this simple act is and how it is very difficult, in fact impossible, to set up common structures between the two systems. The problem, he states, becomes a significant metaphysical one:

> The metaphysical question is, can a thing with changing spatio-temporal and energy dimensions be the same thing with DIFFERENT dimensions when we have seemingly only these dimensions by which to define the thing? (Mead, 1934: 79)

Within this we must come to recognize that in passage there would be a change in the structure of the things; that because of the passage of objects they may come to occupy different systems. It should then be recognized that within this there is a system of transformation, which allows us to move from one system to another and to occupy and identify the same objects in each; further it must also be recognized that the systems do not have to be complementary but indeed may be mutually exclusive. What they share is their proximity in terms of an event which ties the two together (Mead, 1938: 541). The means by which these are brought under control of the individual is through the use of symbols and the way in which meaning is imparted within the symbols. Thus there must be a means through which the transformation occurs. This I would suggest lies within the horizonal component of the systems as they are found within the individual. It is clear within Mead's work that the individual must be aware that he has taken the role of the other; in other words, the transformation is part of the reflective act (Mead, 1934: 78; 1936: 168).

Communication with other human beings brings with it the capacity to call forth the other to bring him along, as it were, into another system. The question that is before us is how Mead would envision a Grade 8 Social Studies student transcending his own national feelings while studying the developing tropical world. Mead may suggest an answer something along the lines which follow:

> We are getting to realize more and more the whole society to which we belong because the social organization is such that it brings out the response of the other person to our own act not only in the other person but also in ourselves. Kipling says, "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet", but they are meeting. The assumption has been that the response of the East to the West, and of the West to the East are not comprehensible to each other. But, in fact, we find that we are awakening, that we are beginning to interchange roles. A process of organization is going on underneath our conscious experience, and the more this organization is carried out the closer we are brought together. The more we do call out in ourselves the response which our gestures call out in the other, the more we understand him. (Mead, 1934: 271)

Thus Mead suggests again that we must fully understand ourselves and our own social situation; he is saying, as I interpret him, that as long as the unit "Developing Tropical World" views the people as "mystical" and strange and does not challenge the student to become self-critical of his own situation, then the "strangers" never will meet. The study of the people on the earth, in other words, must be taken as a study of the reflexive self even at a Grade 8 level; it becomes a search for meaning. There is a second point which is made in the Mead statement above: students know of the broader attempts to unite the world at an organizational level. This suggests that Mead is pointing out how important courses like the Grade 8 Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World" can become in creating a world, as opposed to parochial, view. But again he is not content that we be passive:

> One who can assist any individual who he finds suffering may extend that universality far beyond man, and put it into the form of allowing no suffering to any sensuous being. The attitude is one which we take toward any other form that actually does, or conceivably may, appeal to us when we can convey immediate satisfaction by our own acts. (Mead, 1934: 289)

Understanding the social conditions of the developing tropical world may be reflected through local social action projects as simple as helping a senior citizen with shopping. There must however be a basis for such communication and action: it is not enough to impose one's own will on the situation. Thus for the student the coming together of the senior citizen and himself must be open and honest. Such lessons may be reflected through, for example, the imperialist traditions of the Western approach to the developing tropical world.

Underlying the examples cited above is the actual interpretation of the various symbols or communications associated with the situations. As I have interpreted Mead, the clarity with which Grade 8 students would understand the situations is dependent upon how self-critical they are with respect to their own social world. The unit, according to the interpretation, would have to re-cognize the importance of understanding the possibilities which lie behind various communicative acts.

Time and Space

Implicitly students recognize that they live in time and space. It is this taken-for-granted aspect of time and space that provides us with an example of the self-critical task of the individual. Time and space are experienced by each of us in our everyday lives; but how each of us experiences these is the problem which Mead raised within his work. He has taken the position that the time-space relation between two events is absolute; the only variance is the perspective of the two events (Mead, 1936: 289). The point may be made by a simple illustration. If I am watching an object in outer space disappear I may have the impression that it is travelling away from me faster than I myself am moving. But according to Einstein's relativity theory, such cannot be the case since light travels at a constant velocity. What makes sense from the perspective of the observer cannot, in fact, be so. The conflict, of course, is that the individual does see the event from his own perspective.

Mead discusses time as follows:

> Time is, then, the experiences of inhabited action in which the goal is present as achieved through the individual assuming the attitude of contact response, and thus leaving the events that should elapse between the beginning and the end of the act present only in their abstracted character are passing. In the presence of an indefinite number of such physical objects in the surrounding field, the relation of these events to any one act is blurred into a general succession of events abstracted from any one series. (Mead, 1938: 232)

Mead, in explicating his concept of time in this way is discussing the mechanism through which the individual constructs his sense of time; that is, the individual must have the contact attitude. Such an instance of time would apply to the physicist attempting to understand the space-time continuum as well as to the man on the street. Time, and the space-time relation, exists solely within the experience of the individual. The theory of relativity was useful to Mead for describing the different ways in which we may experience space-time within the experience itself (Mead, 1938: 233).

If, for example, I observe a particular event, I inhibit the action by assuming the attitude of myself involved in the event. In assuming this attitude I enjoin the motion of the event relative to my own position; that is, the contact within the experience acts as a resistance within the space-time continuum and in essence transforms the experience into the form in which I will ultimately, given my own particular motives and interests in the situation, understand the event. Each act, in essence, is made up of a series of events or episodes which are interpreted in terms of the biography of the individual; but in each [illegible]ese the actual event, as viewed by the individual, is only a part of the total landscape against which it is occurring. Mead writes:

> The problem must happen to an individual, it can have no other locus than in his biography, but the terms in which he defines it and seeks its solution must be universal, that is, have common import. (Mead, 1938: 59)

An act itself is broken up into successive events and related to the whole in order for the individual to make sense of them. In this way Mead was directed towards Bergson's concept of time. For Bergson each separate event is related to the total field in which it occurs. If, for instance, I hear a tune, I do not hear a single note at a time but rather I hear it as a whole or a gestalt (Bergson, 1910). Events do not occur solely in some abstracted time, but in time-space. Thus when an individual reflects or directs his attention towards himself, time and space become intertwined; they may not be understood as being isolated one from the other.

Mead develops his concept of time-space more in line with Einstein perhaps than Bergson, although ultimately his end is different from either. Consider, for a moment, the example cited earlier of a passenger on a train looking at another man standing upon a platform. In a sense this provides us with a frame of reference through which we hold particular events while we wait for the rest to unfold; a scene of a village in Bangladesh may look beautiful in its setting, but if it happens that we know that hundreds of people are starving to death there, we may suspend what we know until further notice. In this way it is clear that time-space are only actually present to the individual to the extent to which they are recognized as being there from his perspective. Here, though, when motion is dissolved, so the sense of relativity disappears (Mead, 1938: 239). Thus it is the experiential sense which is left and it is the articulation of this within the self that leads to the universal.

In terms of the Grade 8 Social Studies program "Developing Tropical World", the individual's experiential sense of time reflected through the understanding of time has a bearing. A question may be raised with students as to why some parts of the world have no acknowledged time concept like our mechanistic time. But while Mead develops time in terms of the individual, clearly the import of his concept is directed towards the breakdown of the national spirit. Space, and its understanding from the perspective of the individual was also addressed by Mead. He indicates the following with respect to this:

> If we translate the problem from the form in the immediate experience in which it has been stated into that of conceptual space abstracting from the experience of vision, we have sets of events which are occupied by physical particles. These events must be recognized as extended in time as well as in space. (Mead, 1938: 240)

I see a bird in the sky and focus upon him as he is; I am conscious of his movement through space. In essence, from within my perspective, I suspend time, even though upon reflection of the event I may become aware that some time has passed. Experience thus allows individuals to abstract time and space but in actuality both must be viewed as part of a space-time continuum. Thus time "becomes" but it is not trapped within the emergent events which surround it.

Emergence is the sense of the event which flows from the particular moment in which it exists. It cannot merely happen; there is a history, a landscape, against which what is new becomes. The importance of the past to a particular emergent event may be considered:

> The past is always necessary, but the past which is there is not necessary; i.e., is dependent upon the

> future which determines the present and its interpretation. (Mead, 1938: 616)

The importance of the emergent event is only important in respect to the events which are seen to be important from the present perspective. A past is always interpreted in terms of its present, from the point of view of an individual interpreter.

Emergence involves two different but related time systems, each of which may be viewed as being grounded in the past and present:

> It is the task of the philosophy of today to bring into congruence with each other this universality of determination which is the text of modern science, and the emergence of the novel which belongs not only to the experience of human social organisms, but is found also in a nature which science and the philosophy that has followed it have separated from human natures. The difficulty that immediately presents itself is that the emergent has no sooner appeared than we set about rationalizing it, that is we undertake to show that it, or at least the conditions that determine its appearance, can be found in the past that lay behind it. (Mead, 1932: 14)

Of importance here is Mead's insistence that the individual's experience of time-space be included as a part of the social experience of time-space; one informs the other and cannot be separated. Thus a study of the developing tropical world should be concerned with the experiential sense of space-time, as well as the social sense.

Students within the program may find it useful to consider both their own logic-in-use as it refers to space-time and as well the logic-in-use of the people of the developing tropical world. But of significance here is Mead's conception of the social past. The concern which emerges is which aspects of the individual's experience of time-space are uniquely his own and which arise in the social view of time-space. Analytically, both could be said to exist; that is, for purposes of understanding space, time and space-time, the various components may exist separately. But is it possible for them to exist within a philosophical position side-by-side? Mead has suggested already that under two circumstances the individual experience dissolves into the collective experience. At the same time, however, he adds that while it is important to break down social extremes, it is also important to sever the individual experience from his social surroundings. Thus the purely social experience, the group superiority of one over another, is viewed by Mead as a breakdown in social relations, where it is possible for the individual to lose control of himself.

Mead underlines the need for personal relations when he states:

> But as a rule it can be said that our various democratic organizations of society still are dependent upon personal relations for the operation of the community, and especially for the operation of the government. (Mead, 1934: 314)

He walks this careful "line" between the individual experience and the social. The time-space example illustrated this "line" or distinction.

For Mead, however, the significance of the individual within the group cannot be easily discounted. The individual within the social relationship contains the potential for altering the actions of the group; that is, the individual is able to understand fully his own social situation, and act to alter that situation.

The Social Act

An individual must act within the social setting or society. Mead has, in Mind, Society and Self, characterized society as follows:

> The "social" aspect of human society - which is simply the social aspect of the selves of all individual members taken collectively - with its concomitant feelings on the parts of all these individuals for co-operation and social interdependence, is the basis for the development and existence of ethical ideals in that society ... (Mead, 1934: 321)

Socially collected individuals do not, however, adequately bridge the problem of experience and society. Towards this end he later began to use the concept of sociality to bridge this gap (Natanson, 1953: 18). Sociality bridges the old and the new; it bridges what has happened and carries it through into what is just emerging:

> As we have seen, in the passage from the past into the future the present object is both the old and the new, and this holds for its relations with all other members of the system to which it belongs. (Mead, 1932: 51)

Students involved in searching for understanding of the situation and people of the developing tropical world are thus bound to understand the views of what has been, the old, and that which is emerging, the new. There are two aspects to this:

A) the subjective understanding; that which presents itself, the appearance, and the objective reality, that which is there; and

B) the systematic character of the new which is built upon the old. (Mead, 1932: 51-52)

Each aspect of sociality involves a relationship between what was and what is emerging in the locus of the present. It is here that the concept of transformation plays a critical role in Mead's philosophy for it carries with it the resistance of the old system. If the resistance encountered by the individual is sufficient, then the potential revolutionary character is an inclusive class which carries with it the old system. The transformational structures must be sufficiently strong that the individual does not lose his ability to take the role of the other; if such were to occur the result would be a fictional creation, which when challenged by the other may potentially have no basis or substance in the social world. Within this context there must be a constant readjustment of the distance experience and the contact experience.

Within Mead's concept of sociality the significance of the Grade 8 student understanding his own social world becomes clearer. The curriculum unit, "Developing Tropical World", offers, as previously suggested, the possibility for the student to experience something of geographic foreigners. But the experience is offered solely within Mead's concept of the distance experience; it is a fiction, a range of possibilities that this or that may emerge. The possibilities are not limitless; though, since they are prescribed by the course's resource materials. The only way the distance experience, according to my interpretation of Mead, could become contact experience is if the contact and distance experiences are grounded in an understanding of the student's own social life. The transformations contained within the concepts of sociality thus reveal something of the relationship between a student's possible national feelings and the transcendent bond between himself and his fellow-man. Further, the different perspectives which may be taken within the distance experience would encourage a fuller understanding of the landscape through which the student begins to understand himself and others. The student's consciousness may thus emerge with a fuller understanding of the meanings and values which inform his actions in the world (Mead, 1932: 66-67).

Within the concept of sociality Mead attempts to explore the relationship between the individual student and the social world. The actions of the person in altering the old structures are centered around his own self-criticism and his ability to communicate his perspective. Thus while feelings of superiority of one's group over another may be present in a collective form, its re-interpretation is dependent not upon the collective but upon the individual experience. Mead maintains that individual's experience is a necessary adjunct to self and ultimately to social criticism. Mead expresses this as follows:

> Since society has endowed us with self-consciousness, we can enter personally into the largest understandings which the intercourse of rational selves extends before us. And because we can live with ourselves as well as with others we can criticize ourselves, and make our own values in which we are involved through those undertakings in which the community of all rational beings is engaged. (Mead, 1932: 90)

What are the motivational aspects of self-criticism? How does Mead view self-criticism as ultimately altering the social situation of students?

Motives

Mead discusses in a number of places the concept of role. I have previously discussed the concept, for example, in the earlier part of this chapter with reference to games. Of roles Mead has indicated the following: "What the assumption of the different attitudes makes possible is the analysis of the object". The critical word here is the notion of attitude; i.e., the taking of the role of the other requires different attitudes or perspectives on the situation. In the role of "student" a Grade 8 involved in the British Columbia Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World" will be expected to take the attitude of many others. In particular the course, in suggesting that the students are to understand something of this area of the world, prescribes that students shall take the role of the other, mainly, the geographic stranger. But such a role-taking suggests that the motive for taking such an attitude should be present for the student. Mead begins to discuss the relationship between role, attitude and motive in the following statement:

> It is true that memory images of past expenditure of effort upon it or like objects may arise, but these images will be the efforts expended aroused by the stimulation of what we call the resistance of the object. They do not of themselves carry with them the location of the resistance in the object, nor is this location of the resistance given in the definition of the boundaries of the objects through sight and touch. What has taken place is the "feelings one's self into the object". (Mead, 1938: 310)

"Feelings one's self into the object" suggests that there is an active relationship between the attitude (self-consciousness) and the motives in the situation as defined by the role which is assumed. The object within the situation is thus defined in terms of its horizon; how far the object is probed is dependent upon the reasons for continuing to search for "answers". The reasons would be situationally defined. A particular situation does not simply appear for the individual, rather it is related to both the environment and the individual's ability to select from it. In a social situation it would involve a reciprocity of motives, as assumed through the taking of the attitude of the other. Thus motives are not isolated within the individual but rather complexities of motives are a result of social action.

Motives involve the reflection of the individual. He must understand the possible meanings which are in the situation which lies before him. These would include the meanings from past situations which are presented to him. Sense making, as described by Mead, is closely involved with motives, and as well, language:

> Reason is the reference to the relations of things by means of symbols. When we are able to indicate these relations by means of these symbols, we get control of them and can isolate the universal characters of things, and the symbols become significant.
> (Mead, 1938: 518)

Motives, as I interpret Mead, have their origin in the past of the situation presently experienced. Reason is not constructed in the instance; cases and examples may be cited, and with them the motives for carrying out particular actions. Language or communication conveys these motives into the present. The question that arises is to what extent the individual is willing to prove the past in order to understand the motives which are a part of his present action. If, for example, the motive is simply accepted, then there will be no further action on his part. But if the motive is questioned, the taken-for-granted reason for acting in a certain manner becomes problematic. Questions about particular actions relate more to the individual than to the social situation. It is the individual himself who must stop the action, and question the motive; it cannot be forced upon him. The context for questions about individual motives may, however, be socially raised.

Reference has already been made to the temporal character of the motive: it has an origin in the past and is re-interpreted in terms of the present. As a past for the individual it would carry with it both a personal and social context. The context is personal in that it carries with it the personal interpretation of the social context in which the motive arose. Given this it is clear that the full horizon in which the original motive appeared will never be known since it is being interpreted in terms of the present.

> The stretch of the present within which this self-consciousness finds itself is delimited by the particular social act in which we are engaged. But since this usually stretches beyond the immediate perceptual horizon we fill it out with memories and imagination. (Mead, 1932: 88)

In the present it is the symbolic imagery and its dynamic relationship with the situation before us that carries with it the motives. The actual motives within the past may not be immediately present within the horizon. Mead goes on to say:

> The presents, then, within which we live are provided with margins, and fitting them into a larger independent chronicle is again a matter of some more extended present which calls for a wider horizon. But the widest horizon belongs to some undertaking, whose past and future refer back to it. (Mead, 1932: 88-89)

Exploration of the motives within the horizon of the present involves the self-critical aspect of the consciousness. To suggest that motives are a part of the wider horizon suggests that they belong to the fringes of the individual thought. I have previously suggested that self-criticism is required on the part of the individual in order to clarify the broader range of motives in the social world. In addition, as I interpret Mead, the location of the motives within the broader horizon suggests that they are hidden from the present, and thus present actions require a further researching. In this regard Mead makes the following statement:

> Thus he becomes not only self-conscious but also self-critical; and thus, through self-criticism, social control over individual behaviour or conduct operates by virtue of the social origin and basis of such criticism. That is to say self-criticism is essentially social-criticism and behaviour controlled by self-criticism is essentially behaviour controlled socially. (Mead, 1934: 255)

Here Mead addresses the control between the self and society in terms of the motive.

Motives may reflect control of one over another. For instance, the teacher asks the students to answer three questions in Carswell. The language of the teacher may communicate a motive to the students: do the three questions or lose the marks. Or as another case in point, Carswell may communicate to the reader of the text that the people of the developing tropical world may only be civilized through the importation of Western ideals. In the cases cited, the students are provided with motives.

The students may or may not choose to question the motives. He may, for example, accept the way the situation is defined and answer the questions; here he is accepting the motives of the teachers and Carswell. Or he may elect to question one or both. Such a questioning may be by way of clarification or questioning the nature of Carswell's assumptions. The extent to which the student will question the assumptions is dependent upon the way in which the situations have been typically handled in the past. The questions which are raised about the motives return once again to communication:

> One must assume that sort of a co-operative situation in order to reach what is called the "universe of discourse". Such a universe of discourse is the medium for all these different social processes, and in that sense it is more universal than they; but it is not a process that so to speak runs itself. (Mead, 1934: 260)

Mead is suggesting that the social field must attain the state where a "sort of" co-operative attitude is assumed among the co-participants in the situation. Thus, the student must feel sufficiently comfortable with the social environment in the classroom to raise critical questions. Once a question is asked about a motive, for example, why does Carswell sustain a colonial attitude, the search of the horizon for the taken-for-granted motive is begun. I previously used the phrase "hidden" motive but it is clear that such a phrase suggests that there is more than one motive connected with the situation. Such, I believe, would be the case; the motives horizon would clearly contain the fuller understanding that is being sought. Clearly this search is within the communicative context of each situation. What is being sought is the network of motives which would relate to the framework of understanding for the situation. That such a search "does not run itself" is clear from Mead's work.

Mead, as I interpret him, is suggesting that a discussion of motives within the context of the Grade 8 Social Studies program cannot avoid recognizing the past of both the individual and the historical context in which it arose. Further, such a search, as I have emphasized throughout, must be linked to the situation in which it is happening, namely the Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" and the Social Studies class itself. In the process aspects of the social structure around which the investigations are being carried out will come to light. This I feel is why Mead's thrust towards the "universal discourse" in terms of the motive is important. For as they begin to understand and raise questions about their own social structure and, perhaps, understand their collective national interests and in turn the national interests of other people in the world, a discussion of national self-interest and the motives surrounding it may indeed move students in the Grade 8 Social Studies closer to a sense of human understanding. It perhaps lends itself to a discussion which is more meaningful than the following taken from the resource material:

> (Peru) Men from the eastern lowlands often bring Coca to sell. The Indians are all too ready to buy Coca. This is unfortunate because it is not good for them. Coca is a native plant of the eastern slopes of the Andes. It flourishes in the heat of low elevations. The Indians chew the coca leaves with a little lime. They get relief from hunger, cold and weariness because the leaf contains a drug which deadens the nerves. This habit is harmful.
>
> Quito. The capital ...
> (Uttley and Aitchison, 1969: 78)

What history lies behind this statement? What are the motives of the people involved? What are the motives and history of drug selling in Canada? Such social situations provide much for exploration on the part of students and teachers involved in the Grade 8 Social Studies program. Explorations such as this emphasize Mead's underlying philosophy of living in the world.

Mead's Historical View

Throughout the preceding discussion reference has been made to the notion of past and history in Mead's philosophy. The question that may be raised with reference to his work is, what underlies his particular view of history? Of history Mead states the following:

> It is only of interest to note that the rapidity with which these pasts succeed each other has steadily increased with the increase in critical exactitude in the study of the past. There is an entire absence of finality in such presentations. It is of course the implication of our research method that the historian in any field of science will be able to reconstruct what has been, as an authenticated account of the past. Yet we look forward with vivid interest to the reconstruction, in the world that will be, of the world that has been, for we realize that the world that will be cannot differ from the world this is without rewriting the past to which we now look back. (Mead, 1932: 3)

History, and its interpretation from the present, is constantly being re-interpreted in terms of what is viewed as being the present. Understandings are altered by the events which both the individual and the social group live through (Mead, 1932: 24). The passage of the present and our historical interpretations of the past within it, extend not only to the present, but to the future as well. History for Mead is always forward looking, in the sense of anticipations and forecast. The Grade 8 Social Studies student searching for understanding within his present environment must transcend the present, and temporally span what is possible within the situation presented to him.

Mead, in the Philosophy of the Present, discussed how the past could be disentangled from the present. He wrote:

> We may in ideation recall the process, but such a past is not a reintegration of the affairs as it went on, for it is undertaken from the standpoint of the present emergence, and is frankly hypothetical. It is the past that our present calls for, and it is tested by its fitting into that situation. If PER

> IMPOSSIBILE we were to reach that past event as it took place we should have to be in that event, and then compare it with what we now present as its history. (Mead, 1932: 48)

History, Mead is stating, cannot simply be recalled and fitted in with the present context, without first acknowledging how the present influences the past. Thus it is not enough for the resource material simply to assume the history of the developing tropical world without addressing the influence of the present upon it. For instance how has the view of colonialism changed in our present times? How has its interpretation been altered? Unlike Newton's laws and the various methodologies employed by technical scientists for maintaining stability in their findings, Mead is suggesting that the static view of history is untenable. He suggested that Einstein's question: Did I create that particle? involves personal authorship in the structuring of the typical results which may emerge from the new findings (Mead, 1932: 17). Thus Mead views the student as entering into the historical process, and re-interpreting what has gone before.

New ways of understanding are constantly emerging. Some, like Einstein's theory of relativity, require an understanding, a completely new vision of what has gone on before (Mead, 1932: 19). It involves a new frame of reference in order to make sense of present events. It may be argued for example, in the context of the British Columbia Grade 8 Social Studies program, that Carswell's Man in the Tropics presents a frame of reference which has not reflected, nor significantly taken account of, new perspectives such as corporate colonialism or Marxist positions, all of which have had their impact upon how the tropical world is viewed. Mead would, perhaps, urge that human beings be recognized as human within the program. History is not to be viewed as static but rather as dynamic within the range of human experience.

Mead's Social Conception

Mead essentially develops the dialectic between the self and society within his work. Viewed over the range of his writing we notice a critical hermeneutical style, a continual re-addressing of the ground work of this belief. Essentially his work describes the genetic structure of the individual's social relationship with the generalized other, that is, the other who represents the world as a whole. Indeed, as Natanson suggests, the generalized other represents a metaphysical stance, which despite his attempts to limit its implications for his work is nevertheless one of the consequences of his lifelong endeavor to explore genetically the relationship of the society to the self (Natanson, 1956). The "universal" to which his work constantly returned sought to penetrate the basic ground or fundamental structures upon which human beings emerged into the society. Indeed I would argue that the self as it was originally conceptualized in terms of the I/Me was all but abandoned towards the latter part of his writings. The concepts of emergence, sociality, etc., constantly weave the individual into the society as a whole; the individual in a sense dissolves into a world of being with other people.

Man is engaged in a search for his own becoming within the social domain. Mead, as I view him, engaged the study of man's ongoing attempts to understand himself and his world; not merely the national or local world, but his humanness.

Summary

Mead has contributed much to our understanding of how the British Columbia Social Studies 8 program could have approached the "Developing Tropical World":

a) that it is a social investigation of the people of the tropical areas living in the social world.

b) that the students live in a dynamic social world that they, rather than being born into, emerge into.

c) that tropical man and the program are united in their use of symbols to communicate.

d) that students may come to view the tropical world as a part of their own way of being in the world.

e) that taking the role of the Other in terms of the developing tropical world involves an understanding of one's own social structure as well as that of others.

f) that critical self-consciousness involves the exploration of the horizon of meanings embedded in the self and the social world.

g) that the extent to which the developing tropical world is made problematic for students in a socially relevant way is dependent upon the extent to which the student's own social world is made problematic.

h) that true understanding between people in the developing tropical world and the social world of the British Columbia Grade 8 Social Studies student involves the extent to which they are able to enter into the perspective of the other.

i) that resource materials need to reflect the fundamental aspects of what it is to be human in the world, rather than the more parochial attitudes.

j) that a full understanding of the everyday discourse about the developing tropical world and the classroom is important.

Mead, himself, could have perhaps summarized his position on the developing tropical world when he stated:

> The task, however, is enormous enough, for it involves not simply breaking down passive barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular, but those fine attitudes of customs and status in which our selves are imbedded. Any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there ... The World Court and the League of Nations are other such social objects that sketch out common plans of action if there are national selves that can realize themselves in the collaborating attitudes of others. (Mead, 1932: 195)

Mead does not offer solutions regarding the instruction of the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit, "Developing Tropical World", but does provide some basis for critically understanding it.

Footnotes

1. Mind, Society and Self. Ed. Charles Morris, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934.

   The Philosophy of the Act. Ed. Charles Morris, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938.

   Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Ed. Merrit H. Moore, Chicago, 1936.

   The Philosophy of the Present. Ed. Arthur Murphy, Open Court Publish. Co., Chicago, 1932.

2. Relevance, in this context, would refer to the social sense of belonging. The material is meaningful within the social setting in which it is used.

3. Jalan, Jalan: A Journey in Sudanese Java. National Film Board of Canada. I was party to some of the initial editing of the movie. One of the dominant concerns was that it depict something of the everyday life of people.

4. Copenhagen Group, 1927.

5. The emergence of control involves the self and his reference to the group. This has been suggested by Schaffer, when he suggests that the infant right from the start begins to determine his own experience (Schaffer, 1974: 210).

6. My Master of Education study, "Grade 8 British Columbia Social Studies: Stereo-Types held about the Developing Tropical World" (1972) revealed that of the 1729 responses, 69.7% Grade 8 Social Studies students believed this to be true.

7. Mead, in this context, would be in agreement with Marvin Harris, who states, in a discussion of pig raising, the following:

> Pastoralists and settled farmers living in regions undergoing deforestation might be prompted to rear the pig for short-term benefits, but it would be extremely costly and maladaptive to raise pigs on a large scale. The ecclesiastical prohibition recorded in Leviticus had the merit of finality: by making even a harmless little bit of pig raising unclean, it helped put down the harmful temptation to raise a lot of pig. (Harris, M., Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Culture. Vintage Books, New York, 1977, 198-199)

8. Desmonde, W., G.H. Mead and Freud: Americal Social Psychology and Psychoanalysis, p. 46.

9. van den Berg, J.H. The Changing Nature of Man: Introduction to a Historical Psychology. Delta Books, New York, 1971, p. 209ff.

10. Beliefs, in this instance, may be expanded to include political beliefs.

CHAPTER V

Towards an Understanding of the Social Individual: Re-interpreting the British Columbia Social Studies 8 Curriculum Unit "Developing Tropical World"

> A farmer dug a well and was using the water for irrigating his farm. He used an ordinary bucket to draw water from the well, as most primitive people do. A passer-by, seeing this asked the farmer why he did not use a shadoof for the purpose; it is a labour-saving device and can do more work than the primitive method. The farmer said, "I know it is a labour-saving device and it is for this very reason that I do not use the device. What I am afraid of is that the use of such a contrivance makes one machine-minded. Machine-mindedness leads one to the habit of indolence and laziness."
> (Fromm, Suzuki and De Martino, 1960: 7)

Changtze, a Chinese philosopher, raises the dialectical question which has been hidden by the British Columbia Social Studies Committee: Is it possible to understand "primitive" people through a machine-minded or technical view of people? In one single sentence the western and eastern view of life collide. But how is it possible to understand the collision of views in curricular terms? What further meanings may be uncovered in terms of the program?

Developing Tropical World: A Critique

Chapter II of this thesis came to the conclusion that British Columbia Social Studies Unit "Developing Tropical World" was grounded in a philosophy of technical science. This view of people living in the area defined as the developing tropical world imposed a perspective on them which objectified their living experiences and projected them as though they were concrete objects. Such an image of man was, as suggested, only one possible view, that is, a technical-science view.

By itself, I would argue, there is nothing wrong with understanding the people of the developing tropical world in this way. It may be suggested, however, that the basis of such a perspective should be explored within the curriculum if students and teachers are to have some understanding as to why they should select that particular view (Aoki and Harrison, 1978). The Revision Committee was, in other words, naive in leaving the basis of their own beliefs unaddressed. Prior to the time the Committee was proceeding with its work, Becker and Mehlinger were urging a critical understanding of the traditional view of international education:

> Since 1945, "teaching for world understanding" has provided the conceptual base for most social studies instructions about world affairs. The term "world understanding" is sufficiently general that a variety of approaches might fit under shelter. In practice, however, "teaching for world understanding" became primarily a process of teaching empathy or even sympathy for people of other nations and cultures. While this may be a worthy goal in itself, the point is that the educational procedures often used to convey "world understanding" may distort reality and promote dysfunctional education ... yet with a few exceptions, new formulations or new concepts that might make instruction about world affairs more relevant have not been forthcoming. (Becker and Mehlinger, 1968: 10-11)
> (Underlining added)

"Distortions of reality". Such terms are initially difficult to grasp but the authors do attempt to indicate that international curricula such as the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" should be concerned with understanding the realities of the people living in these areas. The concern raised by Becker and Mehlinger is echoed by Remy, Nathan, Becker and Lorney, when they state:

> ... It is important that Social Studies educators become increasingly self-conscious about the images of the world which underlie their teaching - that is their own world view. (Remy, Nathan, Becker and Lorney, 1975: 3)

These two groups of authors would in all likelihood be critical of the British Columbia Social Studies Revision Committee's failure to make explicit this world view, and to make clear the reality which they are presenting with reference to the developing tropical world.

Both the works of Mead and Schutz are very important in this educational context. Each, for example, is concerned with understanding and clarifying our concepts about reality and in turn helping the educator to understand his own world view.

Mead and Schutz: An Educational Context

Mead and Schutz have both researched through their work for the genetic structure of "what is"; that is, a search for reality. In the context of further understanding the "what is" of the developing tropical world, as revealed through the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit under study, their work is significant.

An unstated premise of the unit "Developing Tropical World" is that people are viewed as they are; that is, as they perform their day to day activities and live their lives. That this is what was attempted in the unit is given in the following quotation from Carswell:

> When not trading or selling, the Bedowin men visit the coffeehouses, entertainment places, or small stores to drink strong coffee, eat sweet cakes, or to hear the latest news or exchange information about the weather, the pastures or the other tribes. (Carswell, 1968: 25)

The resource materials consistently give the setting, but the potential of further understanding the politics, economic conditions, family life, and sharing of mundane stories is lost to us as the book rushes on to give an inventory of food eaten (page 25) and an inventory of clothing (page 26). Such a view of the Bedowins is but one. Schutz and Mead through their respective philosophies point towards a much deeper understanding of Bedowin interactions in several ways:

First: Both are everyday life philosophers. Their interests focus upon the understanding at even deeper levels, the ordinary mundane world.[1]

Second: Both, as I interpret them, indicate how enduring and "universal" human experience[2], through the various acts, can be. This is not to say that they are universal philosophies in their intent but rather that both are searching for culturally specific experiences which speak to all men, both within and without the social group. But at the same time those experiences which are not shared may also be identified and understood at more than a superficial level. In a classroom situation, for example, the student might state that the Bedowins' experience is not the same as his own in terms of how they understand their working lives. But in the findings of Mead and Schutz the grounds would become much more since the Bedowin and the student do share a notion of work, albeit perhaps a different concept.

Carswell does identify the various cultural artifacts and situations which they believe provide students with a basis on which to build a type or example which typifies Bedowin experience; for example, typical situations are identified through the following questions:

> Look at Figure 26: a) What sort of container is used to bring the water to the surface? b) Describe the mechanism which brings the water bag to the top of the well. c) The camel has moved 120 feet away from the well. How deep is the well? d) What are the men at the right doing? (Carswell, 1968: 28)

Such descriptions identify the social world which surrounds the Bedowin. Each of the actions, implements, thoughts, speech patterns, etc., are a part of the meaning which individuals (both Bedowin and Carswell) ascribe to the situation. Of this Schutz says the following:

> By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. (Schutz, 1973: 59)

The scene of the Bedowins at the well, in other words, makes sense to them, but what sense does it make to the authors of the text? And, in turn, to the student? A student sees the picture and is, through the questions, asked to make some analytic comments about it. Each of the questions points collectively towards a powerful view of the culture which underlies them: the example cited conveys the culture of the people and, hence what Mead and Schutz would define as their reality, but it is solely reflected through their material goods. Such a view of culture emphasizes the visible customs (gathering at the well) and artifacts (the mechanism for bringing the water to the surface); it was subsumed under the label "inventory" in Chapter 2.[3]

It conveys a largely static view of culture; that the world is timelessly inherited by those of the present from generations of successive others.

Schutz and Mead both point out, however, that such a timelessness of custom does not hold true.[4] And it has, as Schutz illustrates, further consequences which are important for an understanding of the social setting:

> ...but servitude to custom is to a certain extent voluntary - the tavern, the morning paper, the novel, the game of bridge. Yet slavery in all forms, including the modern slavery to machinery, belongs to the perfect order of society in which, in this sense, all men, even their leaders, must be slaves in soul and body. (Schutz, 1971: 231)

There are several important points which emerge through Schutz's comment:

A) that the "custom" of viewing the people of the developing tropical world is voluntary. What has always been done, either personally or socially, need not be necessarily so in the future.

B) that the "custom" of viewing people of the developing tropical world as inferior is indeed a habit within the program. Schutz is, as I interpret him, saying that such habits are socially conditioned. That is, we live within them in our everyday lives without being aware of them; they manifest themselves through the epistemologies of technical science.[5]

Custom is an enduring experience of everyday life; whether it be the student as he follows his everyday routines in the classroom, or the procedures of the Bedowins at the well, each points towards the possibility of grounds for understanding the notion of custom as it is followed in our lives. But richness of understanding is largely guided, as Mead and Schutz would argue, by the epistemologies employed. While the epistemologies of Mead and Schutz may differ significantly, I would suggest that each searches for greater human understanding. Thus while there would be significant variation in how the two philosophers would approach illustrative examples, both would agree that for the student an understanding of his own social situation is important for a full understanding of the social situation of the geographic stranger. Perhaps the following will be illustrative of how Schutz would approach the pedagogical understanding of the Bedowins' concept of custom.

Custom in schools is part of the inner time which was discussed in Chapter III (Schutz, 1971: 154-179). There is the custom of suggesting that enduring long and boring classes, classes that seem like they will stretch for ever, will be, students are told, worthwhile in the long run. So students defer any immediate promise into the future. Classes become marked hour by hour, day by day; the promise of the future is held out by the holidays that constantly loom on the horizon. Such a pacing, or variation of time, differs from person to person, given the activities of the moment and his biography which provides the history of experience against which the moment's activities may be understood (van den Berg, 1970: 119).

Similarly Bedowins mark the passage of time by the moment within their own experience. As with students in school their stream of consciousness captures the tempo of the well and of the cafe (Geertz, 1972). Schutz is emphasizing that each experience of time on a superficial level is different but that the essentials of the experience are the same (Schutz, 1971: 175).[6] Such beginnings in terms of the notion of custom point towards the need for a case which illustrates at length the understanding of time. Here the term "case" begins to take on very special meaning.

Previously, the phenomenology of Schutz has been reflected through the phrase "what is it like"; that is, the iconic sense of going beyond. Here such illustrations or examples appear inappropriate for they do not illustrate the particular instance of time; that is, the sense of place or situation and its integral relationship with the lived experience. I am here questioning the extent to which the notion of "example" as used previously in Chapter 3, and in some interpretations of phenomenology, sufficiently reflects Schutz's approach.

Bachelard (1964), van den Berg (1971), Van Manen (1980), Tuan (1977) all approach phenomenology through the iconic example.[7] Bachelard, for example, illustrates the concept of nests as they relate to space as follows:

> It is striking that even in our homes, where there is light, our consciousness of well-being should call for comparison with animals in their shelters. An example may be found in the following lines by the painter, Vlaminek, who, when he wrote them, was living quietly in the country: "The well-being I feel seated in front of my fire, while bad weather rages out-of-doors, is entirely animal. A rat in its hole, a rabbit in its burrow, cows in the stable, must all feel the same contentment that I feel. (Bachelard, 1964: 91)

Here the examples always point towards the concept of space. But these approaches to phenomenology differ from those of Schutz.

Schutz, I would argue, is interested in "case" as opposed to "example". Such cases within the works of Schutz are clearly illustrated by the essays, The Stranger, The Homecomer and Making Music Together. His use of these cases is illustrative of Gadamer's discussion of models:

> If, then, there has remained in the work of the critic something of the setting up of models, he is not in fact relating his texts to a reconstructed addressee only, but also to himself (though he is unwilling to accept this). Though he allows exemplary writing its force as exemplar, this always involves a process of understanding that no longer accepts these exemplars automatically, but has chosen them and remains as committed to them. That is why this relating of oneself to an exemplar always has the character of following in someone's footsteps. (Gadamer, 1979: 302)

Cases, models or exemplars of what is occurring allow the reader to follow through the event. They reconstruct or typify the actual situation so that the reader understands something of the full lived event.

The Stranger provides an example of living the experience. Schutz begins the essay as follows:

> The present paper intends to study in terms of a general theory of interpretation the typical situation in which a stranger finds himself in his attempt to interpret the cultural pattern of a social group which he approaches and to orient himself within it. (Schutz, 1971: 92)

He invites the reader to follow through a typical experience of a geographic stranger. In approaching the stranger in this way, Schutz reveals the world as totally problematic and demonstrates how it will continue to remain problematic until he begins to make sense of it. Reading the paper we come to understand what the situation is like; the descriptions are pointed towards the totality of the lived experience and not solely towards the example in isolation; e.g., space, which is nevertheless part of the understanding of the situation.

Thus, understanding Bedowin life around the water hole is revealed through the case. Such a view of his phenomenology is consistent with his definition of reality:

> The wide-awake man within the natural attitude is primarily interested in that sector of the world of his everyday life which is within his scope and which is centred in space and time around himself. (Schutz, 1973: 222)

Reality, in other words, is what is there. Beyond what is immediately there a stock of knowledge at hand permits a student to interpret what it is that lies before us. That is, present reality is what is seen as possible within our immediate future.[8] Within the school structured reality of the developing tropical world the expectation is that the students are in essence strangers. But problematic within the situation is that the dialogue is constructed through the teacher who is present to propose, stimulate and enter into a conversation with students about geographic strangers. The text, by itself, does not construct a dialogue. Thus what is there in terms of the Bedowin's lived experience in terms of the curriculum is twofold:

A) the reality presented by the textbook and the extent to which it captures the actual experiences of Bedowin;

B) the extent to which the teacher is able to aid the student in understanding the problematic and thus facilitate the grounds for making Bedowin culture more familiar to the student.

Even within our present context the significance of Schutz's view of reality cannot be escaped. If a case captures something of the actual experience, then we may begin to understand a part of the possible futures for an individual; in this sense Schutz invites us to "walk in the shoes of the individual".

An exemplar of such writing is as follows:

> Manuela keeps dreaming about the village ... It is often very hot in the village, though at night one may freeze. The earth is dry. Time moves slowly as the white clouds move through the brightly blue sky over the brown and arid hills. Time moves slowly in the faces of the people, too, and the faces too are brown and arid. Even the faces of the very young seem to hold old memories. The children do not smile easily. (Berger, 1974: 210)

Berger, in his exemplar, calls the reader into the situation by making him a stranger. To a western individual children's faces do not hold "old memories". Within such a description our typical frame of reference becomes alien.[10]

Familiar/Unfamiliar

Both Mead and Schutz invoke the unfamiliar within their philosophies. Schutz's Stranger could in some senses be found within the writing of Mead. As with Schutz, Mead focuses upon the notion of attention:

> We give our attention to one particular thing. Not only do we open the door to certain stimuli and close it to others, but our attention is an organizing process as well as a selective process ... Our attention enables us to organize the field in which we are going to act. (Mead, 1934: 25)

Attention is a conscious act which selectively focuses our interest; it is what calls our attention towards the need to act in particular ways. The action, which will be taken, will not, in other words, be random. How we act, however, is dependent upon how familiar we are with the possible actions.

> The discovery that things in his new surroundings look quite different from what he expected them to be at home is frequently the first shock to the stranger's confidence in the validity of his habitual "thinking as usual" ... For the members of the approached group their cultural pattern fulfills the function of such a scheme. (Schutz, 1971: 99)

The movements and motions which are typical or habitual no longer apply. We may organize the field but the assurity as to how our act will be interpreted by others is not present. Indeed in such circumstances we are neither sure of ourselves or of others we encounter.

Emphasizing the factual material through a technical-scientific view of the developing tropical world, the Grade 8 Social Studies unit isolates the student from participating in the dialectics of social inquiry.

> Sri Lanka's thirteen million people live mainly on the fertile coastal plain ... Most of the people live in small scattered villages along the coastal plains and on the lower mountain regions. The villages are typical of those of tropical Southeast Asia - the houses have thatched roofs of palm leaves, each village has its wells and tanks, and each cluster of houses is surrounded by plots under cultivation.
>
> Sri Lanka has few cities ...
> (Clee and Hildebrand, 1973: 531)

The typical of social life is reduced to a catalogue of separate largely unrelated facts: the dialectic between the lived experience and social structure is lost. Mead and Schutz both emphasize the seriousness of overlooking our social life.

The Stranger essentially describes unfamiliarity in terms of the student; his own personal world must at one and the same time be made problematic before he may enter into the lived world of the person in the developing tropical world. Schutz is saying that it is necessary to understand ourselves before we understand another. Within the context of the resource material, students will need to be able to break through the illusions of their own resource material. Barrett poses the question as follows:

> What leads us to the philosophies we eventually adopt for ourselves. Or, more simply, what makes us as individuals see things as we do? (Barrett, 1979: 17)

Mead, in a very significant way, contributes to our understanding of the dialectic.

> In the field of social conduct, attention is indeed directed towards the stimulation existing in the overt actions and preparations for action on the part of others, but the responses to these indications of conduct lead to change in this conduct. The very attention given to stimulation may throw one's attention back upon the attitude he will assume towards the challenging attitude in another, since this attitude will change the stimulation. (Mead, 1959: 131)

In one sense he addresses the lived experience of the individual: he must experience a situation in order to be able to know it is unfamiliar. At the same time it is dependent upon the social, not the physical, landscape being unfamiliar: A road is always a road, albeit in different surroundings, but asking for directions along the road and receiving them in a strange dialect is another matter. Mead points out that strangeness is based upon a social construct: it is the continual adjustment to the other that interpenetrates the sense making in the situation.

Schutz continually points towards the importance of the social patterns while in his text seeking to understand the experience of the stranger. He searches through the in-group and their way of thinking:

> As Vassler has shown, the whole history of the linguistic group is mirrored in its way of saying things. All the other elements of group life enter into it - above all its literature. (Schutz, 1971: 101)

But within the exemplar, in order to capture the full experience, the approach of the stranger to the new cultural group must also be considered: that is, the strangeness of the stranger and his impact upon the in-group. He is a challenge to the status quo. Mead suggests that the adjustment of the stranger would indeed involve a consideration of the perspective of this group:

> What I am suggesting is that this process, in which a perspective ceases to be objective, becomes if you like subjective, and in which new common minds and new common perspectives arise ... (Mead, 1959: 1972)[11]

Schutz, while not addressing the issue directly, does so indirectly.

The Homecomer (Schutz, 1971), for instance, deals with the adjustment that must be made within the group to an individual (in this case a soldier) who has been absent for a prolonged period of time.

> ... the perspectives have changed; what was merely in the horizon has shifted towards the centre of attention or disappeared entirely; former chances have turned into realities or proved to be impossibilities - briefly, the former experience has now another meaning. (Schutz, 1971: 115)

There has been a shift in the views of the in-group and the individual over time; even while such shifts may be imperceptible, they are there. Mead speaks to the importance of such shifts when he states:

> It is the "what it was" that changes, and this seemingly empty title of irreduceability attaches to it whatever it may come to be. The importance of its being irrevocable attaches to the "what it was", and the "what it was" is what is not irrevocable. There is a finality that goes

> with the passing of every event. To every account of that event this finality is added, but the whole import of this finality belongs to the same world in experience to which this account belongs. (Mead, 1938: 3)

Both Mead and Schutz are speaking of the open horizon of the future.

Within this open horizon the unfamiliar encounter with a stranger in the developing tropical world could exist for the student in the British Columbia Grade 8 Social Studies program. If the resource material and curriculum guide addressed the lived experience and social structure of the people, students would indeed approach the geographical stranger as strangers themselves. Each lesson could be viewed as a journey into the unfamiliar; each lesson ends with a question about what we have learned about ourselves. This is one of the fundamental understandings towards which Mead and Schutz guide us; that a successful lesson, within the framework of the developing tropical world, recognizes that the students at the end will not be the same as they were at the beginning.

"The road from Paris to Chartres has a different aspect from the road which leads from Chartres to Paris" (Schutz, 1971: 115).

Mead and Schutz offer one further insight which is of use to the problem at hand. It may be expressed as follows: as the student becomes more familiar with the strangeness of the problem, its very strangeness begins to disappear (Schutz, 1971: 105; Mead, 1959: 4). But at the same time the experiences, and therefore the perceptions of the student of his own situation, may be altered; what was most familiar at the outset now has the potential for becoming unfamiliar. Thus we may begin to further address the hermeneutic qualities of the writing of Schutz and Mead.

Perspective and Reciprocity

Approaching the developing tropical world at the level which the Grade 8 Social Studies program suggests, students are to learn something of other cultures. Further, while the Revision Committee and writers of the resource material have largely objectified the study of the area it is nevertheless an assumption that the students will view the area from the perspective of the people. Carswell, for example, in describing the eruption of Mount Popocatepetl in Mexico include the following:

> It is interesting to note the first reaction of Dionisio to the impending destruction. He was not concerned about the danger of the erupting volcano, but in the destruction of his cornfield. "My cornfield! My cornfield!" indicates the great attachment of the peasant to his land. A year after this spectacular beginning ... (Carswell, 1968: 262)

For a brief moment we are invited to take the place of the peasant and understand something of the world from the perspective.

A) Perspectives

The Grade 8 Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World" is an invitation to understand people of another culture not with the purpose of becoming a member, but rather with the purpose of having a basic idea of what it might be like to live in the area and a knowledge of some of their problems. Much of the program is directed towards the physical nature of the area (landforms, climate, etc.) (Clee and Hildebrand, 1972). But, as I have indicated, the objectified position taken within the program precludes the sense of what it would be like to live within the region. Both Mead and Schutz have pointed out the importance of the perspective in terms of establishing and understanding our social relationships. From their writing a penetration of how important it is to understand the perspective of the Other within the curriculum and resource material for the unit "Developing Tropical World" may be derived.

Mead states his position regarding the reciprocity of perspectives as follows:

> This principle is that the individual enters into the perspectives of the others, in so far as he is able to take their attitudes or take their point of view. (Mead, 1959: 165)

Such a position in terms of the social perspective underlies the work of Mead. It is the means through which the individual comes to understand the position of the other. Mead points out one very significant aspect of their reciprocity of perspectives; it is easily understood, but he suggests we are deluded by its very ease. We may easily translate the experience of communities into our own point of view (Mead, 1959: 166). Each moves to incorporate the views of the community into our own since it provides a certain finality to our own position. He states:

> The common perspective is comprehensibility, and comprehensibility is the statement in terms of social conditions. (Mead, 1959: 167)

There are several important insights which we may draw from Mead's work:

a) that the Revision Committee and resource material glossing over of the perspective of the Other, as a taken-for-granted, has encouraged the distancing between themselves, and the object of their concern, the developing tropical world; and

b) that the students become isolated through the resource material and curriculum statement regarding the developing tropical world. Taking the role of the Other and understanding the common perspectives is two-stepped:

i) an understanding of an individual's own culture;

ii) an understanding that, as we have seen, the translation of another culture into our perspective is not a simple task. There must be a realization that we bring more than ourselves to the situation; we also bring the pasts which belong to the social community (Mead, 1934: 244). Further, the more that we take-for-granted about ourselves and the people of the developing tropical world the more the distortion. This last statement is worthy of further consideration.

Dilthey asserts a point similar to Mead's when he states:

> Exactly because a real transposition can (when man understands man), because affinity and universality of thought ... can image forth and form a social-historical world, the inner events and processes in man can be distinguished from those animals. (Dilthey quoted in Palmer, 1969: 104)

Glossing over how the possible relationships with the people of the developing tropical world came to be, leads the various authors of the resource material and curriculum guide to ignore the social-historical background against which their view has been constructed. If such a background is ignored, the a-historical character of the unit emerges. Both Mead and Dilthey, in this sense, are in agreement that the "comprehensibility" of how we came to hold our views or perspectives is significant. Mead, therefore, may be interpreted as saying that the interpretations of the people of the developing tropical world must include an understanding of their history as well as the student's own. There must be, in other words, the sense of social-historical development built into the material. How the Bantus of South Africa came to be oppressed under the rule of the British Colonials and Dutch Boers is, therefore, a significant question within the context of Mead's work.

All questions which are pertinent to revealing the situation are, therefore, important to understanding the meaning of the situation. It is significant to note that the projective techniques such as those which a psychologist may use are not at issue here, but rather what is important is that the Others and the self arise within the social act together (Mead, 1959: 169). Particularly, in dealing with the "Developing Tropical World" resource material it is important that the sense of Other emerges. Again we ride with Tom Sawyer on his river raft; "when man understands man" to once again underline Dilthey's phrase.

Schutz as well has addressed the issue of reciprocity of perspectives:

> It is obvious that both idealizations, that the interchangeability of the standpoints and that the congruency of relevances - together constituting the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives - are typifying constructs of objects of thought which supersede the thought objects of me and my fellow-man's private experience. By the operation of these constructs of commonsense thinking it is assumed the sector of the world taken for granted by "us". (Schutz, 1970: 12)

The structure of this taken-for-granted typification is what, as detailed in Chapter III, occupied Schutz. Here the typifications which underlie our functioning in the world, are "stable", particularly in a "they" relationship. Significantly Schutz states it as follows:

> ... and the typifications underlying a they-relation can be modified. But this happens only to a negligibly small extent, as long as the sphere of interest, which determined the original use of the type, remains unchanged. (Schutz, 1973: 85) (underlining added)

Before commenting further upon this statement, it is necessary to remind ourselves what Schutz means by the term interest.

> Interest is nothing else than selection, but it does not necessarily involve conscious choice between alternatives which presupposes reflection, volition, and preference. (Schutz, 1971: 78)

Like Mead, Schutz is saying that the means by which the individual understands the intersubjective is through the commonly constructed social world into which we are born. This "inherited" or given body of knowledge is largely given to me; very little of it actually involves personal experience[13] (Schutz, 1973: 13).

Since typifications which function within the individual remain stable their fundamental contribution to an individual's particular world view must be recognized. Since, as Mead and Schutz indicate, our sphere of interest is taken-for-granted, it is necessary to question how an understanding of its comprehensibility could attribute to an altered state within the consciousness. The unfamiliarity of a situation and the tension which arises within the individual within such situations has already been discussed.

A change in world view, in other words, a change in the way in which the situation is seen by the individual, requires more than just an unfamiliar situation. Rather the typification which was socially constructed must be altered in terms of the sphere of interest through which it came to be constructed. Thus Mead and Schutz have as a critical component of their own positions the critique of what Schutz has labelled the "tyranny of science" (Schutz, 1973: 49). Within such a critique each has constructed his philosophy as a fundamental alternative to the way in which technical scientists would view the world as unfolding.

Each component offers a very different way of approaching and understanding the social world. Within the work of Mead and Schutz the underlying interest has changed from explanation to understanding the social situation. Ultimately the aim is to be able to better assess the world that surrounds us; not in a taken-for-granted sense but rather as a conscious, reflective choice.

The British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" clearly has not explicated an alternative view of this area of the world as Mead and Schutz would suggest. Even where something of the people has emerged the sphere of interest has not been significantly altered; thus the image of the people of the developing tropical world as colonial and subservient has been consistently presented. I am reminded of a statement by Nietzsche:

> The surest way to corrupt a youth is to instruct
> him to hold in higher esteem those who think
> alike than those who think differently.
> (Nietzsche, 1978: 91)

Both Mead and Schutz address the possibility of instructing the Grade 8 students differently.

It is important to recognize in the foregoing discussion that there is a difference within their work between seeing something differently and understanding it differently. Buber, for example, illustrates the seeing differently as follows:

> I contemplate a tree.
>
> I can accept it as a picture: a rigid pillar in
> a flood of light, or splashes of green traversed
> by the gentleness of the blue silver ground.
>
> ------------------------
>
> I can assign it to a species and observe it as
> an instance, with an eye to its construction
> and its way of life.
> (Buber, 1970: 57)

While Buber extends his illustration in other ways, for my purposes it suggests the simple concept of seeing differently. Students implicitly understand this; many will shrug their shoulders and say, "So what, I knew that". But as I have interpreted Mead's and Schutz's concepts of perspective, they point to the very ground upon which the "simple seeing" is based; it requires seeing the world with a radically different interest in mind.

> Gentle Kadia, his young wife, overwhelmed by the news, suddenly ceased grinding corn, put the mortar away under the barn, and without saying a word shut herself into her hut to weep over her misfortune with stifled sobs. For death had taken her first husband; and she could not believe that now the white people had taken Naman from her, Naman who was the centre of all her new-sprung hopes.
> (Fodeba - African poet, as quoted in Fanon, 1963: 229)

A student, for example, in order to understand this line of poetry by Keita Fodeba, a Guinean poet, must first understand what it is to be white, white in Africa and then white in the eyes of a black. Such a task, as Mead and Schutz illustrate, is not easy. It would require, on the part of the Revision Committee and the resource material a much more open recognition that there are other possibilities for deeply or comprehensively understanding the social world. Thus the need, as Mead and Schutz illustrate, for a deeper understanding of the meaning of reflection as it relates to the interpretation of concept of perspective developed to this point.

B) Reflection

Mead describes reflection as follows:

> Reflection, then, is a type of action in which the individual in conversing with others is conversing also with himself and is able to call out in himself the same sort of response which he calls out in another. (Mead, 1938: 222)

The individual, through reflection, is able to distinguish the knife-edged present from the future and the past. Through reflection an object or thought is removed from its ongoing context and given in representation to the "mind";[14] reflection is thus an interpretation of what the individual imagined the event to be (Mead, 1938: 222). Within an act the stimuli that initiate the act must be in some way or other reconciled with the representation at the completion of the act. Such a reconciliation requires that the individual enter into different possible perspectives.

> Reflection involves the assumption of different attitudes with the consequent different perspectives that answer to these different attitudes, but in reflection these attitudes are present not in full perceptual form. They are present in abstraction. (Mead, 1938: 182)

Thus an act is based upon the reconciliation of the varying perspectives which arise as possibilities within the act. Given the historical nature of the act of reflection the continual adjustments which are made are never in terms of a static view of the social relationships but rather of a dynamic one. This suggests that the interest itself may always be changing slightly; indeed this is consistent with the point I suggested Schutz made earlier.[15]

For Mead the act of reflection signals a constant alteration in the interest of the individual; adjustments may be small or significant. As such reflection indicates the possibilities for the individual; he is, however, dependent upon the challenge he perceives which enables him to think in terms of his own values and ethics. Here, for example, the student may be open to the challenge of studying the inequalities of the developing tropical world. It is within the act of reflection that the grounds for significantly reinterpreting the world view lie.

> A man has to keep his self-respect, and it may be that he has to fly in the face of the whole community in preserving this self-respect ... Both of these are essential to moral conduct: that there should be a social organization and the individual should maintain himself. (Mead, 1934: 389)

It is within the act of reflection that man is able to separate himself from the everyday lived experience and subject it to rigorous thought; in everyday life "the world and the individual stand upon the same basis of reality" (Mead, 1964: 30); it is not until the reality is interpreted that it is subjected to different ways of understanding.

Mead makes a very important contribution to our understanding of the Grade 8 Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World". It is not solely the descriptions of the people of the developing tropical world that will build a new basis of understanding but also the particular questions that are raised in terms of such reading. He is suggesting that it is not enough to raise questions about climate, landforms, crop production, etc., as the course has indeed concentrated upon. Rather questions must be raised in terms of the student's dialectical relationship with the social world. Through such questions the student is enabled to understand that different methodological approaches to the social world will give different results. But more than just this emerges. Such ground for understanding the social world may potentially hold for the individual the understanding of the developing tropical world differently, thus requiring of the individual a sense of commitment to the unit.

Mead, through his work, suggests how the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" may begin to overcome the objectification of the technical science approach to the region: that is by restoring the self-respect of the individual through critical reflection upon the possibilities which reveal the social world.

Schutz was more concerned with uncovering how the individual grasped the social act in reflection. Following Dewey, Schutz defines reflection as "stopping and thinking"; stopping the flow of the stream of consciousness, in other words, and stepping out of it (Schutz, 1973: 169). As suggested in Chapter III the experiences may be grasped monothetically or polythetically. That is to say they may be grasped as a single event or as a series of sub-experiences which build one upon the other. But it is the polythetical aspects of experience which Schutz may be interpreted as saying would be important for a Grade 8 Social Studies student's understanding of the developing tropical world:

> ... if I want to attempt to grasp the meaning of those experiences whose meaning is ESSENTIALLY contained in the polythetic structures of its elements in inner durations, that is, experiences of so-called temporal

> Objects. When it concerns the meaning of a musical theme, of a poem, etc., I must carry out polythetically, after the fact, what has been built up polythetically. (Schutz, 1973: 54)

Reflection defines the experiences of the moment and sets up the limits of interest in terms of the individual. Schutz is suggesting here that the interest and its theme are significant in terms of understanding. To understand the intention of a poem or another situation requires formal knowledge (e.g., nations of the developing tropical world). That is a polythetic reconstruction of meaning. The question of how these reconstructions are viewed within Schutz's work becomes important since it recalls an argument within the field of hermeneutics: who speaks, the text or the reader?[16] I would interpret Schutz as saying that it is the reader who must polythetically reconstruct the meaning. Consider, for a moment, Schutz's reflection upon the role of the phenomenologist as developed by Husserl and Fink. He states:

> As we have said before, my mind may pass during one single day or even hour through the whole gamut of tensions of consciousness, now living in working acts, now passing through a daydream, now plunging into the pictorial world of painting, now indulging in theoretical contemplation. All of these different experiences are experiences within my inner time; they belong to my stream of consciousness; they can be remembered and reproduced, and that is they can be communicated. (Schutz, 1973: 258)

Thus reflection is the means through which social experiences can be made to make sense to the individual. Take, for example, a simple illustration from the Grade 8 unit "Developing Tropical World". If the student is to understand something of the experience of being black in South Africa, Schutz may be interpreted as saying:

dialectical relationship with the social world. Through such questions the student is enabled to understand that different methodological approaches to the social world will give different results. But more than just this emerges. Such ground for understanding the social world may potentially hold for the individual the understanding of the developing tropical world differently, thus requiring of the individual a sense of commitment to the unit.

Mead, through his work, suggests how the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" may begin to overcome the objectification of the technical science approach to the region: that is by restoring the self-respect of the individual through critical reflection upon the possibilities which reveal the social world.

Schutz was more concerned with uncovering how the individual grasped the social act in reflection. Following Dewey, Schutz defines reflection as "stopping and thinking"; stopping the flow of the stream of consciousness, in other words, and stepping out of it (Schutz, 1973: 169). As suggested in Chapter III the experiences may be grasped monothetically or polythetically. That is to say they may be grasped as a single event or as a series of sub-experiences which build one upon the other. But it is the polythetical aspects of experience which Schutz may be interpreted as saying would be important for a Grade 8 Social Studies student's understanding of the developing tropical world:

> ... if I want to attempt to grasp the meaning of those experiences whose meaning is ESSENTIALLY contained in the polythetic structures of its elements in inner durations, that is, experiences of so-called temporal

> Objects. When it concerns the meaning of a musical theme, of a poem, etc., I must carry out polythetically, after the fact, what has been built up polythetically. (Schutz, 1973: 54)

Reflection defines the experiences of the moment and sets up the limits of interest in terms of the individual. Schutz is suggesting here that the interest and its theme are significant in terms of understanding. To understand the intention of a poem or another situation requires formal knowledge (e.g., nations of the developing tropical world). That is a polythetic reconstruction of meaning. The question of how these reconstructions are viewed within Schutz's work becomes important since it recalls an argument within the field of hermeneutics: who speaks, the text or the reader?[16] I would interpret Schutz as saying that it is the reader who must polythetically reconstruct the meaning. Consider, for a moment, Schutz's reflection upon the role of the phenomenologist as developed by Husserl and Fink. He states:

> As we have said before, my mind may pass during one single day or even hour through the whole gamut of tensions of consciousness, now living in working acts, now passing through a daydream, now plunging into the pictorial world of painting, now indulging in theoretical contemplation. All of these different experiences are experiences within my inner time; they belong to my stream of consciousness; they can be remembered and reproduced, and that is they can be communicated.
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Thus reflection is the means through which social experiences can be made to make sense to the individual. Take, for example, a simple illustration from the Grade 8 unit "Developing Tropical World". If the student is to understand something of the experience of being black in South Africa, Schutz may be interpreted as saying:

A) an initial experience, a poem - may be presented to the student;

B) the understanding of the poem in its context may only be understood if the polythetic (after the fact) conditions surrounding the writing of the piece are addressed. This would, as I interpret it, mean both individual and social experiences - the motives and interests of the author.

C) the material should point the way back to the originating idea; even if the program actually takes the student back that far for various pedagogical reasons.

In making this interpretation of Schutz, the use of the term "case" or exemplar again comes to mind. The exemplar provides the social and individual setting for exploring the everyday life world of the author of the poem. Schutz, I believe, makes this point in the following statement:

> The preceding remarks serve to clarify the particular social relationship between composer and beholder. Although separated by hundreds of years, the latter participates with quasi-simultaneity in the former's stream of consciousness by performing with him step by step the ongoing articulation of his musical thought. The beholder, thus, is united with the composer by a time dimension common to both, which is nothing other than a derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a genuine face to face relation such as prevails between speaker and listener.
> (Schutz, 1971: 171-172)

The pedagogical problem which arises from the quasi-simultaneous relation is not so much now a question of how to achieve it, but rather which examples will be powerful enough to bridge the gap between the student's social setting and the black African's. Which examples, in other words, will prove relevant and at the same time arouse both teachers and students to work through the polythetic steps which lead to the creation in the first place.

It is possible to grasp a poem monothetically within a conceptual scheme, as Schutz points out, but in such a grasp the essence of its meaning is lost. He here would warn the Revision Committee against taking such short cuts:

> I can tell in one or two sentences the story of the ancient mariner, and in fact this is done in the author's gloss. But in so far as the political meaning of Coleridge's poem surpasses the conceptual meaning - that is, in so far as it IS poetry - I can only bring it before my mind by reciting or reading it from beginning to end. (Schutz, 1971: 173 - italics in original text)

The sense of "being with" the author in the quasi-simultaneous is, therefore, significant. "Quasi", however, is an important term in the sense that the reader still must be cognizant of interpreting the work from his own point of view, both social and historical: it is impossible to enter into and become one with the original author. Thus Schutz and Mead would agree in that a quasi-simultaneous relationship bears a close relationship to the reconciliation of which Mead writes (Mead, 1938: 182).

Each also suggests that reflection has both a social and historical character to it: that acts are constantly interpreted from the present into the past. Within this relationship the dialectic between the social and individual emerges. Such a relationship is clearly developed by Mead. But of importance in Schutz is that the ground structure of a social interpretation is clearly in evidence. The Other's world clearly holds the power, once reflected upon, to alter the course of the individual. His actions are not those of an isolated individual, but rather those of an individual both influenced by and influencing, the social world. Both would also agree that it is necessary to pursue rigorously the open horizon of particular experiences in order to understand the motives and other situational pressures which are brought to bear. Through their work it is clear that both the curriculum guide and the resource material for the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit must begin to provide substantive materials which will permit the students to think, in depth, about the character, both individual and social, of the developing tropical world, with the intent of critically understanding the area.

Historical View Point

Reflection, as a relevant concept in the works of Mead and Schutz, is related to the historical sense: man has both a personal or biographical history and a social history. It is the latter concept which will be addressed since it is related to the perspectives or approaches to knowledge which may be developed within the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World".

The resource material for the unit often reflects an historical point of view, frequently assuming or taking for granted the historical conditions which may have contributed to the present social situations in particular nations. The following serves as an illustration of this point:

> Rubber is grown on large organized plantations such as those operated by the Firestone Rubber Company in Liberia, whereas the cacao and oil palm trees are raised by Individual West African farmers. There are few permanent European settlers in West Africa. Most are traders or government officials who return home when their terms of duty are completed.

Rubber is made ... (Carswell, 1968: 212)

Why such a historical condition has arisen is not discussed. Further, as the next line indicates, the emphasis is mainly upon rubber and how it is made.

For Schutz the premise of the reciprocity of perspectives carries with it the historical situation. By this he means:

> All this does not refer merely to perspectives originating in the location in space, but also to those determined by the particular socio-cultural situation in its particular historicity. (Schutz, 1971: 147)

As such the individual experiences his biography in a world of contemporaries which is an historical one since it is constituted by the socio-cultural processes which form the environment (Schutz, 1971: 312). The historical problem is mainly one of unfolding the relationship between contemporaries; that is, individuals who are acting within the present rather than in the past. The past, however, unlike the open horizon of the future, is fixed; the events themselves, as Mead suggested, have the same reality (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 87). They are closed and thus become the subject of future interpretations. Again the quasi-simultaneity of the individual with the past becomes important but, in this case, with a stronger sense of the past. Schutz states it thus:

> Through this change in my attitude I put myself in a kind of pseudo-contemporaneity with the historical subject. Historical research is indeed seldom directly interested in the conscious life of the historical subject. But it should not be forgotten that historical sources, documents, etc., always allow a backward reference of such a kind, since they presuppose and pass on experiences of social reality on the part of the signa-positing subject. (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 90)

Schutz here forcefully reminds us that behind every anonymous document, there lies the biography or biographies of other human beings. Therefore, he calls our attention to the fact that there lies behind the Firestone Rubber Company the hand of individuals and their particular beliefs in how the economic work should unfold. Indeed, with his interest in microeconomics, the foregoing statement would closely conform to his philosophy.

Students taking the Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" would, as I interpret Schutz, benefit from such a study. The Firestone executives' biographies, revealed as a typification, would serve to indicate the particular motives and interests which guide the Firestone Rubber Company in its day to day activities during this particular time in history. Studies of men in other companies of the same genre would provide additional material.

Thus the student begins to develop an exemplar or case study of men who influenced and directed a particular period of colonial history. Schutz, in his view of the history, calls our attention to the fact that it is a history of man.

But such an exploration only completes part of the scenario which is being developed. For it is clear that the student and the leaders and workers of the Firestone Company in North America all share something in common; they belong to the same western cultural group. The other side of the coin is to understand something of the social history of the native people who live in the developing tropical world: for example, those who raise rubber trees in Brazil and Malaysia.

Essentially, we are left to discern what we can of their writing. Schutz, I feel, makes this point in the following statement:

> The reason that we characterize the latter as quasi-social is to be found in the fact that this "society" has no "history", if one does not want this expression to mean the intersecting of biographies of A and B. When they die, their common knowledge will die with them.
> (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 290)

Such historical writings should reflect that which is common knowledge to the people, illustrating their typical problems and their typical solutions. Such descriptions, while culturally unfamiliar to the student may open the door to establishing a base for understanding. The selection of the case to present is crucial since it would be precedent-setting in that it sets the standard against which other exemplars may be judged (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 293). In a similar vein to the Firestone exemplar those of the farmer may illustrate his day-to-day economic relations with others: growing his crops, selling it, purchasing household goods, borrowing money, and so on. In their social-historical setting such cases would illustrate the individual and social relations of the typified farmer in the Developing tropical world. His motives and interest may then be compared with the Firestone executives and management.

Schutz is correct, I would assert, in developing the historical in terms of contemporary relations; particularly in the context of understanding the Grade 8 Social Studies program. Students involved in the unit are, for the most part, interested only in viewing the past in terms of the present. At the same time, through his detailed examination of because and in-order-to motive and the notion of quasi-simultaneity in terms of the historical, Schutz might suggest to the Revision Committee how important these ideas are to an understanding of the developing tropical world. Mead's interest in the historical parallels that of Schutz. He states:

> The best approach to this import is found in the world within which our problems arise. Its things are enduring things that are what they are because of the conditioning character of passage. Their past is in what they are. Such a past is not eventual. When we elaborate the history of a tree whose wood is found in the chairs in which we sit, all the way from the diatom to the oak but lately filled, this history revolves around the constant re-interpretation of facts to be found simply in the impact of changing human experiences upon a world that is there.
> (Mead, 1959: 27)

Mead is explicating here the relationship between history and everyday life, and the constant re-interpretation of the past in an effort to make it connect with what is known in the present. As well Mead suggests that it is the search for motives which lie hidden in past events which are important to bring to the present

> ... to which these histories seek a constantly approaching agreement, comes back to motives other than those at work in the most exact scientific research. (Mead, 1959: 28)

The concept of "approaching agreement" within Mead's work leads to the question of how the histories of the people of the developing tropical world may come to be meaningful for the Grade 8 student. As Mead points out, there must be "agreement" with the context of the present. Such an agreement, as I would interpret it, would involve social and individual understanding. The interpretation must make sense within the various historical perspectives of the present which are given social status (Stern, 1956). Mead states:

> Compare for instance the excitement of Eddington's or Jean's histories of stellar bodies with the monotony of a Newtonian mechanical structure or the Kantian or Laplacean hypothesis. But they carry with them not finality. (Mead, 1959: 46)

Socially there must be a constant readjustment of the histories. But such a readjustment is not simply a linear relationship; that is, the history changes. If Schutz's concept of quasi-simultaneity may be re-introduced at this point, Mead's meaning, perhaps, becomes clearer. Not only does the history become re-interpreted but so does the individual or social group making the interpretation.

Placing this in the context of the Grade 8 Social Studies resource material, it may be said that if students come to the historical cases or descriptions (individual or social) and interpret them in light of the present then it is possible to say that a transformation will take place; neither the students nor the histories will emerge the same as when the study was begun. "We do not remain", to quote Gadamer, "as we were" (Gadamer, 1975: 341). In this sense the beginnings of a common set of ideas which bridge the social-cultural gap may begin to emerge. Thus, while the resource material for the British Columbia Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World" stresses physical-cultural differences, Mead, as I interpret him, is suggesting that a common ground or set of ideas should be identified within the resource material; it may depict, for example, the history of both the indigenous populations of the developing tropical world and western world. Such a view is consistent, as well, with the notion of taking the role of the other as it was previously discussed in this chapter.

Schutz's and Mead's position may, therefore, be summarized as advocating an historical basis upon which the unfamiliar may become familiar. If the exemplars do not reveal such common ground within their possibilities, then the course would not be as rigorous as it might otherwise be. Each, as well, provides the grounds for critically assessing the social-historical development of the tropical world in relation to the present day, contemporary world. The understanding of the notion of historical thus leads to the question: how does the historical world relate to the contemporary world within the context of the Grade 8 Social Studies unit under consideration?

Contemporary World: A Basis for Social Action?

> That's the best thing, he thought, I'd better try a different approach. This is what I'll do - I'll just be an outside observer, and nothing more. I'm an onlooker, an outsider, that's all, I'll say. And whatever happens it won't be me who's to blame. That's it. That's how it will be now.
>
> ... It's the best thing. You're not answerable for anything, and you'll see what you should. (Dostoyevsky quoted in Laing, 1969: 132)

The work of neither Mead nor Schutz considers, as I have detailed previously, the possibility of the disinterested observer. An individual is committed to the scene in which he is involved. Mead, for example, states his position this way: "The social nature of the present arises out of its emergence" (Mead, 1959: 47). Schutz, using his notion of daily life, assumes the commitment of the individual to the life world at each moment:

> yet the world of my daily life is by no means my private world but is at the outset an intersubjective one, shared with my fellow-men, experienced and interpreted by Others ... (Schutz, 1973: 312)

At the heart of each of the philosophies lies a view that the individual is an active member of the society, involved in each moment of it.

These two philosophies reflect a view which, as I have previously suggested, differs from that of the Grade 8 Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World". The student, to use Dostoyevsky's terms is "an outside observer". While I have illustrated such instances several times over, the following questions will serve as reminders of this position from within the resource material:

> 17. What are the main occupations of the people of the savanna?
> 18. (a) What is the chief handicap to agriculture in the savanna? (b) What steps have been taken to improve agriculture?
> 19. Draw two types of houses common in the savanna.
> 20. Describe the change in vegetation from north to south in the savanna.
> (Carswell, 1968: 199)

Such observer status detaches the student from the situation and essentially turns him into a non-participant observer of the life world. Schutz describes the observer status thus:

> In other words, the observer does not participate in the complicated mirror-reflexes involved by which in the interaction pattern among contemporaries, the actor's in-order-to motives become understandable to the partner as his own motives and vice versa. Precisely this fact constitutes the so-called "disinterestedness" or detachment of the observer. He is not involved in the actor's hopes and fears whether or not they will understand one another and achieve their end by the interlocking of motives.
> (Schutz, 1973: 26)

The question here remains: how would Mead and Schutz view the student as an active participant in the Grade 8 program "Developing Tropical World"?

Mead's position regarding the active social participant may be considered in light of the following statement:

> If, however, the position to which I have been referring is a correct one, if the individual reaches his self only through communication with others, only through the elaboration of social processes by means of significant communication ... (Mead, 1934: 233)

A self, according to Mead, is constructed through "significant communication". He defines, as I interpret it, significant communication as follows:

> That is the essential part of language. The gesture must be one that calls out the response in the individual, which its utilization will bring out in another's response. (Mead, 1934: 97)

It is significant communication which permits the individual to gain control of the field and thus to formulate his intents for approaching a particular problem. Mead states it hence:

> We get the attitude, the meaning, within the field of our own control, and that control consists in combining all these various possible responses to furnish the new constructed act demanded by the problem.
> (Mead, 1937: 97)

Such control would, in Mead's sense, allow the "I" to emerge within the individual; that is, the individual is able to sense the relevance of particular materials for himself. It speaks directly "to" him rather than "at" him.

Further, as I interpret Mead, he is suggesting that the nature of significant communication must be such that it provides the grounds for allowing the individual to take social action. Specifically by this I feel Mead may be interpreted as meaning:

1) control over the situation where an individual acts in concert

with others but without losing his own self in the process. The individual may at any time break off his conduct with the others and "go it alone".

> The social conflicts among the individual members of a given organized human society, which, for their removal, necessitate conscious or intelligent reconstructions and modifications by those individuals of their own personalities. (Mead, 1934: 309)

> A member of a community is not necessarily like other individuals because he is able to identify himself with them. He may be different. (Mead, 1934: 325)

The term "go it alone" means that the individual is sufficiently cognizant of his own position and the social structures of the situation (be it a group or social institution) to act, if necessary, against them.

2) tension between the individual and the object of interest; if we limit this to a social situation it clearly would involve the dialectic between the individual and the society (Mead, 1959: 279-280).

3) recognition that any social action involves a degree of change; no situation is static (Mead, 1934: 321). In the context of the "Developing Tropical World" unit under discussion Mead would perhaps summarize the case as follows:

> Education is definitely the process of taking over a certain organized set of responses to one's own stimulation; and until one can respond to himself as the community responds to him, he does not genuinely belong to the community. (Mead, 1934: 265)

That is, until the student is actively engaged in sorting out the problems presented by his own education through the developing tropical world, then it could not truly be claimed that he is actively involved in the course.

Schutz approaches the concept of social action from a different perspective. He begins with the individual and moves toward the society. Like Mead, Schutz viewed social action as a fundamental unit of study within the social sciences.

> This means that any phenomenon pertaining to the realm of the social sciences may be described as a system of human actions which is capable of being broken down into ultimate unit acts, whatever level of analysis is employed.
> (Schutz and Parsons, 1978: 11)

Much of the social action of the individual involves his everyday life world; the world in which he follows or acts through the situations he encounters according to the various recipes which he has learned socially (Schutz and Parsons, 1978: 27). These habits of thought are, for example, the ones which a student in a Grade 8 Social Studies class might follow in order to "get through" the course. Here, as I have previously outlined in terms of Schutz's work,[17] we must make clear the interest of the Grade 8 student. He is not, by and large, the social scientist interested in searching out validity claims, but rather he may be conceptualized in terms of the well-informed citizen. He is learning how to view situations problematically and how to judge, given the data, whether his conclusions are probable. Schutz might conceptualize, as I interpret him, the typical Grade 8 student studying the unit "Developing Tropical World" thus:

> To be sure, if a situation emerges which cannot be controlled by pure routine, if the actor "stops and thinks", as Dewey says, he might refer to some empirical science, for instance, by consulting an expert as to whether the means he intends to apply are efficient enough for realizing the intended ends.
> (Schutz and Parsons, 1978: 29)

As such, the basis of the action which follows is one of the possibilities, the end which emerges is the result of following through one of the possible consequences. Thus, the basis for action, in the educational setting of the Grade 8 Social Studies program "Developing Tropical World" is related to the consultative process: resource materials, teacher, other students. In this sense the basis for understanding social action within the context of the unit begins to emerge: social has its origin in the intersubjective world; I act with others.

> My experience of the world justifies and corrects itself by the experience of the others with whom I am interrelated by common knowledge, common works, and common suffering. (Schutz, 1971: 9)

Experiences in the world, eventually, are discriminated one from another. Such discrimination involves not only corporeal objects but also mental constructs such as those students would encounter in the Grade 8 Social Studies program, that is, the ideas which are presented within the context of the program. These provide the substantive concepts around which the pages are constructed. As such Schutz defines action as initially referring to the project.

> Action then is behaviour in accordance with a plan of projected behaviour; and the project is neither more nor less than the action itself conceived and decided upon in the future perfect tense.
> (Schutz, 1971: 11)

Here, too, the previous discussion of in-order-to and because-motives is significant since the latter refers to the possibilities and the because to what has occurred. In a social sense the Grade 8 Social Studies program will orient the student towards the possible paths which he may take. A fuller understanding of the reflective aspects of the action, through the because-motive, would require the student to become actively involved in his own social environment. What the student comes to understand may then be applied to some of the unit material related to the developing tropical world. Thus, as I interpret Schutz he is suggesting that the "aliveness" of the material related to the developing tropical world is important for conveying and helping the student understand the social grounds for action in the everyday life of the people.

This point is very difficult within Schutz and Mead since they are not setting forth the recipes for going into the world and altering its fundamental social and economic structure. Rather, each, in a different way, is providing the basis of why an individual or group may go forth and attempt to alter the social-economic structure. They attempt to answer the question of how the student may become involved in altering the social world. Thus, when Schutz, for example, suggests:

> The meaning of a musical work, however, is essentially of a polythetical structure, (Schutz, 1971: 172)

he is indicating, as I interpret him, the complexity of understanding within any one given social act. It is not the simple understanding of the uninformed man on the street:

> A certain tendency to misinterpret democracy as a political institution in which the opinion of the uninformed man on the street must predominate increases the danger. It is the duty and privilege, therefore, of the well-informed citizen in a democratic society to make his private opinion prevail over the public opinion of the man on the street. (Schutz, 1971: 134)

Both Schutz and Mead might agree that a well-informed citizen must be prepared to speak out. Students studying the British Columbia Social

Studies unit "Developing Tropical World" should be prepared for speaking out, to be actors in their own social world. The materials in the course, following Schutz and Mead, should inform students to the point where they are able to speak out intelligently in terms of the developing tropical world. Resource material may reflect the frames of reference, roles, thinking, social conditions, history, and so on, of the people of the region. The involvement of a student in his own social world in an active way may be taken-for-granted but, of course, it is the degree which is important. Thus Schutz, in referring to the uninformed man and the well-informed citizen is speaking to this degree. Resource material and the curriculum guide for the "Developing Tropical World" could not provide the action but rather only the sense of the social action; take the stance, in other words, that people are involved in their social levels. A program, as I interpret Schutz and Mead as saying, should address these grounds for possible action. The student within the Grade 8 Social Studies program cannot be a passive observer of his world but must always be viewed as an active participant in his world.

Basis for Understanding the Social World

The Revision Committee for the British Columbia Grade 8 Social Studies program took for granted the way in which the people of the developing tropical world may be understood by the students and teacher. Focusing upon the methods of technically oriented scientist, without addressing his fundamental assumptions, created potential to isolate, in many instances, the program from the participants. The position is taken that the people of the developing tropical world, in other words, exist for the convenience of the program; they are there to be studied.

Both Mead and Schutz begin by making the social world problematic: nothing is to be taken for granted. But while each makes it a problem, the starting position for each differs very widely:

1) Mead begins, as suggested earlier, by considering the society and the individual's relationship to it. The individual is born into a social world and is shaped by this world. It is this world which creates his very humanness.

2) Schutz begins with the individual and assumes that he moves into the social world. How the child comes to be a human being is largely taken for granted within the work of Schutz.

> The historical social structure is already "causally" presupposed in the earliest experiences of the child. We do not need to discuss this circumstance further at this point; it is obvious that the social structure (mother, provider, protector, teacher, etc.) also serves a function in the survival of the human child ... It is crucially significant here that the self, on which the conscious unity of subjective experiences and acts is based, becomes educated through intersubjective events and thereby presupposes a historical social structure. (Schutz, 1973: 244-245)

For Schutz the self is given through his contacts with the other as they are defined within the context of "responsibility". Responsibility connects the past, present, and the preplanned acts of the future (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 245). But such responsibility may only be learned and as such suggests that the individual comes from a presocial experience into a social setting, that is, the "We can act together" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 35). In this way language determines the version of the We-relationship which a child will experience. It is through this language that the habits and taken-for-granted assumptions will become available to a child. Thus the culture of the particular social group or sub-group, is passed from one generation to another. For Schutz the question of language is one which addresses the function of communication in terms of the individual and the social structure.

> Then, is it the symbol which creates society and community, or is the symbol a creation of society imposed upon the individual? Or is this interrelationship between society and the system of symbols a process of such kind that symbols, or at least some of them, originate in society, and, once established, influence in turn the structure of society itself? (Schutz, 1973: 292)

Elsewhere I have considered the background to Schutz's position regarding these questions.[18] Here I consider the statement "influence in turn the structure of society itself" since we are considering, in Schutz's terms, the "power" of the exemplars or cases which might be considered for inclusion in the resource material.[19]

Perhaps the first point to consider is that the everyday world in which I live is not of my own construction. Thus, in McHugh's sense, the student must begin by defining the situation (McHugh, 1968). Tension will be created between the social and individual definitions of a particular action. Such tension stimulates within the individual a pause in the action and possibly a search to control those aspects of the act which lie within my reach or manipulatory area (Schutz, 1973: 329; Mead, 1938: 121). (Mead states: "In the distance characters seem to be no longer distant, and the object answers to a collapsed act" (Mead, 1938: 121).) In such a setting the ability to move within the horizon or to foresee new horizons does not come from the situation but rather in the interpretations which flow from it. This means that I must come to terms with what potentially is laid before me. The resource material for the unit should therefore open these potentially new horizons: they should provide some of the basis for judging and understanding the social-cultural experience in terms of the individual experience. The following would serve as examples:

> Mexican Peasant:
>
> As far as there being any protection for the rights of people who live in the country, the peasant keeps on eating beans out of an earthenware pot and hot peppers which he mashes on a stone slab; that's all the peasant eats, and he goes around half naked all his life. He doesn't make any progress; he doesn't go ahead. (Lewis, 1961: 297)
>
> Corporate Executive:
>
> The best hope for developing countries, both to attain political and cultural nationhood and to obtain the employment opportunities and export earnings they need, is through the integrative power of the world economy. And their tool, if only they are willing to use it is, above all, the multinational company - precisely because it represents a global economy and cuts across national boundaries. (Drucker, 1974-75: 129-30)

Each of these statements represents a symbol of "progress"; each, in its own way, defines the term. Schutz would view man as being born into this predefined world:

> In truth, man finds himself from the outset in surroundings already mapped out for him by Others; i.e., "premarked", "preindicated", "presignified", and even "presymbolized". (Schutz, 1973: 348)

The method for finding one's way about within this predefined map is largely set; the peasant accepts his role as peasant. Such would be the case only if the world were statically defined, but symbols like society are potentially fluctuating in their meaning.

James, for example, says in discussion on the fringes of a concept, and so does Husserl in his concept of horizon, that every symbol contains within it the potential to move beyond (James, 1980: 275-276). Thus the symbols themselves carry with them a potential tension for interesting the individuals. In terms of the two example quotations cited above the questions a Grade 8 student may raise are, what does each mean by "progress" and what assumptions might each make? It is important here to realize that there is not simply a relativistic point of view emerging but rather a search for the essence of what "progress" means in its context. They may in the end mean the same thing. Our relationship to the institutional beliefs embodied within the symbol "progress" should therefore be revealed. The Grade 8 Social Studies student would become informed about the depth of the concept. Schutz opens the way for such activities on the part of students when he states:

> We merely want to add that the symbolic appresentations by which the in-group interprets itself have their counterpart in the interpretations of the same symbols by the out-group or out-groups. However, those interpretations will be necessarily different from that of the in-group, because the system of relevances of both groups (and the respective apperceptual, appresentational, and referential schemes taken as systems of reference for interpreting the "order" so created) cannot coincide.
> (Schutz, 1973: 355-356)

But while the interpretations may be different there is tension created through the student's attempt to understand how they would or would not coincide within their particular frame of reference. Thus, while Schutz suggests how symbols came to be and how they are interpreted, in identifying this aspect of the process, at the same time reveals how they may be destroyed. It is within the horizonal aspect of each concept or idea that the power of re-interpretation lies both with the individual and the society. The Mexican Peasant cited above, for example, goes on to say:

> If the government happens to be a decent fellow, the gangs that control him won't let him do anything. Any time there's a good man who wants to do something for the people, the other fellows won't let him. There's nothing dirtier than politics. (Lewis, 1961: 495)

"There's nothing dirtier than politics" is perhaps an ordinary man in the street's comment which students could associate with. But it is what follows that could separate the student and the Mexican:

> It's pretty rotten, and there's been a lot of blood shed too, and who knows what else. How many people die so a man can get into power? Things are muddled up, not above board, I'd say ... He tells them, you go this way, and they go this way; you go that way, and they go that way. (Lewis, 1961: 496)

Motives, frame of reference, and so on, all become important within the situation. But such descriptions of repression and the symbolization of "progress" are aspects of the individual interpretation of the situation and are capable of being addressed within the case as I have interpreted it.

There is, perhaps, a further sense of the symbolization which has been addressed by Mead. As noted previously, Mead initially focused upon the understanding of gestures. "The gesture gains its significance through the fact", states Lorenzer of Mead, "that a commonly-accepted meaning is attached to it" (Connerton, 1976: 149). Interaction between individuals is based upon the symbolic exchange and interpretation between individuals:

> The importance, then, of the vocal stimulus lies in this fact that the individual can hear what he says and in hearing what he says is tending to respond as the other person responds ... It is, of course the relationship of this symbol, this vocal gesture, to such a set of responses in the individual himself as well as in the other that makes of that gesture what I call a significant symbol. (Mead, 1934: 70-71)

Such an interchange occurs against a background or landscape, that is, against a social situation which reflects a social-historical setting. The landscape is continually altering against the social setting. Only those aspects of the landscape within immediate grasp or manipulatory area may be altered:

> Human intelligence ... deliberately selects one from among the several alternative responses which are possible in the given problematic situation ... (Mead, 1934: 98)

Such responses, given a problematic situation, are not automatic; they convey new possibilities for understanding the life which lies behind them.

Mead's discussion about learning a new language suggests that the process cannot be carried out in isolation from the people or cultural context; people will learn, in other words, something of the culture as the language is studied.

> A person learns a new language and, as we say, gets a new soul ... he becomes in that sense a different individual. You cannot convey a language as a pure abstraction, you inevitably in some degree convey also the life that lies behind it. (Mead, 1934: 283)

The question here for the Grade 8 Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World" is not so much about learning a new language, but rather whether learning new ways of understanding the social world is like learning a new language. For example, if social understanding is typically conveyed through the language of technical science then does viewing the social world through Mead's pragmatism or Schutz's phenomenology constitute a similar experience to learning a new language? If so, what does it suggest about the critical function of learning new ways of approaching the developing tropical world? Dallmayr and McCarthy point towards the fundamental nature of learning different ways of thinking when they state:

> The tension between invariance and contingency, individualism and intersubjectivity, are not the only predicaments besetting social inquiry today. Conjoined with these issues, the sketched skirmishes and developments have engendered a quandary which touches the core of cognition and the basic structure of the republic of letters: the quandary regarding the relationship between science and understanding, knowledge and self knowledge. (Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1977: 10)

Of critical theory Connerton says the following:

> Common to all these aspects of this programme was the belief that no partial aspect of social life and no isolated phenomenon may be comprehended unless it is related to the historical whole, to the social structure conceived as a global entity. (Connerton, 1976: 12)

Each of these authors refers to the fundamental way in which language conveys, to paraphrase Mead, a new soul to the individual. A way of thinking, through the language, carries with it the way of thinking about society. Both Mead and Schutz, for example, wrote against the "tyranny of science", that is, the language and praxis of technical science as it was being used in scholarly and everyday works. Language, or the learning of a way of thinking, can be expressive, that is, it may hide or cover over what is there. So while Mead states, "A person learns a new language and, as we say, gets a new soul ...", there must be more to it than that. An individual must be, in the full sense of Schutz's term, a well-informed citizen. It is not enough to substitute one form of tyranny for another, one form of obsession for another. Such a "new soul" should recognize his position vis-a-vis others. There must be, in other words, critical understanding on the part of the individual. In many ways Mead parallels Schutz's view of the well-informed citizen. For example, his discussion of the expert reveals the sense of the well-informed citizen as follows:

> The superiority which the person now has is not a superiority over the other, but is grounded in that which he can do in relation to the functions and capacity of others. (Mead, 1934: 285)

An expert is grounded in that which he can do, as would a well-informed citizen, as opposed to the uninformed man on the street. His position "gives him a definite position in which he can realize himself in the community" (Mead, 1934: 285). Of the ordinary citizen in society, Mead says this:

> But with a full development of such organization we should get a higher spiritual expression in which the individual realizes himself in others through which he does as peculiar to himself. (Mead, 1934: 289)

The importance of the term "realizes" must be stressed. A person cannot develop unless he is fully aware of why he is acting as he is; his own self does not fully emerge unless there is that awareness. If we carry this further within Mead's work, it follows that the expression of the individual exists if he is not allowed to fully emerge, that is, if his self does not develop. Thus the singular research position taken in the "Developing Tropical World" of the Grade 8 Social Studies would, as I interpret it within Mead's work, represent a form of repression.

But Mead also makes the point that it is within the control of the individual as to whether or not a particular environment is permitted to continue:

> The sort of environment that can exist for the organism, then, is one that the organism in some sense determines. (Mead, 1934: 245)

If the conditions of emergence are non-repressive, it is possible for the individual student to influence something of the social environment. But as has been continually stressed by Mead, this is contingent upon the full emergence of the self. While these conditions are not the same as Schutz's, they are similar in their thrust to his theme in the essay, The Well-informed Citizen.

A study of the developing tropical world should, I would conclude, effect some grounds for understanding the social world of the people of the region as revealed through a fairly simple, yet philosophically complex study of approaches to the area. Unless the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit does address some of these concerns, it will contribute to the isolation of students from the social world around them.

Summary

Mead and Schutz have contributed to the reviewing of the social world as it has related to the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World".

Mead and Schutz each would conceive of "development" as being related to the ongoing action of the individual in the social world. It is implied that a relationship exists between the individual and his social world. Such a relationship involves an understanding of his own social situation and that of the people he is intending towards. Also involved is a critical understanding of the situation as it exists as well as the possible futures for it which may be unfolded. In this sense the unfamiliar as well as the familiar social world must be explored.

The concept of "development" entails, therefore, a sensitive portrayal of the social world. Relationships between peoples are made problematic at both a micro and a macro scale. At its basis is an understanding of how social relationships are entered into amongst the people of the world. "Development" is thus a term which implies a deep understanding of and commitment to the social world.

"Development", as it is presented in the unit, glosses over the dynamics of the social world which have been presented by Mead and Schutz:

a) the need to relate the student's own social world to the developing tropical world;

b) the possibility for finding materials which reflect the position of reciprocity;

c) the active understanding of the social world;

d) the understanding of the developing tropical world's history from the standpoint of the present;

e) that a deeper understanding of our own culture comes through an understanding of another;

f) that the national and western beliefs limit or provide significant resistances to our understanding of man in his relations with other human beings. To understand another as a human being strikes deeply into our own understanding and values.

Footnotes

1. Critical Position

Alfred Schutz and George Herbert Mead are each in his own way concerned with understanding human social experience. By this I mean that both sought through their lifelong endeavors to genetically understand the human being as he actively lives in his social world. It is my position that while their interests varied, they in many ways complement one another in their work. This, however, is not to say that Schutz is a pragmatist for he is not, nor is it to say that Mead is a phenomenologist, for he is not; rather it is to suggest that there is the possibility of identifying some common ground between the two.

At the outset it is necessary to note the work of Maurice Natanson, in his book, Social Dynamics of George Herbert Mead. Natanson offers in his work some comments upon some of the phenomenological insights offered by Mead. I would, however, view this chapter not as a summary of his work but rather as one that raises and discusses some questions which I feel arise from his effort. Among these questions are the following:

1. How may Alfred Schutz be used to complement the work of George Herbert Mead? Or how may the work of Mead be complemented by Schutz?
2. How would the divergent qualities of each render the complementary aspects of each impossible to develop? Might it be possible to reconcile philosophically the two positions?

Maryl establishes, in a short paper entitled Ethnomethodology, the critical positions of incompatibility between Mead and Schutz. His critique is reflected in the following two excerpts.

> Thus in Mead's classic formulation, the meaning of A's activities are found in B's responses. For Schutz following Husserl, on the other hand, meaning originates in the stream of experiences of the solitary ego. (Maryl, 1977: 275)
>
> As Marx, Mead, and more recently Goldmann, among many others, have forcibly demonstrated, social relationships are derivable and explainable, from social relationships and not individual consciousness. The only thing that can be derived from the solitary ego is the solitary ego. (Maryl, 1977: 277)

As I interpret Maryl's position he is saying that since Schutz accepts meaning as arising solely within the individual consciousness, he fails to establish meaning and how it arises within the intersubjectivity of everyday life; that is, how it may be socially derived. If meaning arises solely within the solitary ego, we could not hope to understand the social situation and its emergence within the individual consciousness. The question which Maryl has raised was reflected in an early part of Chapter II through an example related to the Grade 8 Social Studies curriculum. The example was as follows: A black South African constantly lives with the threat of death within that society. Since Schutz's phenomenology is largely concerned with descriptions of the taken-for-granted of everyday life, he addresses himself to the question of how it would be possible to describe eidetically such a social instance. In answer to this I would initially respond from Schutz's position, that what is taken-for-granted is the situation of continually living with the threat of death. But beyond this we must also consider the relationship that must be established between the phenomenologist and the individual or individuals whose descriptions of experience become the object of his attention. To take such a position regarding the phenomenological descriptions would preclude the possibility that the object of its research interest are merely fictions of his mind. Upon entering into a social relationship in order to comprehend and describe the experience, the phenomenologist is implicitly recognizing the intersubjective nature of his task. Constructing typical frames of reference is an intersubjective activity.

If we return to the South African situation we will recognize that the South African lives in one situation while we live in another; one situation is relative to another. The meanings which I give to my everyday life are taken-for-granted as being normal to me, while those of the South African black, living in the constant threat of danger, are normal for him. Since the two positions are initially relative we would understand that the phenomenologist would recognize that each would dwell within a different system. Schutz, in other words, in describing the way in which meaning is within consciousness, does not take account of how such meaning has arisen. The knowledge which we have of the life world is understood by us as already socially constituted and meaningful. It is a world which is full of others, some of which have existed in the past and some of which exist in the present. The "things" of the world are not simply physical entities but rather they are the sedimented meanings, purposes and values (norms, histories, etc.) of the world which surrounds us. As I interpret the everyday life world of Schutz, it is a world which is peopled by others who have entered into relationships whose activities have led to the constituting of activities. While we are not able to experience directly these beyond the contemporaries, those with whom we share the world, we are nevertheless able to invoke various schemes to interpret the world of our predecessors, part of whose meaning dwells in the symbols of our daily lives (Schutz, 1967: 210-211). Schutz makes this point in a different way in the following comment:

> But, of course, by "understanding the other person" much more is meant, as a rule. The additional something, which is really the only strict meaning of the term, involves grasping what is really going on in the other person's mind, grasping those things of which the external manifestations (e.g., gestures) are mere indications ... He knows perfectly well from the total context of his own experience that, corresponding to the outer objective and public meaning which he has just deciphered, there is this other, inner subjective meaning. (Schutz, 1967: 113) (Bracket added)

As I interpret Schutz, meaning involves both the public, the social understanding, which is already constituted as well as an inner subjective meaning. The interpretation of the meaning which concerned Schutz was both of these aspects: the social and the inner subjective experience. Thus I would argue that while Schutz does not develop the social self, as does Mead, the essence of it is present in his writing.

Maryl is not, I would argue, within my interpretation of Schutz, entirely correct to claim that Schutz's position ends with the solitary ego. But aside from this his position does not negate the worthwhileness of using their work in a critical analysis of the Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World". The usefulness of such an activity is suggested by George Gurvitch when he states:

> Neither the individual nor society is able to exist without the other ... The individual is immanent in society and society is immanent in the individual. From this reciprocal immanence one finds society anew in the depth of the "Me" and discovers once again the "Me" in the depth of the "We" society. (Gurvitch, 1968: 68)

Mead and Schutz represent, in a sense, the point and counterpoint of the individual-society dialectic. The points of view are remarkably different and yet they parallel each other very closely. For it is not in the "I" of their relation, but rather in the "Me" and "We" of the relation that their work is significant.

2. Mead's philosophy, as Chapter IV indicated, is ultimately metaphysical. His concern was ultimately that which is held in common with all men within their lived experiences. Schutz, on the other hand, focused upon the everyday experience, looking

at the "universal" within the cultural group. But does Schutz necessarily stop there? I would suggest that he ultimately wished to develop a philosophical anthropology of man as a natural extension of his work. Within such an anthropological approach culture would be preserved in terms of its intentionality, that is recognizing as Bidney has done that culture is the product of human work and its adjustment to the natural, physical world (Bidney, 1973: 134).

Schutz's interest in a metaphysical anthropology is revealed in his writings with respect to Max Scheler (Schutz, 1975: 143ff). He writes of Scheler:

> Surely only by starting from the essence of man as brought into view by the philosophical anthropology can the supreme ground of all things, which is God, be revealed by means of a kind of transcendental inference ... (Schutz, 1975: 154)

Schutz, speaking of Scheler's interpretation of three forms of knowledge goes on to say:

> Sometimes in great cultures a particular type of knowledge predominates, such as in India knowledge for the sake of salvation, in China and Greece cultural knowledge, in the Occident (since the beginning of the twelfth century) knowledge for the sake of domination in the positive science. (Schutz, 1975: 154)

Schutz's explorations of the lived social world were, I would argue, to provide a framework for a later philosophical anthropology of man, with a view to understanding social man in his world. His tentative directions *Structures of the Life World* begin to indicate this.

Mead, as I have indicated several times in Chapter IV, was interested in the human relations which bind man. Burke suggests, though, that Mead cast his approach to the metaphysical questions in the following form:

> How does a proper understanding of the method of science enable us to handle problems traditionally called "metaphysical" without appealing to transcending experiences? (Burke, 1962: 86)

Mead's position clearly refers him back to the social dialectic of the individual and the society, or the social construction of reality as Berger and Luckmann (1967) put it. This foundation perhaps points to the possible grounds for further considering the work of Schutz and Mead. Such a study would appear to be a logical extension, at this point in time, of their work.

3. See Chapter II.

4. Both Mead and Schutz agree that the past is always interpreted in terms of the present. The following references illustrate the case in point.

5. Schutz and Mead agree on this point. Mead, following Schutz, suggests that habits are indeed outside the realm of ordinary thought (Mead, 1938: 68). Further, Mead, throughout all of his various works, consistently refers to the epistemology of technical science and its linear ordered view of society. (Mead, 1938: 63)

6. (1) While Mead and Schutz approach the notion of time differently, we may agree that time varies with the perceived pace of experience.
(2) Both would agree, I would argue, with the procedure; that is, beginning with the student's own social setting.

Popkin (1968), in an article Where are the Living suggests that Schutz's use of the stream of consciousness postulates Husserl's solitary ego and thus confines his work within this assumption. (Husserl, 1960) But I would suggest that unlike Husserl, Schutz premised the existence of the social world. As such the stream of consciousness of the individual must be re-considered later within his framework. Schutz states:

> Once we have established the fundamental priority of the subjective stock of knowledge (and finally of knowledge based on "independent" experiences), in contrast to the social stock of knowledge, we must stress that in its actual development things are otherwise. The subjective elements of knowledge which enter into the social one are only to a small degree "independently" acquired - and this only in the restricted sense of the "independence" previously indicated. Whenever we take on such a minimal social stock of knowledge (and that by definition happens in every human society), most of the subjective elements of knowledge that enter into its further development are derived from the prevailing, already given state of this stock of knowledge.
> (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 263)

Schutz clearly bases his work upon the social individual as the foregoing demonstrates. As well the "stream" metaphor might be considered as a landscape metaphor rather than as a "line" or "water" one. A river cannot exist apart from its banks and its total drainage basin. Similarly, as Schutz might suggest, the consciousness cannot exist apart from the social events around which it is constructed. Further their conception of "We" has several commonalities.

We

The notions of past, present and future all speak towards the individual in his social setting but how these are carried over in a social sense must be considered further. Schutz, constantly through his work, speaks of the "we-ness" of the social relationship. Indeed it is impossible to consider meaning apart from this. We need not repeat all of our previous discussion but rather indicate Schutz's position and then comment upon it relative to the situation at hand:

> I experience a fellow man directly if and when he shares with me a common sector of time and space. The sharing of a common sector of time implies genuine simultaneity of our two streams of consciousness: my fellow man and I grow older together. (Schutz, 1971: 25)

Within this we must also note that Schutz would consider the individual to have the freedom to move within the various choices that lie before him as he lives with his fellow-man; such actions which may be directed towards his fellow-man must be viewed in terms of the meaning which he ascribes to these behaviours. It is within this that meaning becomes a time problem for Schutz. (Valone, 1976: 202) The attention "a-la-vie" as Bergson would suggest involves the tensions which arise between the individual and the social conditions which surround him; as such he is able to understand that he is indeed growing older with them. The objective social condition of human suffering, be they a drunk on the street or the more remote Biafran child, focus our attention on the world. We realize that it will take us time to solve these problems; but at the same moment we may project towards them. The essence of this situation is contained in Schutz's understanding that we live with the understanding of our own temporality; we are living in that sense with death; with our finite time, but this, as Schutz suggested, is also understood from others of whom we may have direct or indirect experience. We are aware that the world has been inhabited by both predecessors and successors as well as our contemporaries. (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 47)

Such a limitation Schutz suggests influences our total relevance system. He states:

> The relevance system of the natural attitude is derived from this: the manifold, mutually

> interwoven systems of hope and fear, wants satisfactions, chances and risks that induce men to master their life-world, to overcome obstacles, to project plans and carry them out. (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 47)

But man is here limited to what is before him. Indeed he cannot truly comprehend more than the "what is", in the sense that he is able to interpret his own historical situation vis-a-vis those who have gone before. He points out the following:

> The stream of history includes anonymous events, it knows co-existence and fixed loci in time. On the other hand, the stream of history can be reduced to the genuine experiences of other men, experiences which occur within the immediacy of individual streams of consciousness, experiences which refer to contemporaries, experiences which take place within both We and They relationships. (Schutz, 1967: 214)

Here we see a common element which Mead and Schutz have: both wish to avoid the ontological problems of the human existence. That is, they wish to start with and remain at this everyday level. The question may be raised, how does the novel or the tension of everyday life provide a human connection; what binds us, in other words, together?

For both Schutz and Mead it was enough to live our lives with others and through this to understand what it is to be human, in our everyday life. In this sense the ontological question does not need to be answered; it is enough that we live with our own finite and it is as Schutz and Mead suggest possible to develop a metaphysical position out of this.

If we return to the quotation above I would note Schutz's early use of the term "stream" as it would relate to history. Considering his position on history we would realize that the term "stream" could be substituted for passing as for example in the same sense as a play. Indeed Schutz says:

> As one generation gives place to the next, consociates become predecessors, successors become consociates ... In a sense, history itself can be regarded as one continuous We-relationship from the earliest days of mankind to the present, a relationship of variegated context and everchanging partners. (Schutz, 1967: 214)

It is through this continuously unfolding of the relationship of mankind that the tension creates a We-relationship; in this sense it is a recognition that I belong with others, my predecessors and successors. Such a relationship is similar to the view of history which Mead developed. He states:

> Now over against this evident incidence of finality to a present stands a customary assumption that the past that determines us is there, in its certainty or probability in the same sense that the setting of our own problems is there, I am proceeding upon the assumption that cognition, and thought as a part of the cognitive process is reconstructive because reconstruction is essential to the conduct of an intelligent being in the universe. (Mead, 1932: 4)

As I interpret Mead, he suggested that it is our time, our history which binds us together in everyday life. That it is made accessible, in a potential sense, is the thread that runs through all of our social life. The novel or the emergent nature of the present requires that the individual's consciousness be ever related to the past as it emerges into the present. Both Mead and Schutz follow this hermeneutic view of history; and I feel their view is reflected in a quotation which Palmer quotes of Dilthey; he says: "History is ultimately a series of world views, and we have no firm and fixed standards of judgment for seeing the superiority of one world view over another" (Palmer, 1969: 117). The tension which is created by the continuously emerging present through the past, "the new system emerges from the old", forces the individual to concern himself in his life with other people; not merely of his own social group but of the social group as a whole. Both Mead and Schutz recognize the fundamental We-ness of society but beyond that recognize that there is not one society within this grouping but rather societies.

A common view towards history reflects the relationship, in part, between the individual consciousness and that of society. Of the dialectic, in other words, between the individual, others and the society. Both Mead and Schutz recognized this interpretation. As well both recognized the fundamental sociality, the experience of a self with others, which binds human beings together. It is to this aspect of their work that I wish to return again.

7. Tuan's Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (1977) is an example of iconic writing. By this I mean that a single example is selected and the experiences which surround it are then considered. "Space" provides an example. Tuan, phenomenologically, illuminates the concept using themes:

Experiential Perspective
Space, Place and the Child
Body, Personal Relations, and Spatial Values
Spaciousness and Crowding
etc.

Each of the examples is designed to illuminate the concept of space; each illustrates a different aspect of space.

The Dutch phenomenologist, van den Berg, in his book, Things: Four Metabletic Reflections (1970), uses the same approach. He, for example, devotes one of his reflections to an understanding of the experience of dimension.

8. Mead and Schutz would agree on this point. Schutz suggests:

> As this first zone of potentiality is related with the past, so is the second one based upon anticipations of the future. Within my potential reach is also the world which neither is nor ever has been within my actual reach but which is nevertheless attainable under the idealization of "and so on" (world within attainable reach). The most important instance of this second zone of potentiality is the world within the actual reach of my contemporaneous fellow man. (Schutz, 1973: 225)

Mead states:

> The actual spatiotemporal structure of passing events with those characters which answer to the susceptibilities of the organism are there in nature, but they are temporally as well as spatially away from the organism. The reality awaits upon the success of the act. Present reality is a possibility. (Mead, 1932: 173)

9. Berger (1974) expands upon the case beyond the paragraph cited here.

10. While Mead never specifically develops the case, he nevertheless consistently illustrates the possibilities. His concept of taking the role of the other forcefully illustrates how the "walking in another's shoes" is socially possible. In this sense, I would argue that Schutz and Mead complement one another; that is, Schutz does not address the notion of how it is that the emergent adult becomes able to understand another.

11. Quotation ends ... "is an instance of the organization of perspectives in nature, of the creative advance of nature" (Mead, 1959: 172).

12. This book is completely devoted to this perspective of geography.

13. Both Mead and Schutz agree on this point. Significantly Mead does not detail how such knowledge is taken over from the social world. Mead's description of the game, as detailed in Chapter IV, depicts this process and thus, perhaps enlarges Schutz's work.

14. Mead's work contains the prefix "so-called" (Mead, 1938: 223).

15. This is the central question raised by Hoy, in his work The Critical Circle. (Hoy, D., The Critical Circle: Literature, History and Philosophical Hermeneutics. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978.) See particularly Chapter 1, Validity and the Author's Intention: A Critique of E.D. Hirsch's Hermeneutics.

16. Several histories (typifications) in biographical style have been written; e.g., Braudel, F., The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible. London, Collins, 1981.

17. See Chapter III, pages 137-145. As well, see Schutz's essay on the well-informed citizen.

18. See Chapter III, pages 134-137.

19. The term "power" refers to the exemplars' presentation of this situation. In this sense it is a metaphorical usage which addresses the relationship between man and nature. Schutz's belief that the exemplars contain the power or force to influence the decisions of man suggest that they have a political intent.

CHAPTER VI

Reflections

> I do not want my house to be walled in on all
> sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want
> the culture of all lands to be blown about
> my house as freely as possible. (M. Ghandi)

PART I: Reflections Upon the British Columbia Social Studies 8 Unit "Developing Tropical World"

McLuhan has suggested that we belong to a "global village", to a community of man (McLuhan and Fiore, 1967: 63). But to whose village do we belong and to whose view of man does this "global village" commit us? Western man is linked to the rest of the world by his technology, but does this technology reflect a reciprocity of knowledge or does it promote the dominance of technical-science over man? Does the premise of a global village, in other words, mean people of the developing tropical world should accept a new form of colonialism? Perhaps, as Mead and Schutz point out, the global village is designed to promote a passive view of man and thus limit our horizonal understanding. I would strongly suspect that to the proponents of the British Columbia Social Studies 8 Unit "Developing Tropical World", the program does reflect the "global village" of McLuhan.

The program's view of man as a passive being within his world, however, also suggests that the tropical world is a static entity. Such a program promotes linear thinking; that is, teachers follow the resource material for the course through from region to region, treating each the same, Climate, physical features, information about the people all follow one another in an endless chain. At the same time, the material through its approach isolates students from the cultures it seeks to have them understand. At issue here is whether or not educators constructing curriculums about the developing tropical world are open to challenging their own views of culture, geography, philosophy, history, sociology, and anthropology. Would they be willing, for example, to consider that there are differences between linear and horizonal sense making? Such a difference may be illustrated as ABCDE and B, relating to A or D. Educators I would argue generally come from a pedagogic tradition of linear thinking. To cite but a few examples: lesson plans are often organized into objectives, content, method, and conclusion; the school day is divided into equal units, equal terms, bells ring at the same times; one thing follows another. The routines and the reasons for them are often completely hidden from educators; indeed, we may not even be able to recover the reasons at all.

Arguing that making lists of the objects and activities people use in their day to day lives erects a barrier to understanding is not readily accepted among educators. "Understanding" other cultures is something to which teachers often pay lip service without wishing to probe further. Beyond what is taken-for-granted, Mead and Schutz are stating something different: they are saying that understanding must penetrate the superficial notions which, in our day to day lives, may pass for "understanding". Their probes into our social relations reveal the depth to which educators must be willing to probe themselves and the social world. Pedagogically this presents both a twofold problem:

A) exploring strategies with students for understanding the Cartesian dualism; and

B) locating or writing materials which promote alternative ways of understanding. Developing exemplars, for instance, which reflect a reciprocity of perspectives and posing questions which create the tensions within students to have them probe further with respect to the tropical world would be a case point. But before such work may begin, further research is needed to help educators to illuminate further how students construct their types in relation to the geographic strangers of the developing tropical world.

A second issue which emerges is the possibility for a "new" view of the student; an active rather than a passive one within the Social Studies unit "Developing Tropical World". Mead and Schutz, in my opinion, clearly indicate the limitations of a passive pedagogical view. To suggest that a student explore his own social world as a way of understanding geographic strangers is a radical notion. From my experience as an educator, it is one foreign to most classroom teachers. The issue here is whether or not publicly supported school systems are willing to permit teachers and students the freedom to explore, in an open, honest manner competing philosophical positions. Most departments of education, school boards and school administrators understand that passive individuals in a school system are much easier to deal with than active students. I am reminded, in this context of the "radical" publication for students, The Little Red School House, which opened by stating: "If you want to gain control of your own life and make these years count this book is for you" (Hansen and Jensen, 1971).

Implied in the above statement is the need to question the present within its social-historical setting. This requires, as Mead and Schutz illustrate, a careful reflection upon the everyday experience by the students. Then, where required, various pedagogic strategies may be formulated for taking action on the situation. Allow me to illustrate with the following example.

Most students will eventually hold part-time jobs before they will graduate. Consequently, it may be interesting for them to survey older students who do work about conditions (pay and work) on the job. Often such surveys uncover examples of unfair labour practices; practices which students accept for various reasons: not knowing, for example, who could help them to solve the problem, not wanting to lose the job, etc. Such studies reveal for them not only ways of solving a problem but also something of what it is to be "oppressed". It is not to the same extent that a black plantation owner may feel "oppressed" but it does provide an initial background through which students may begin to understand the situation of geographic strangers. Thus students may begin to move beyond their own private interests.

But as both Mead and Schutz indicate, such a position requires an understanding of the possibility of challenging the passive view of man. It is a challenge which requires political organization. As both argue tacitly from their positions, new research positions involve the politics of debate even in academic circles. We have only to witness awareness of the political situations involved (Schutz, 1978). Arguing for different views of man in order to expand the horizons of the British Columbia Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" is a political issue. Further research is required to identify the differing perspectives of students in terms of an active and passive view of man, and to further uncover possibilities for understanding the basis upon which students would be prepared to take various forms of action.

A third issue which follows from this is whether or not the Ministry of Education in British Columbia should identify, or make explicit, the reasons they have for selecting the particular perspectives of knowledge they have included in the program. I was recently involved in a British Columbia Ministry of Education Curriculum Development Committee. On this committee I argued for the inclusion of such a statement. But, for various reasons which were never made clear, the statement was deleted from the final draft. I might raise various questions about the deletion; these would, however, only indicate the centred concern; i.e., how do senior administrative officials influence the political direction of any one piece of curricular work? Flowing from this would be an understanding of their logic-in-use as it relates to the process of constructing curriculum. Such research is important if what is familiar to us is to be made problematic. We need to understand further the term "institutional bureaucracy" as it relates to the construction of school programs.

A fourth issue which emerges from this study concerns the resource material. The resource material for the Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" was remarkably consistent in the viewpoint or perspective of man presented in the text. Anyon came to the following conclusion with respect to textbooks dealing with the history of the United States:

> Social change is intimately connected with changes in available cultural symbols and meanings. Although it is probably true that ideological shifts in curriculum are ultimately a reflection of shifts in social power, it is also true that the availability of ideological alternatives increases the likelihood of power shifts and changes.
>
> Diverse perspectives can provide genuine alternatives to standardized knowledge. (Anyon, 1979: 385-386)

Anyon's claim needs further investigation, particularly with respect to the Canadian textbook industry. How does their corporate structure influence the various Departments of Education in Canada and vice versa?

A fifth issue emerges: if we are talking of direct social control then we must also understand how students and teachers understand the textbooks and their place in the classroom concerning the developing tropical world. The assumption I have made throughout this work is that the Curriculum Guide for the Social Studies 8 unit "Developing Tropical World" and the resource material for it constitute the course but naturally this is only partially correct.

What I have focused upon are the static aspects of the program. In essence neither has changed; what have changed with time are the students and teachers, and how they interpret the program. Do they view the program in the same way as the Revision Committee intended?

If not, how has the view changed over time? Further research is required in order to understand the program in action.

A sixth issue which emerges concerns the typifications through which teachers and students approach the geographic strangeness of the developing tropical world. There are both pragmatic and phenomenological questions embedded within this concern. How do students come to understand the meaning of the term "stranger" with respect to the people of the developing tropical world? How do these types reflect the people of the developing tropical world? How does their understanding change over time? To what extent does nationalism interfere with our understanding of what it is to be human?

Answers to such questions are not simply found. They reflect complex national social, economic and political issues, as well as an understanding of how each of them is reflected at an international level. We may draw from the work in the Social Studies and cross-cultural education but the work in this area is not extensive.

Perhaps Mead and Schutz both indicate the direction which needs to be pursued further:

1) each indicates how little we understand about human relations;

2) each indicates the importance of the unfamiliar in understanding new social situations; and

3) each indicates the need to develop and investigate a philosophical understanding of man.

But, in light of the unit "Developing Tropical World", they do not indicate the day to day implications for the classroom teachers. It is in this area that our pedagogical efforts should lie.

PART II: Reflections Upon Pedagogy: Mead and Schutz

Mead and Schutz have provided the basis upon which I have come to see the social world differently, and particularly, they have influenced my conception of pedagogy. I shall always remember in my undergraduate years learning recipe after recipe for coping with students in classrooms. The hollowness of such recipes did not become clear until I began to work with students on a daily basis. Then I realized that the procedures I was taught simply did not describe the reality of the classrooms. But at the same time it was the distinct feeling of "emptiness" with respect to my pedagogic understanding that drove me to search further.

Reading the work of Schutz for the first time was like seeing "home" in a different light. As I have read further into his work I have come to appreciate his insight more and more. I have heard critics dismiss him as being "too easy". But Haiku may also appear "easy". If I understood little of Schutz's work, then I can truly say that I understand less of it now. But Schutz has left me with an indelible impression: to consider, at all times, what is there in experience. The familiar settings and events which surround me every day are rich with material for reflection. Pedagogically, each small encounter a teacher has with a student is rich with the possibilities of further understanding the social interactions which occur in the classroom. To ignore such events is perhaps similar to ignoring the wind as it moves through the trees.

Sensitively reflecting upon the small events leads us, horizonally, to the broader contexts in which life is lived. It is almost impossible to push aside experience as being unimportant. But at the same time experience reveals to us the limitations of our consciousness. What an individual eventually comes to understand of an experience is merely a fragment, a thread, of what has occurred in the world. Reflection, our remembering the immediate and distant past, destroys much of the context which is present. Pedagogy is in this way a re-covering of those experiences which have been lost. Since pedagogy involves the experience of many, I would view it as a collective re-membering. The focus of the activities is centered around uncovering that which is familiar and unfamiliar within experience. Further, it is important to realize that the activity is not unidimensional. There are many different levels of experience which may be reflected upon.

One level is experience itself. That is the actual event as it was lived through. Writing on a blackboard, talking with students or discussing a picture would be but examples. Consciousness, as I indicated above, does not permit a perfect recall of what actually happened in the events which I cited above. Upon reflection our motives, interests and intentions emphasize certain aspects of the event. But now it may be recognized that a second level of experience in relation to an event has entered the discussion. Our very reflection upon our remembrances of the original experience allows a new experience to come into existence. This in turn produces new meaning which becomes part of the event. Thus a sense of experience within experience begins to emerge. Here the meta-experiential level is considered. But of what interest is this pedagogically?

First I believe it points to the very complexity of taken-for-granted experience. Secondly, it focuses our attention upon a new possibility for understanding the experiences of students in classrooms. At the meta-level each experience in being re-thought would have its own motives, time and intentions. It is also possible that the social and political implications of experience begin to unfold more clearly for the student than before. Here I remind myself that experiences are not isolated one from another. There is an essential unity of experience within the individual. But at the same time the horizonal aspects of experience must be made clear to the individual within his horizon. How experiences are subtly combined to form this unity needs to be considered further. Pedagogically, the understanding of its emergence would be of value to the teacher since it would help him in helping students make sense of individual lessons and their eventual combination into units.

Upon further consideration of the unity of experience, it may be realized that such a unity may not be completed without invoking the past, both near and distant. The inclusion of the past within the interpretation of the present experience permits the new meanings to emerge. With each new meaning the original experience is pushed further into the past and "lost". But with each new combination new levels of experience are potentially achieved. Here as teachers we become aware of the multi-dimensional aspects of consciousness.

The point I wish to reiterate is that the world which we share with others is very difficult to grasp. Teachers who are involved with students are together within the ongoing praxis of everyday life. Educators, as Mead and Schutz would indicate, should be concerned with helping students to understand their experiences in the social world. Helping them, in other words, to comprehend the everydayness of their lives. In order to do this teachers should be sensitive to the possibilities within social relationships. One aspect of schooling, for example, which constantly involves teachers is that of control. A concept which impinges upon social situations in which control is involved is that of "will".

"Will" is a very old philosophical concept which describes an "invisible" boundary between the self and others. While generally considered a passive term, it marks the limit beyond which the individual will "fight back" in order to ensure that his control of self will not be given over to the others. That, for instance, the teacher will not order him to do that which he does not wish to do. Perhaps the most forceful example I can recollect concerning the will was given by Dr. Helmut Wagner in a lecture I attended several years ago. His example, which I have paraphrased, went something like this:

> For a parent to stamp out the will of a child, if that child did not wish to be controlled, would require that you kill him!

Startling? Yes, but nevertheless Wagner has illuminated something which most educators forget. To have potential control over another human being throws a teacher into a very powerful social relationship. At the same time it is a very subtle relationship since, potentially, its most dynamic aspects are for the most part hidden from the participants.

The achievement of a social relationship in the classroom where the participants mutually respect one another requires the direct involvement of all concerned. Involving students and teachers together requires that the topics to be investigated lend themselves to dialogue. As such, the present study has suggested that the organizer of classroom affairs have a thorough understanding of the material itself. That is, he must be clear about the limitations of material which separates subject and object or, in other words, separates theory and practice. Students often find themselves a mystery. Curriculums which seek to perpetuate the subject-object split limit the possibilities through which the student may explore his own social experiences. Thus ways in which curriculums may contribute to a lessening of the subject-object split need to be considered. (Make within this an assumption: namely that the written word itself and the ways of viewing knowledge are important in helping educators to understand curriculum.)

The organization of knowledge by itself is not enough. Knowledge is passive; something must be done with it. Action, or gearing into the social world requires that teachers and students set forth to engage others. Only through such engagement does the full potential of experience begin to emerge for the student. Social relationships point towards the sociality of experience; experience itself captures the many dimensions of the human condition. Here again the central theme of the present study comes into focus: namely, the dialectical relationship between the individual and society.

Up to this point it has been assumed that all experience is significant, and horizonally this would be so. But pedagogically, the teacher selects experiences which he feels will illuminate situations for the group. This is important for the students as well as the teacher since a poor choice will often mean a lost lesson. Here Mead and Schutz point out a need for further research into why individual classroom lessons are more successful than others. Such an understanding would reveal much about the social dynamics of the classroom. The findings of such investigations may then be incorporated into curriculum guides.

Another aspect of pedagogy which I feel Mead and Schutz illuminate is the importance of questioning. Questioning points the student towards understanding life experience. When I read their work I am reminded of the Zen masters who consistently answer questions which are put to them in terms of the everyday life world. Such a pedagogy is consistent with the theme of Mead and Schutz, that of revealing the familiar world. Carefully, the Zen master unites the questioner's world. In the answer lies the portrayal of the unity of subject and object. The Zen master answers in such a way that question and answer become one. Within the typical pedagogy of the classroom, the question is too often seen as being separate from the answer; i.e., question and answer. But consider for a moment the potential of the term "question-answer". Here the possibilities for exploring the meanings lie within an open horizon.

Cast within the frame of a Zen master such a relationship is always directed towards the understanding of experience. Since experience is intersubjective, the question-answer point directly to the world of self and others. It seems to me that both the phenomenology of Schutz and pragmatism indicate such an understanding of experience. Phenomenology seeks to understand through its case studies the meaning of experience. Pragmatism, as indicated by Mead, seeks to explore the sociality of experience. At the same time, as Barrett indicates, Zen seeks to avoid the metaphysical entanglement of other religions by avoiding the concept of "God" as it would be developed perhaps in the Christian sects. The question of God is left moot. But my purpose here is not to raise theological questions. Rather I wish to indicate a need to explore further the relationship among questioning, Zen, Mead and Schutz.

Beginnings

This study will never end. The reader simply assumes there is an end since the back cover has been reached. Where it has ended is not where it began, with the importance of understanding the teacher and the student in the classroom. But rather I have returned to the point where I must re-new my thinking about the teacher and the student. What has been reached is simply a bench mark in the writer's public thinking. Thus as I begin this study anew I would like to reflect upon the following Zen statement:

> The wild laurel happened to be blooming. The master said: "Do you smell the fragrance of the flowering tree?" The scholar responded: "Yes I do." "Then," declared the master, "I have hidden nothing from you." (Suzuki, 1956: 251)

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APPENDIX

British Columbia Social Studies 8 Program

PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
DIVISION OF CURRICULUM

SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM GUIDE

SOCIAL STUDIES - 1968

Social Studies 8

Issued by Authority of the Minister of Education

Victoria, British Columbia

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Department of Education gratefully acknowledges the professional advice and assistance of the following members of the Secondary Social Studies Revision Committee:

Members

Mr. C. T. Rendle, Chairman
Mr. J. S. Church
Mr. C. W. Dick
Mr. D. F. Forman
Dr. C. F. Goulson
Mr. P. Harper
Mr. B. G. Holt
Miss M. E. Pedley
Mr. D. P. Reimer
Mr. D. S. Steinson
Dr. G. S. Tomkins
Mr. A. J. Welsh

Consultants

Miss H. L. Cryderman
Dr. L. W. Downey
Mr. W. A. Hyndman

PREFACE

If there is any subject in the curriculum which should be of vital interest and importance to pupils it should be Social Studies. For this subject deals with human beings - in the past, in the present, in the immediate community and in various parts of the world. Although this description is not new, the programme outlined in this bulletin is new. Planned by a representative committee and developed over a number of years in consultation with a large number of teachers and other interested persons, this revision is intended to give new life to a vitally important field of study.

The previous programme has been criticized as being content-based rather than concept-based and repetitive rather than sequential. It was concerned with a tremendously broad range of detail and its teaching was limited by the emphasis on subject matter content and by a lack of adequate resources. These and other limitations, real or assumed, made it difficult to give meaning and significance to the studies which this programme embraced.

Content has been selected from each of the major fields of history and geography. The unity and structure of both of these disciplines have been carefully and thoughtfully considered in determining both the objectives recommended and the methods suggested. The view has been taken that understanding in each discipline is most effectively secured through the inductive method, through a study in depth of representative areas and periods in history, rather than through a rapid and hence sketchy, survey of tremendously broad areas and periods. In choosing history and geography as the vehicles for study, the committee have not ignored other social sciences. As stated elsewhere in this bulletin: "Both (history and geography) draw on the insights of other disciplines such as geology, meteorology, anthropology, sociology and political science. These insights should be incorporated by teachers wherever they contribute to geographical and historical understandings."

No less a thoughtful consideration has been given to the interests and maturity of the pupils. It is perhaps a tragedy that a programme which has so much to contribute to their general education has often failed to achieve its objectives by attempting to contribute too much detailed knowledge. Fundamental to the new programme is the principle of selection and the provision of a wide variety of resources and a broad framework of content to facilitate this selection. Hopefully, these features will make possible the development of appropriate and significant courses for all pupils in all secondary schools.

No claim is made that this curriculum guide is the "last word" in the development of a Social Studies Programme. Rather it is a beginning - an interim step in what must be a continuing assessment of approach, scope and resources. Not all of the perceived weaknesses of the previous programme can be remedied by a printed document. This curriculum guide should be of assistance in the development of improvements. With the printing of this document the challenge passes from the developers of this programme to the practitioners - the classroom teachers.

IMPORTANT NOTES

1. Implementation

In keeping with the policy of permissive implementation of new or revised courses, for the School Year 1968-69, schools may choose to introduce the Social Studies 8 course outlined in this bulletin or continue to offer the presently prescribed Social Studies 8 course. If schools choose to introduce the new course, recommended texts and resource books listed in the List of Prescribed Textbooks (1968-69) will be provided. It is expected that all schools will implement the Social Studies 8 course, outlined in this bulletin by September, 1969.

This guide is published in full so that teachers may have the opportunity to become familiar with the total programme and undertake any preparation necessary for implementing subsequent courses in subsequent years. It is expected that necessary textual materials for subsequent courses are to be provided on a similar basis to that established for Social Studies 8. Because of the marked difference in courses in this programme and courses in the presently prescribed programme, and because of the extensive nature of necessary resource materials, including prescribed textbooks, it is not recommended that there should be a general implementation of all courses in one year.

2. Prescribed Textbooks

Information concerning prescribed textbooks is published annually in the List of Prescribed Textbooks issued by the Textbook Branch of the Department of Education.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE SOCIAL STUDIES

NOTE: The following statements guided the Secondary Social Studies Revision Committee in the development of this programme and should be used as a basis for planning the teaching of each course. However, it is possible to state objectives in a number of different ways and in the final analysis it is the individual professional teacher who must interpret printed statements and translate them into action.

1. KNOWLEDGE:

TO CAUSE STUDENTS TO ACQUIRE A BODY OF KNOWLEDGE (COMPRISED MAINLY OF BASIC CONCEPTS OR PRINCIPLES AND GENERALIZATIONS) ABOUT THE FUNCTIONING OF HUMAN SOCIETIES - BOTH PAST AND PRESENT, BOTH AT HOME AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

(The student should comprehend the structure of ideas that is the essence of history, geography and the social sciences; he should gradually accumulate the kinds of information that produce these ideas and heighten his perceptions of them.)

2. METHODS OF ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE:

TO CAUSE STUDENTS TO DEVELOP SOME FACILITY IN USING THE METHODS OF INQUIRY THROUGH WHICH KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOCIAL DOMAIN IS DISCOVERED AND ACQUIRED.

(The student should understand and use at his level the approach of the historian, the geographer or the appropriate social scientist, as determined by the nature of the particular phenomena under investigation.)

3. THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE AND A SPIRIT OF INQUIRY:

TO CAUSE STUDENTS TO DEVELOP THE CAPACITY FOR THE SORTS OF SPECULATIVE AND CREATIVE THOUGHT WHICH ENABLE ONE TO THINK HYPOTHETICALLY, TO HOLD TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS, AND TO RECONSTRUCT THE KNOWLEDGE ALREADY IN ONE'S POSSESSION.

(The student should learn to live with the realization that most knowledge in the social domain is really a body of approximation of the truth; hence, he should cultivate the capacity to rethink knowledge already in his possession and to re-use the old data to test new hypotheses.)

4. VALUE QUESTIONS:

TO PROVIDE A FORUM IN WHICH STUDENTS MAY LEARN TO DEAL WITH VALUE QUESTIONS IN AN INTELLECTUALLY AND ETHICALLY HONEST WAY.

(The student should realize that inquiries in the social domain invariably lead to questions to which he and others bring biases, preconceptions and personal values; he should learn to analyze such value differences as he finds among individuals, among groups and among societies through both comparative and philosophical methods.)

GEOGRAPHY - A STATEMENT

Scholars frequently argue over the definitions of the scope of many academic disciplines, but there is usually general agreement as to the core and purpose of a field of study. One definition is that it "describes the earth's surface with particular references to the differentiation and relationship of areas". Another definition is that it is "the dynamic study of man in the perspective of place".

The fields of knowledge are continually evolving as new facts are discovered, processes revealed, theories advanced and techniques developed. These dynamic changes not only stimulate new approaches to the study of the world scene, but they also lead to the emergence of new concepts within existing subjects. Contemporary geography, no less than other disciplines, has benefitted from a gradual evolution and acceptance of new ideas, methods and techniques, but it has also kept from the past that which time and experience have shown to be a sound approach to the subject. It is important, therefore, to examine present views concerning the nature of geography so that geography teaching can be based on current concepts.

Geography is concerned with the characteristics of places and regions particularly as to:

(a) their location in relation to other places; and

(b) variable phenomena, both natural and cultural (physical and human), which distinguish one place from another; and

(c) interaction between places.

The characteristics of these places are not static, but are in continual evolution, therefore necessitating a flexible curriculum. Geography should consider process, or the sequence of changes by which mankind has occupied the world's lands. Even though the position of a place does not change, the significance of that position must continually be evaluated in terms of certain basic geographic concepts.

Geographical study is carried out in two main ways. Systematic geography is the study of individual features or phenomena which are found in association at particular places, both in terms of their areal patterns and the processes of their development. Some of the systematic geography divisions are: economic geography, physical geography and settlement geography. Systematic geography is concerned both with classification and analysis of phenomena within areal units.

Regional geography is the study of the distinctive areas of the earth. A region may be defined as an area of any size throughout which there is some degree of uniformity in terms of the criteria by which it is defined. The region may be as small as a farm or a city block or as large as a continent: it may be a region defined by political boundaries, high mountains or climatic differences. The regional geographer studies areas, seeking to discover and analyze particular patterns of phenomena such as landforms, settlement or crops. In regional geography facts are selected subjectively in order to show how the character of a region is different from that of other regions, and also how phenomena within the region are related or interconnected. To teach regional geography as a collection of miscellaneous facts about a part of the earth is just as serious an error as to teach history as a list of dates or chemistry as the properties of the elements.

Methods of Geographic Study and Research

Much geographic research is based upon direct observation; viz. the use of topographic maps, aerial photographs and sampling and interviewing procedures in the field. Observation also includes the gathering of information and opinion from others not necessarily concerned with geography. The empirical method underlies most geographical research, but a statistical and mathematical approach is being greatly expanded because of the increasing availability of high speed electronic computers. These techniques, used from the viewpoint of place, location, movement and areal distribution, are directed to the analysis of geographic problems. From detailed analyses of regions or topics the geographer can draw generalizations or conclusions which may apply to some degree to other regions.

Geographers look for areal associations, whether identified visually from map comparisons or derived from complex analysis. They recognize that these associations need not establish a cause and effect relationship. The establishment of causal relationships is difficult and may lead to inaccurate and naive generalizations. The study of areal associations between man and his physical environment has long been, and continues to be, of interest to geographers. Geography has always dealt with the physical earth, but modern geographers believe that the significance of the elements of the physical world is a function of the attitudes, objectives and technical abilities of man himself. Man's interest in and study of the differences which exist from place to place on the earth are related to man's search for knowledge about himself. Put in a simpler way, geographical study of the earth and its places becomes interesting and meaningful if it is helping to answer the question: "Why do people do what they do where they do it?"

GEOGRAPHY - CONCEPTS

The following concepts, for information of teachers, form the framework which unifies the field of geography and gives meaning to the factual content of the discipline.

1. Spatial Distribution

   - the distribution and arrangement in the modern world of such geographic phenomena as people, physical features, natural resources, economic activities, socio-cultural patterns, political systems.
   - causes and explanations of such distribution and arrangement.

2. Areal Coherence

   - areal associations and variations of geographic phenomena in terms of cause and effect relationships.
   - order and reason observed in sets of geographic elements that coexist in an area.

3. The Regional Concept

   - every region an area homogeneous in terms of specific criteria chosen to delimit it from other regions.
   - delimitation always based on an intellectual judgment.
   - theory of regions an important aspect of this concept.

4. Location Theory

   - attributes of place, mode for establishing position, significance of relative location (the situation), all of which impart uniqueness and personality to any given place on the face of the earth.

5. The Cultural Viewpoint

   - society's value system, goals, organization, and level of technology determining which elements of the land are prized and utilized.
   - each culture tends to view its physical habitat differently.

6. The Human Relationship to a Natural Resource

   - the interpretation of the existence, value, and utility of a natural resource in terms of the cultural achievement of a society.

7. The Dynamic Nature of Geographic Analysis

   - the general principle of continual change in human affairs, in the habitat features, and in their interrelations which necessitates the reappraisal of the geographic landscape at any given time.

8. The Importance of Time

   - intellectual insights into the nature of the human occupancy and trends for the future revealed through cumulative knowledge of historic occupance.
   - the time perspective, an essential dimension of the man-land complex.

9. Spatial Interaction

   - the connections and movements within and between regions as zones of dynamic interaction which induce patterns of migration, trade, and transportation, or cultural diffusion.

10. Man-land Relationships

    - the entire man-land complex and the understanding of every aspect of this interrelationship on a worldwide system, a unifying theme in geography.

11. Global Interdependence

    - increasing interdependence on a wider and more complex scale, concomitant with the development of the industrial-urban society.

HISTORY - A STATEMENT

History encompasses the whole of recorded human experience. What men have thought and created, how they have worked, fought and worshipped are all within its scope. Like the scientist the historian has special need for the scholarly virtues of patience, objectivity, exactitude and disciplined imagination; both face the difficult task of selecting the most relevant from a mass of data, of testing their hypotheses against evidence, and of finding a place in their conclusions for the awkward fact that does not seem to fit. No less close is history's kinship with literature, for the two studies share a central concern with men and their relationship to society: both use art to apprehend and communicate their findings. Form is as essential to a good historical work as to a good novel - perhaps more so, for without structure, history becomes a mere catalogue of events. Thus because it is singularly comprehensive and since it shares with all academic subjects the responsibility of instilling in people habits of critical thought, history should be an integral part of the secondary school curriculum.

In addition to the qualities which it shares with other disciplines, history has a number of unique and important qualities which it can contribute to intellectual development.

History provides, as can no other subject in the secondary school, a sense of man's place in the dimension of time. It enables the student to place himself in time, to extend his experience beyond the limits of memory, to understand the development of his own society and the development of his society in its wider historical setting. A sense of history includes a perception of concurrence, of sequence, and of cause and effect. A study of history provides an awareness of historical roots and that awareness can help to overcome the sense of isolation, the "cultural amnesia" which is a peculiar problem for peoples in comparatively young societies.

From history the student can gain an understanding of the changing functions and purposes of institutions. His study enables him to develop empathy for peoples and cultures outside his experience, for the ideas, for the modes of behaviour, for the problems which are ambivalent legacies from the past. It follows that history does not have as its purpose the inculcation of beliefs or opinions of party, nation or religion.

History develops a perspective on the greatly varied and tremendously complex nature of human society. From an examination of diverse historical settings the student can gain insight into the kaleidoscopic forces which govern his own society - the changing relations between personal, social and economic pressures, and the power of ideas and convictions. It provides him with opportunities to weigh questions which have no single, final or complete answer, questions with innumerable variables, questions involving tentative conclusions. In short, history provides insight into social structure and its change and experience in a method of analysis, a method which is transferable to the study of other problems in different settings.

History, finally, provides the student with an opportunity to enjoy the intellectual stimulus of a challenging academic discipline.

There is a close connection between the subject matter of history and geography. Nevertheless, the distinctive methods of analysis of each should be learned before students are expected to understand the relationship. To study history and geography of the same area in the same year is desirable whenever possible. The study of each subject, however, should be designed as a logical sequence. Wherever possible, opportunities should be taken to co-ordinate the studies.

There is also a close connection between history and civics. History should lead to an understanding of our political institutions; it should develop an awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of competing political systems and ideologies. It should develop an awareness of the benefits of international co-operation as well as of the difficulties and obstacles to their achievement. To this extent history is a preparation for responsible citizenship.

The study of history must be sufficiently restricted in breadth to provide the opportunity for study in depth. Students must have this opportunity and they must have adequate time to ponder and to reflect so that they gain the understandings and insights and develop the flavour and feeling of another age. Only when this happens can the study of history provide students with the ability to ask more penetrating and searching questions, to question assumptions previously uncritically accepted. Only when this happens can the study of history mature into a lifelong evocation.

For:

> The drama of history does not lie in its endlessness, but in some compact story, some particular tragedy or triumph. It lies in contrast, not blur. Let us richly establish the truth that in some other place, and time, men and women, and children lived and died, sorrowed and enjoyed themselves, went on great adventures or invented great thoughts after fashions radically different from our own. To make this point shrewdly a single phase of history, if it be richly thought about, is infinitely better than all history thinly masking social problems.[1]

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1. Jones, Howard Mumford: "Uses of the Past in General Education", Harvard Educational Review, volume 26, No. 1 (Winter, 1966), page 15.

HISTORY - CONCEPTS

The following concepts, for information of teachers, form the framework which unifies the field of history and gives meaning to the factual content of the discipline.

1. Belonging

Man needs roots, something to provide him with a sense of belonging. History can provide this sense of group identity. The necessity of teaching the national story is implied.

2. Continuity

But for history each generation would have to start anew. History can give us perspective; we are not beginning but continuing.

3. Social Order

History can give an understanding of the social order and the student's place in it.

4. Values

History can develop an understanding of the values that have been operative in our civilization. It can lead the student to make value judgments on the events and people of history.

5. Internationalism

History can develop an understanding of the values and insights available in other civilizations. It can demonstrate the increasing interdependence of one nation on others in the modern world.

6. Co-operation

History can be used to demonstrate the need for co-operative action in the family, the community, the state and the world.

7. Causation

History can investigate causation and consider in actual situations why man acts as he does. It can also demonstrate that thoughtful purpose does not always lie behind human actions.

8. Change

History can show that change is an inevitable condition of life. It can show that the desire for change is seldom uniform in all social groups, and that varying attitudes towards change can produce conflict.

9. Progress

History can show that change is not necessarily progress. It can show that progress implies goals and involves success in achieving them.

10. Chronology

History involves the relationships of events in time. With so much more to be learned than time to teach it, and with emphasis on streams and postholes, it is important that some sense of chronology be maintained.

11. Definitions

History can provide a definition of and an understanding of the institutions and forces that operate on our lives. Examples are:

government
political theory: democracy, fascism, dictatorship
economic theory: capitalism, socialism, communism
imperialism
industrialism
culture

12. General

History involves the imaginative reconstruction of past experience. History is both an art and a science. History is creative. It should be good literature. It should demonstrate that man is capable of deep and comprehensive awareness.

WORKING PRINCIPLES FOR THE REQUIRED SOCIAL STUDIES COURSES
(GRADES VIII TO XI)

1. It is intended that within the framework of this programme the teacher shall have maximum choice of method, material and content.

2. Each Geography and History programme has been designed so that it may be conveniently taught in one half the total time available for social studies in each grade. This may be accomplished in a number of different ways, depending on personnel available and on administrative arrangements within different schools.

3. The courses are based on a series of skills and concepts which are also the foundation for the elementary school programme. In each succeeding secondary school year the programme should develop these concepts at a more sophisticated level and also develop the skills necessary for a mature geographic and historic understanding. Within each year, different skills and concepts may be stressed as the teacher chooses a particular unit to meet the varying abilities and interests of students. However, the total programme in any one year should assist in the development of all concepts and skills.

4. In each year a minimum and a maximum number of units are suggested. This is to provide for studies in depth, with opportunities to move out from a single area to emphasize similarities and dissimilarities throughout the world.

5. Geography is the dynamic study of man in the perspective of place. History is the dynamic study of man in the perspective of time. Both necessarily draw on the insights of other disciplines such as geology, meteorology, anthropology, sociology, economics, and political science. These insights should be incorporated by the teacher wherever they contribute to geographic and historic understandings.

Special Note Concerning Materials

Prescribed materials have been selected after careful study of a wide range of publications using such criteria as accuracy, scholarship and appropriateness to the course level of maturity of the pupils. Every effort has been made to provide a minimum or nucleus of material. However, it should be stressed that:

(a) this is a minimum list. For some topics, further resources may be desirable particularly where present materials present one point of view; e.g., in a study of the Reformation - Counter Reformation period.

(b) there will be need to ensure that annual school library purchases take into account the necessity for up-to-date references and to ensure their use as part of the courses presented.

EVALUATION

Schools organize a special variety of feedback. They call it evaluation. Most of it goes on informally, half-intuitively; the most visible - but not necessarily the most important - part of it goes on through a complex of quizzing and testing and examining and comes out in a system of grades and marks and credits.

Yet regardless of whether the evaluation is formal or informal - and also regardless of whether it is "good" or "sensitive" or "adequate" - it has one thing in common with every other system of feedback: When it has been blended into the background system of purposes and values and policies, it controls the next steps.

There are 3 levels of evaluation:

1. Pupil Evaluation

   - perhaps the most important, too often unnoticed.
   - pupil "aware-ing" himself and situation around him.
   - sizing up the value of what the school offers him.
   - making decisions - conscious or unconscious, about the next investment of energy.

2. Teacher Evaluation

   - the sector most commonly noticed and worked at.
   - the use of personal sensitivity plus whatever diagnostic aids he can devise to help determine the next choice of subject matter and method.

3. Organizational Evaluation

   - by principals, superintendents, supervisors, municipal and provincial offices, and the public.
   - evaluation is too often unnoticed.
   - judgments are made and profoundly important decisions are based on them.
   - too often judgments based on hunch, impression, rumor, or even prejudice.

The essential fact is that at every level it is evaluative feedback, however valid, that conditions what happens next. It conditions what pupils do, what teachers do, what school officials do, and what the supporting public does.

The test of an evaluation system is simply this:

Does it deliver the feedback that is needed, when it is needed, to the persons or groups who need it?

If any system of evaluation is to meet this test it must satisfy several basic criteria:

1. Evaluation must facilitate self-evaluation

   - The most important outcome of evaluation is what happens within the learner himself.
   - The kind of feedback which a young person receives from a system of evaluation is crucial in his learning and development. It can lead him forward to precisely calibrated learning efforts on an ever-broadening front, as well as to an enriched conception of himself and of his purposes, values and ultimate goals. Or, it can strain and distort him, narrow his vision and purpose, and bring him little but a sense of defeat.

2. Evaluation must encompass every objective valued by the school

   - Whenever an institution commits itself to any purpose, it takes on the obligation to keep finding out how well it is achieving that purpose. Otherwise it cannot improve its efforts.
   - Unless the school keeps trying to find out how well it is succeeding with that purpose, the purpose itself is likely to atrophy.

3. Evaluation must facilitate learning and teaching

   - Instructional diagnosis lies at the heart of good teaching.
   - As each bit of evaluative data comes in, the teacher should be a little surer how to proceed next.
   - There is an all-too-common confusion of evaluation as a terminal activity.
   - The pupil also needs diagnosis so that he knows where he stands and how to move ahead; i.e., the pupil needs to see diagnosis as an aid - not a trap to catch him in failure.

4. Evaluation must produce records appropriate to the purposes for which records are essential

   - Records are essential for the teacher's own use. These vary with subject matter, situation and with the teacher's own style.
   - Records are essential for general school purposes; e.g., when a pupil transfers to another school.

- Records are useful to employers whose needs for information may be different and whose ability to interpret the typical record may be questionable.
- Records to pupils such as counsellors use may be very different from a mere list of grades.
- Records are of obvious value to parents.
- In summary, records are essential and in every case the essential thing is that records be able to say what really counts and say it in a way that genuinely communicates.

5. Evaluation must provide continuing feedback into the larger questions of curriculum development and education policy.

   - Evaluation must concern itself with all the important objectives of the school.
   - It is important for evaluation to "get outside of" established objectives and raise still larger questions.

Specifically, as far as the social studies teacher is concerned, evaluation must proceed in terms of the objectives which are clearly stated at the beginning of this programme. If a social studies teacher says he is aiming for concept development and a spirit of inquiry, but organizes his evaluative techniques in terms of memorization of facts, his students will soon be conditioned to this expectation and their learning directed towards this goal.

Throughout the programme, then, the teacher must keep all the objectives clearly in mind, and, in addition, should try to get outside the objectives to determine whether or not the objectives are themselves valid.

Space does not permit a complete documentation of the evaluative techniques and instruments which a geography or history teacher might employ. You are referred to several important works where these are discussed in detail:

1. Harry Berg, (ed.) Evaluation in Social Studies, Thirty-fifth Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, 1965.

2. Bloom, Taxonomy of Education Objectives - The Cognitive Domain, David McKay Co., New York, 1964.

3. Krathwohl and Bloom, Taxonomy of Education Objectives - The Affective Domain, David McKay Co., New York.

4. Evaluation of Pupil Progress, a report of an invitational seminar sponsored by the B.C. Teachers' Federation, February 1966.

5. Fred Wilhelms (ed.), Evaluation as Feedback and Guide, 1967 Yearbook of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, National Education Association, 1201 - 16th St. N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.
(The committee wishes to acknowledge that it has drawn material from the first chapter of this book in preparing this statement on evaluation.)

GRADE VIII - THE DEVELOPING TROPICAL WORLD

The purpose of this first high school course is to continue the development of skills and concepts which were introduced in the elementary school. The approach will be increasingly more sophisticated.

The programme is designed so that students can examine in some detail those areas of the world that lie in or near the tropics and that have economies essentially rural, agricultural, or subsistence in character.

Agriculture rather than industry dominates the economy of these regions and therefore becomes the main theme of the course. The types of social organization to be considered in this course should include those which are based upon:

a. Hunting and gathering
b. Shifting cultivation
c. Pastoral nomadism
d. Rudimentary sedentary agriculture
e. Subsistence crop and livestock farming
f. Intensive subsistence (rice dominant)
g. Intensive subsistence (rice not dominant)
h. Commercial agriculture

This does not preclude the possibility of considering some urban, industrial, or other cultural phenomena within the regions selected.

FIELDS OF INQUIRY

1. Asia (select one of the following)

    a. Peninsular Southeast Asia and South China
    b. South Asia
    c. Southwest Asia (and Mediterranean North Africa)
    d. Insular and Oceanic Asia

2. Africa (select one of the following)

    a. Mediterranean North Africa (and Southwest Asia)
    b. Saharan Africa
    c. Sub-Saharan (Equatorial) Africa

3. Latin America (select one of the following)

    a. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
    b. The inter-tropical areas of South America

4. One or two additional units from the above list may be selected at the option of the teacher.

Within each area selected, relatively small sample regions or topics should be studied in depth in order to develop valid concepts and generalizations relevant to the area as a whole. In order for the course to be a rewarding experience for student and teacher alike, the units or regions must be chosen for a specific purpose, and a definite theme should be established for each region selected.